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Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in Pork Barrels:
Endangered Species and Land Use in America
GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS*
IRMA S. RUSSELL**
The Court today holds that § 7 of the Endangered Species Act requires
afederal court, for the purpose ofprotecting an endangered species or
its habitat, to enjoin permanently the operation of anyfederal project,
whether completed or substantially completed This decision casts a
long shadow over the operation of even the most important projects
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Legal protection for wildlife and plant species under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973 (ESA)t could develop into a significant control on land use
and related activities in the United States during the 1980's. The Act already
has had a profound, if scattered, effect. As of this writing, a massive oil refin-
ery long proposed for the coast of Maine remains on the drawing board be-
cause of its claimed consequences for protected eagles and whales.2 In
Tennessee the proposal for the Columbia Dam on the Duck River ran aground
on shoals of endangered mussels and snails.3 Other dams and diversion
projects in Oklahoma and Colorado have encountered similar barriers. 4 In
Wyoming, the sponsors of a water power facility had to spend millions of dol-
lars over their budget after litigation forced expensive alterations to accommo-
date the stopover requirements of migrating whooping cranes.5 A sale of oil
and gas leases north of Alaska was temporarily enjoined for fear of harm to
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law students at the University of Kansas, and the financial assistance of the University of Kansas
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** Member, Missouri and Kansas Bars; B.A., 1969, M.A. 1972, B.S., 1973, and J.D., 1980, The Uni-
versity of Kansas.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2. See Pittston Co. v. Endangered Species Comm., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1257, 1259 (D.D.C.
1980) (Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) withheld discharge permit for refinery planned in 1972
because of jeopardy to continued existence of bald eagle and humpback whale); see also infra notes
733-46 and accompanying text (discussing Pittston).
3. See Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 831-32 (6th Cir. 1981) (construction of dam
stopped in 1977); see also infra notes 186-201 and accompanying text (discussing Pac#fc LegalFounda-
tion v. Andrus).
4. Endangered Species Oversight Hearings (HR. 10,883) Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wild-
lfe Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 109-10 (1978) (statement of Rep. Watkins) (one reason for "scrubbing" Lukfata Dam in
Oklahoma was dam's effect on leopard darter) [hereinafter 1978 ESA Hearings]; see infra notes 206-30
and accompanying text (discussing suit brought by water districts in Colorado seeking declaration that
listings of several endangered species were invalid).
5. See Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156, 1181 (D. Neb.
1978) (successful challenge to Rural Electrification Administration (REA) loan guarantee and Corps of
Engineer dredge and fill permit for construction of Grayrocks Dam because of jeopardy of whooping
crane); infra notes 297-309 and accompanying text (discussing Nebraska v. Rural Electroffcation
Admin.).
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the bowhead whale and other wildlife,6 and several other lease sales have been
challenged on similar grounds.7 The 1.2 billion dollar Dickey-Lincoln water
project proposal for Maine was held in abeyance for years because it would
have inundated the only known habitat of the Furbish lousewort, an endan-
gered variety of snapdragon.8 The suspected presence of the elusive Houston
toad has complicated development in that city.9 Developers have held the
equally unlovely Colorado river squawfish responsible for retarding progress
on water development in Colorado,10 and the woundfin minnow for holding
up a salinity project and a synfuels complex in Utah.I These and other similar
instances of the Act's impact involve a physical project or facility to be con-
structed or licensed by an agency of the federal government. In that respect,
each case is similar to the Tellico Dam, the TVA project halted just short of
completion by the Snail Darter litigation. 12 The area of future conflicts be-
tween new facilities-particularly energy-related projects-and depleted wild-
life species promises to be a lively legal battlefield.
Federal facilities are only a part of the story: numerous other public and
private undertakings also run the risk of severe curtailment if they adversely
affect endangered or threatened species. Several decisions already have estab-
lished some principles and trends. In Minnesota a court protected wolves sus-
pected of killing cows from an irate farmer and overzealous government
hunters.13 Hunting and trapping of nonendangered species have been out-
lawed or limited to protect indirectly species that are or may be in danger. 14
Use of water rights has been affected, 15 and forest 16 and marine 17 management
6. See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 364 (D.D.C.) (lease sale may not proceed
until biological opinion completed), injunction vacated, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also infra
notes 351-58 and accompanying text (discussing North Slope Borough v. Andrus).
7. See Conservation Law Found. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 714 (1st Cir. 1979) (Georges Bank sale
challenged on ESA grounds); California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1386-89 (C.D. Cal.) (Santa Maria
Basin sale challenged on ESA grounds), af'd, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
8. See Irwin, Miss Furbish r Lousewort Must Live, reprinted in 1978 ES,4 Hearings, supra note 4, at
386-89 (discussing impact of proposed Dickey-Lincoln water project on Furbish lousewort).
9. See 43 Fed. Reg. 4,022 (1978) (comments on critical habitat designation for Houston toad).
10. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Andrus, Cir. No. 78-A-1 191 (D. Colo. Aug. 3,
1981) (interlocutory decision), discussed Mra at notes 206-30; see also Colorado River Water Conser-
vation Dist. v. Andrus, 476 F. Supp. 966, 968 (D. Colo. 1979) (developers of water project claimed
designation of Colorado River squawfish and humpback chub as threatened species caused construc-
tion delay).
11. 1978 ESA, Hearings, supra note 4, at 404-08 (statement of Ival Goslin, Exec. Dir. of the Upper
Colorado River Comm.) (anticipating disruption of salinity control project if critical habitat for
woundfin minnow designated).
12. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1978) (survival of "three-inch fish" requires permanent
halting of virtually complete dam costing over $100 million).
13. Fund for Animals v. Andrus, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189, 2200 (D. Minn. 1978) (Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) regulations under ESA, authorizing taking of "depredating wolf," impose bur-
den on agency to insure that each wolf it takes is actually depredating).
14. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.D.C. 1977) (FWS regulations permit-
ting twilight hunting of migratory birds deemed arbitrary and unlawful because administrative record
inadequate to show regulations would not result in some killing of protected species). But cf Connor v.
Andrus, 453 F. Supp. 1037, 1041-42 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (FWS regulations prohibiting all duck hunting in
designated portions of New Mexico and Texas to protect endangered Mexican duck held arbitrary and
invalid because administrative record failed to demonstrate that hunting threatens Mexican duck).
15. In Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), the United States Supreme Court enjoined
landowners adjacent to a national monument from pumping groundwater that would destroy the
breeding habitat of the endangered Devil's Hole pupfish.Id at 147. The decision was not based on the
ESA, but rather on the ground that the pupfish is an integral part of the monument and the water
necessary for breeding was impliedly reserved. Id
1434
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practices have been challenged, because of their effects on endangered species.
In Hawaii a federal court enjoined continuance of a popular state hunting pro-
gram as a violation of the Endangered Species Act.18
These decisions may be the first wave in a flood of land use disputes trig-
gered by constraints imposed by the Endangered Species Act of 1973. This
unique federal law is one of the few nearly absolute standards governing man-
agement of the American natural legacy. Section 7 of the Act commands fed-
eral agencies to conserve listed species, to consult with the Fish and Wildlife
Service, and to ensure that their actions do not jeopardize a species or harm its
critical habitat. 19 As interpreted in TVA v. Hil,20 the 1978 Snail Darter case,
section 7 creates a private right of action to enjoin federal projects that jeop-
ardize the continued existence of a species, however economically insignifi-
cant. 21 The snail darter problem was simple compared to the many hard
questions of ESA interpretation that have not yet surfaced.
One focus of future dispute will be section 9 of the Act,22 which, among
other things, forbids absolutely the "taking" of a listed species by any person
in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.23 Although section
9 has not achieved the notoriety of section 7, its "taking" provisions have been
interpreted to bar harmful land uses not within the ambit of section 7.24
Some critics of Congress have opined that the amendments to the ESA in
1976,25 1978,26 and 197927 have lessened potential land use friction by emascu-
lating the Act's basic protective scheme. 28 That concern became more acute
16. In Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 433 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd,
573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978), the district court enjoined timber harvesting in
a national forest until the Forest Service could prepare and obtain court approval of an environmental
impact statement Id at 1253-54. The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that because the endangered red-
cockaded woodpecker lived in such mature pine stands, the timber sale violated the ESA. Id at 1244.
The injunction was lifted on appeal. 573 F.2d at 208, 212 (environmental impact statement not re-
quired). See also Lachenmeier, The Endangered Species Act of1973: Preservation or Pandemonium?, 5
ENVTh. L. 29 (1974) (ESA affects federal land use policy).
17. Cayman Turtle Farm, Ltd. v. Andrus, 478 F. Supp. 125, 127 (D.D.C. 1979) (upholding FWS and
National Marine Fisheries Service regulations prohibiting all importation of sea turtles listed as
threatened and endangered with no exception for commercial mariculture operations). See infra text
accompanying notes 178-85 (discussing Cayman Turtle Farm, Ltd v. Andrus).
18. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 999 (D. Hawaii 1979)
(state maintained herds of feral sheep and goats for benefit of hunters, and feral animals ate plants on
which endangered palla relied for subsistence), afid, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981); see infra notes 359-
84 and accompanying text (discussing Palla).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
20. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
21. Id at 172-73. The Court stated that although the snail darter had no commercial value, it had, in
the eyes of Congress, "incalculable" worth. Id at 187-88.
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
23. Id § 1538(a)(l)(B) (1976). "Taking" is a term of art that ordinarily means killing or capturing;
the ESA, however, significantly expands the definition. Id § 1532(19) (Supp. IV 1980). See infra notes
324-43 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of "taking" in ESA).
24. See infra notes 359-86 and accompanying text (discussing broad interpretation of § 9 of ESA).
25. Act of July 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-359, 90 Stat. 911.
26. Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632,92 Stat. 3751. Seeinfra notes 387-548 and accompany-
ing text (discussing 1978 Amendments to ESA).
27. Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225.
28. One author commented that the 1978 ESA amendments "clearly reflect a congressional retreat
from the 1973 unequivocal commitment to the continued viability of endangered and threatened spe-
cies against any interference from federal public works projects." Stromberg, The Endangered Species
Act ,4mendments of 1978: .4 Step Backwards?, 7 B.C. ENwvL As. L. Rv. 33, 35 (1978). Another
wrote that Congress went beyond its initial purpose of introducing flexibility into the ESA and signifi-
19821 1435
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with the advent of the Reagan Administration; Secretary of the Interior Watt
has announced an intention to de-emphasize endangered species protection.
29
Despite these statutory and bureaucratic adjustments, however, the basic pro-
tections afforded by the Act remain intact. As long as private individuals and
organizations remain willing to enforce the ESA by bringing lawsuits, land use
controversy is inevitable.
The number of instances in which the welfare of a plant or wildlife species
may interfere with proposed human uses of land is staggering. Estimates of
the number of species on earth range toward ten million,30 not counting sub-
species or isolated populations.31 In 1981 fewer than a thousand species were
officially listed by the Department of the Interior as "endangered" or
"threatened," 32 but some biologists assert that perhaps one millioA species may
be eliminated by the end of the century.33 The domestic and worldwide lists
will grow rapidly-perhaps exponentially-if the listing authority follows sci-
entific discovery and classification.34 Dire predictions of extinction rates so
common in recent years,35 have been given credibility by the estimate in
Global 2000 Report that fifteen to twenty percent of present species on earth
could be extinct by the year 2000.36 The debate over whether such conse-
quences are catastrophic or insignificant need not be joined; the United States
Congress has concluded that the death of even one species, anywhere, is a
disaster to be avoided at nearly all costs.3
7
The legal disputes which center around competition between endangered
species protection and human land and resource development go deeper than
money. The passage of the ESA in 1973 represents a culmination of certain
canly weakened the Act. Goplerud, 2he Endangered Species Act: Does it Jeopardize the Continued
Existence of Species?, 1979 ARm. ST. L.J. 487, 499.
29. See Drew, Secretary Watt, NEW YORKER, May 4, 1981, at 104, 130, 132 (Secretary's emphasis
switched to recovery plans).
30. See N. MYERS, THE SiNKiNo ARK 14 (1979) (estimating that there are anywhere from five to ten
million species on earth).
31. "Species" has been defined as a group of individuals that interbreed, but classification is less than
an exact science. Often taxonomic classification of plants and animals does not end at the species level:
subspecies and populations within a species can be identified on the basis of reproductive compatibility
or geographical isolation, or even by the presence of one differing genetic trait. Whether the classifier isa "splitter" or a "lumper," the number of subspecies may be three to five times the number of species.
See Wood, On Protecting an Endangered Statute: The Endangered Species ct of1973, 37 FED. B.J. 25,
27 (1978) (quoting FWS Associate Director Schreiner). See generaliy Ramsay, Priorities in Specics
Preservation, 5 ENVTL. AFF. 595, 599-601 (1976) (discussing taxonomy).32. The list of endangered and threatened species as upda ed is found at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, .12
(1981). The distinction between the two categories is discussed at notes 162-69 infra and accompanying
text.
33. N. MYERS, supra note 30, at 3-5.34. Seeid at 15-18 (estimate of number of species has risen from three million in the 1960's to 10
million in the 1970's).
35. See, ,'g., S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973) (one species a year becomes extinct; 109domestic species threatened with extinction); CO uNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE SIXTH AN-
NUAL REPORT 408 (1975) (10 percent of surveyed species in the United States may be endangeredor
threatened); N. MYERS, supra note 30, at 5 (one species an hour could become extinct by late 1980s).
36. An estimate of extinction prepared for the Global 2000 Report to the President predicts that
between five hundred thousand and two million species--15 to 20 percent of all existing species--couldbe extinct by the year 2000. T. LovEJOY, A PROJECTION OF SPECIS EXTINcTIONS 328-31 (1979).
37. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (plain intent of Congress in enacting ESA was to halt
and reverse trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost); id at 187 (Congress viewed value of
endangered species as "incalculable"); H.R. REth. No.412, 93d Cong., ist Sess. 4(1973) (ESA needed to
preserve genetic heritage of incalculable value).
[Vol. 70:14331436
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altruistic strains in natural resources thought.38 The ESA is a societal recogni-
tion, or creation, of a general right in other animate creatures to exist. It is a
partial reversal of the traditional legal view that consigned them to the status
of object over which God gave man absolute dominion.39 Congressional spon-
sors of the Act believed, however, that in the long run protection of species in
danger of extinction is more than simple altruism. Fish and wildlife are valua-
ble and renewable natural resources, and recovery of wildlife species to abun-
dance serves human and national goals of an economic as well as aesthetic or
moral nature. 4° The emerging law of endangered species is one of the more
radical forms of conservation through law.
41
Every effective conservation measure necessarily impinges upon some
human economic interest.42 Congress nevertheless decided in 1973 that the
drastic plight of wildlife required a drastic remedy and that profit was an in-
sufficient justification for what it saw as a biological calamity. But in making
this commitment to species preservation, congressional leaders did not foresee
all of the potential ramifications of their legislative creation. 43 Nor do the
amendments to the Act in the wake of the Snail Darter case resolve all of the
land use problems inherent in the original language. The interests of both
developers and preservationists will be served by clarification.
This article examines endangered species law as it may affect land use in the
United States. The first section describes the legal and biological contexts into
which the ESA intruded. Section II outlines the protective mechanisms estab-
lished by the 1973 version of the Act and their reception by the courts. The
third section discusses the corrective amendments to the Act enacted in 1978.
The final section indulges in the hazardous business of forecasting: it applies
the law as it has developed and as it is likely to evolve to a series of more or
less hypothetical land use conflicts. It portends multiplication of the disputes
between endangered species and human desires.
38. The evolution of human attitudes towards things wild is traced in McCloskey, The mrlderness Act
of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 OR. L. REV. 288 (1966). Cf. Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 ScI. 1243, 1248 (1968) (restrictions on land use are response to overpopulation).
39. The biblical basis for the notion is in Genesis 126-28. See generally Burr, TowardLegaliAightsfor
Animals, 4 ENVTL. AFF. 205, 205 (1975) (man has viewed animals as objects that exist for his use);
Coggias & Smith, The Emerging Law of Wilde: A Narrative Bibliography, 6 ENVTL. L. 583, 588-94
(1976) (wildlife historically considered property); Favre, Wildlfe .Rghts: 7he Ever-Widening Circle, 9
ENVTL. L. 241, 241-43 (1979) (discussing historical attitudes towards animal rights).
40. The 1973 hearings and debates are replete with references to the potential benefits that would be
foregone if species were rendered extinct. See H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., ist Sess. 5 (1973) (pre-
serving genetic variation of species is in best interest of mankind); cf Sagoff, On the Preservation of
Species, 7 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 33, 45 (1980) (Congress in passing 1978 amendments to ESA did not
intend to preserve every species regardless of cost).
41. The word "conservation' was coined by Gifford Pinchot and colleagues around the turn of the
century to represent their new emphasis on resource management. S. UDALL, THE QUIEr CRisIS 106
(1963).
42. Coggins & Ward, The Law of WrIdife Management on the Federal Public Lands, 60 OR. L. REv.
59, 70 (1981).
43. The Snail Darter case itself is an example. Justice Powell in dissent characterized the Snail
Darter litigation as possibly "invited by careless draftsmanship of otherwise meritorious legislation"
and pointed out that Congress nowhere debated the precise situation confronting the Court. TVA v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 202 n.11, 207 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
14371982]
HeinOnline  -- 70 Geo. L. J. 1437 1981-1982
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
I. ENDANGERED SPECIES PROTECTION IN PERSPECTIVE
Ultimately, we are the endangered species. Homo sapiens is perceived
to stand at the top of thepyramid of life, but thepinnacle is aprecarious
station. We need a large measure of se/f-consciousness to constantly
remind us of the commanding role which we enjoy only at thefa our of
the web of 9ife that sustains us, that forms a foundation of our total
environment..
Remarks of Senator Leahy,
quoted in N. MYERS,
THE SINKING ARK iX-X (1979).
Although wildlife conservation was slow to emerge as a national priority,
44
federal wildlife law has been developing since the 1890's. 45 Still, by 1973 Con-
gress thought that federal, state, and foreign regulatory systems were inade-
quate to protect species that seemed doomed to extinction.46 The Endangered
Species Act of 1973 directly addressed that specific problem, but it neither
arose from nor operates in a legal or biological vacuum. It is a part of the
wave of environmental legislation of the early 1970's that inundated the nation
with new rules founded on moral as well as ecological precepts.47 Wildlife
conservation is closely related to the growth of federal involvement in many
areas of national life because federal construction, licensing, or financing of a
project or activity ordinarily carries with it federal strings, one of which is
endangered species protection. This section first outlines the nature of the
problems that Congress sought to overcome when it enacted the ESA and then
discusses the general legal setting of wildlife conservation.
A. WILDLIFE ENDANGERMENT
It is simplistic to assert. . . that species are driven extinct through the
44. At the federal level, the slowness was due, in part, to constitutional qualms. In 1896 the Supreme
Court stated that wildlife within any state is owned by that state in trust for its people. Geer v. Con-
necticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896). In 1912 the Court strongly implied that federal regulatory power did
not extend within state borders. The Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166, 173 (1912). The notion of state regu-
latory exclusivity was quashed in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920), and the notion of state
property rights was eroded over the years. The Court overruled Geer in 1979 and held that a state
statute prohibiting interstate transport of minnows seined or procured within the state violates the com-
merce clause. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). See generally M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION
OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 12-34 (1977) (discussing development of state ownership doctrine and
federal wildlife law) (1977); Coggins, Wildlife andthe Constitution: The Walls Come Tumbling Down, 55
WASH. L. REV. 295 (1980) (same); Coggins & Hensley, ConstitutionalLimits on FederalPower to Protect
andManage Wildlife" Is the Endangered Species Act Endangered? 61 IowA L. REV. 1099 (1976) (same).
45. See generally M. BEAN, supra note 44, at 20-34 (discussing early development of federal wildlife
law); Coggins, Federal Wildlife Law Achieves Adolescence: Developments in the 1970s, 1978 DUKE L.J.
753, 760-62 (same).
46. See Coggins, supra note 45, at 802 (ESA result of seven years' frustration with inadequate prior
legislation, lack of state action, and progress in international negotiation for species preservation).
47. The foremost of the new laws is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347, 4361-4369 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
See infra text accompanying notes 128-36 (discussing NEPA).
[Vol. 70:14331438
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ignorance or stupidity or wanton destructiveness of modern man. Spe-
cies disappear because of the way we prefer to live, all of us.
N. MYERS, THE SINKING ARK xi (1979).
Categorizing some causes of wildlife population depletion may clarify the
scope of the constraints imposed by the Endangered Species Act. In passing
the ESA, Congress stated that endangerment results primarily from hunting
and habitat destruction,48 a simplistic but accurate generalization. In some
cases, the factors leading to the decline of a species include the evolutionary
process, 49 interbreeding or genetic swamping,50 overzealous scientific collec-
tors,51 or changes in natural conditions. 52 As primary causes, these are rela-
tively rare phenomena.5 3 Most modem wildlife population problems stem
from human activities that directly or indirectly kill members of species.
Historically, hunting has been responsible for many instances of extinction
or close calls, frequently in conjunction with habitat alteration and poor spe-
cies' adaptability. The bison and passenger pigeon are prominent examples,
but the list is extensive. Shooting and poisonng have taken severe tolls on
wolves, bears, eagles, hawks, and other predators 4 Vulnerability plus human
48. S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1973). Of these threats, commentators considered habitat
destruction to be the greater cause of extinction. Hearings on Endangered Species Before the Subcomm.
of the House Comm on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 236, 241, 306 (1973) [here-
inafter 1973 ES,4 Hearings]. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978) (witnesses informed Congress
that principal cause of extinction is destruction of natural habitats); Lachenmeier, supra note 16, at 31
(both Senate and House reports state that destruction of habitat is most significant cause of species
endangerment).
49. The California condor is a vestigial remnant from the ice age and may be naturally doomed, but
human causes have greatly accelerated its demise. See Borland, Take a Long, Last Look at the Condor,
NAT'L WILDLIFE, April-May 1974, at 34, 35-36 (poisoning, shooting, trapping, and disturbance of
breeding areas have reduced California condor population to less than 60).
50. Genetic swamping occurs when two previously isolated but closely related species or subspecies
interbreed. Forest clearing in the southeast United States, for instance, brought the coyote (canis la-
trans) into contact with the red wolf (canis rufus). As a result of their interbreeding, very few, if any,
genetically pure red wolves remain. Ripley & Lovejoy, Threatened and Endangered Species, in WILD-
LIFE AND AMERICA 365, 371 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978). The converse of genetic swamping is speciation,
the emergence of a new organism, which, because of its characteristics, habitat preference, and repro-
ductive isolation, is a separate species. Ripley and Lovejoy point out that human intervention has
accelerated both processes. Id
51. For an account of one prominent ornithologist who refused to stop collecting the eggs of the
endangered peregrine falcon, see N.Y. Times, Jul. 13, 1974, at 1, col. I (Fish and Wildlife Service
imposed $3,000 fine against Dr. Charles G. Sibley, Director of Yale University's Peabody Museum, for
illegally importing birds' eggs from Britain).
52. For instance, a hurricane destroyed one half of the whooping crane population in 1910.
53. "That extinction is a natural phenomenon is sometimes advanced as an excuse for not trying to
rescue endangered species. This is, of course, nonsensical because although natural extinction is very
gradual, occurring over many millennia, today there is considerable additional extinction caused by
human interference, so that extinction has become primarily an unnatural phenomenon." Ripley &
Lovejoy, supra note 50, at 365. See also Asimov, Man Stacks the Evolutionary Deck, NAT'L WILDLIFE,
April-May 1974, at 16, 19 (humankind is changing environment faster than most species can evolve).
54. In 1963, before the 1972 ban of poisons for predator control on public lands, seeinfra note 78, the
Department of the Interior killed 190,763 predatory and nonpredatory animals in its animal damage
control program. Cain, Predator andPest Control, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 379, 391 (H. Brokaw ed.
1978). Shooting continues to be the major cause of bald eagle mortality, 41 Fed. Reg. 28,525, 28,526
(1976), even though it has been illegal since 1940. Bald Eagle Protection Act, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250
(1940) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
In 1971, a former pilot for a Wyoming flying service told a Senate subcommittee of killing approxi-
mately 800 eagles over Wyoming and Colorado during 1970-71. Hearings on Predator Control and
Related Problems Before the Subcomm. on Agriculture, Environmental, and Consumer Protection of the
14391982]
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rapaciousness meant the demise of the great auk and the Stellar's sea cow as
well as near annihilation of many marine mammal species. 55 Market hunters
in their heyday brought innumerable birds of fine plumage and many edible
species to the brink of extinction.56 Commercial fishermen stiff deplete certain
marine fish such as the Atlantic salmon;57 trappers still cause significant popu-
lation declines in newly profitable species such as lynx and bobcat;58 and
poachers still take alligators and similar sources of valuable hides.59 In gen-
eral, however, large-scale commercial hunting died out in this country with the
rise of public outcries and controls over markets, although it continues to
threaten species abroad.60 Species that compete for economically valuable re-
sources, however, often are still exterminated. 61 Sport hunting, now heavily
Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 153-67 (1971). Charged with killing 366 bald and
golden eagles for bounties paid by local ranchers, another pilot pleaded guilty to 75 slayings and was
fined $500; a rancher charged with killing 65 eagles was fined $1,700 for slaying five. Conservation
News, Jan. 1, 1973, at 3-4. Under the Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980), violators may be sentenced to a maximum of two years in jail and a $10,000 fine for each
violation. Id § 668(a) (1976). The executive vice president of the National Wildlife Federation called
these fines a "piddling slap on the wrist." Conservation News, Jan. 1, 1973, at 3.
55. See generally P. MATTHIESSEN, WILDLIFE IN AMERICA 92-111 (1959) (discussing hunting of great
auk, Stellar's sea cow, whale, sea otter, fur seal, and elephant seal); Hedgpeth, Man on the Seashore, in
WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 163, 166, 168 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978) (discussing demise of great auk and
Stellar's sea cow).
56. In an early plea for conservation of endangered species, William Hornaday exclaimed, "To-day
the women of England, Europe and elsewhere are directly promoting the extermination of scores of
beautiful species of wild birds by the devilish persistence with which they buy and wear feather orna-
ments made of their plumage." W. HORNADAY, OUR VANISHING WILDLIFE 7 (reprint ed. 1970) (1st ed.
1913). Hornaday declaimed that "[w]ith but extremely slight exceptions, the blood of slaughtered in-
nocents is no longer upon our skirts .... But even while these words are being written, there is one
large fly in the ointment. The store-window of E. & S. Meyers, 688 Broadway, New York, contains
about six hundredplumes and skins of birds ofparadise, for salefor millinery purposes. No wonder the
great bird of paradise is now almost extinct!" Id at 114, 116 (emphasis in original). Hornaday listed 62
species of birds outside the United States that hunters were exterminating for the feather markets. Id
at 119-20. By 1913 the great auk, passenger pigeon, Cuban tricolored macaw, Eskimo curlew, Labrador
duck, and Pallas cormorant were extinct because they were prized for the table or for their fine plum-
mage. Id at 10-16. See also J. TREFETHEN, AN AMERICAN CRUSADE FOR WILDLIFE 129-30 (1975)
(societies were formed in 1880's to protect wild birds from demands of high fashion).
57. See Stroud, RecreationalFishing, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 53, 63 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978) (heavy
harvest of Atlantic salmon by Danish commercial fishers). See generally Alverson, CommercialFlshing,
in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 67, 67-85 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978) (discussing commercial cod, ocean perch,
Pacific salmon, halibut, tuna, and menhaden fishing).
58. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Endangered Species Scientific Auth., 659 F.2d 168, 178 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (bobcat export guidelines invalid because FWS did not establish absence of detriment to species).
In 1980, five government employees were convicted of illegally selling bobcat and coyote hides worth
$100,000. WILDLIFE NEWSLETrER, July 1980, at 3 (published by Wildlife Section, Land and Natural
Resources Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
59. The ESA itself tends to create poaching incentives. For instance, when the Nile crocodile was
placed on the endangered species list, the reptile industry turned to less desirable species such as the
American and Orinoco crocodiles. As these became scarce, the industry sought large caimans; when
they in turn declined, smaller caimans were hunted to meet the market demand. The search for raw
material to substitute for the species overharvested by overreaching industries has led not only the
whaling industry far afield: in addition to using less desirable crocodilians when the Nile crocodile was
depleted, the hide industry turned to sea turtles. Thousands of Olive Ridley sea turtles were destroyed
to satisfy the market demand, and the turtle is now endangered. King, The Wildife 7ade, in WILDLIFE
AND AMERICA 253, 262 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978).
60. "Prohibition.of commercial dealing in wildlife was the ingenious solution American law devised
to the problem of limiting takers." T. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW 105 (1980). See generally
King, supra note 59, at 254-55 (surprisingly little trade in native game species within United States).
61. The timber wolf is the most obvious example, and other predators such as mountain lions and
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regulated, is even less of a cause of species' decline than market hunting.62
Protecting species that are threatened by hunting pressures is relatively sim-
ple, at least in theory. The wildlife agency must prohibit hunting both of the
species in trouble and of similar species that could be misidentified by hunters;
and, as a backstop, it should prohibit all commerce, possession, or transporta-
tion of protected species to remove the incentive for poachers and to facilitate
prosecution of offenders. Although the practical difficulty of enforcement un-
dercuts the theory,63 and the scarcity of the species drives up its price in illicit
markets, such direct controls, when rigorously applied, generally have been
effective.6
Habitat destruction, alteration, and poisoning have replaced direct killing as
the dominant cause of species' declines.65 Land use practices having indirect,
grizzly bears also have been decimated. See Note, Predator Control and the Federal Government, 51
N.D.L. REV. 787, 788-91 (1975) (extirpation of wolves).
Large predators, however, are not the only wildlife species whose demise has resulted from economic
competition. Wild horses and burros, considered by ranchers on the western ranges to be pests because
they compete with livestock for forage and water, were indiscriminately slaughtered before 1971. Cain,
supra note 54, at 384. In response, Congress passed the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burroi Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Another resource conflict has been the competition be-
tween sea otters and fishermen for the valuable abalone on the California coast. Armstrong, The Cali-
fornia Sea Otter. Emerging Conflicts in Resource Management, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 249, 249 (1979).
62. Even so, it continues to pose three types of threats to species already in dire population trouble.
The first threat is honest mistakes: some endangered species (e.g., Mexican ducks) are very similar to
species that may be taken legally (e.g., common mallards). Overeager and undereducated hunters have
shot whooping cranes and other endangered species unintentionally, although they are substantially
dissimilar to legal game. See Conservation News, Jan. 1, 1973, at 4 (hunters claimed ignorance that
bird they shot for coyote bait was golden eagle). A second threat is posed by some sport hunters who
avidly collect trophies from vanishing game species. State game departments sometimes have been
unable to resist pressures to allow some shooting of species that they knew should have been allowed to
recover unmolested. See 1973 ESA Hearings, supra note 48, at 31 (statement of Tom Garrett, Wildlife
Dir., Friends of the Earth) (many state wildlife commissions more interested in selling hunting licenses
than in protecting endangered species). Polar bears, grizzly bears, bighorn sheep, and grey wolves all
have been subjected to some legal shooting by trophy hunters. But these problems pale in comparison
to the third threat, outlaw hunters who for various reasons refuse to abide by the rules. Some dilettant-
ish sport hunters and trophy seekers scoff at seasons, limits, and conservation. Unscrupulous guides
and outfitters encourage and abet their illegal ventures. See United States v. Sandford, 547 F.2d 1085,
1090-91 (9th Cir. 1976) (guide charged with hunting in Yellowstone National Park).
One commentator notes that the number of hunters has been reduced by the demise of subsistence
hunting and trapping, the move away from traditions that demand wild game for holidays, the growing
antihunting sentiment in the United States, and the drift of young people away from their hunting
heritage as they move into urban areas. Reiger, Hunting and Trapping in the New World, in WILDLIFE
AND AMERICA 42,46 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978). But see C. AMORY, MANKIND? OUR INCREDIBLE WAR ON
WILDLIFE 15 (1974) (one of chief problems in preserving endangered species is that hunting still
allowed).
63. Domestic enforcement is difficult because illegal hunting is naturally an isolated and secretive
business. Even murder of enforcement officials in the field by poachers is not unknown. See generally
W. SIGLER, WILDLIFE ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1972) (discussing difficulties in enforcing wildlife laws).
International enforcement is difficult because wildlife and customs agents are often unable to identify
endangered species and their parts. Customs agents must read labels on food packages printed in
foreign languages to ascertain that a foreign delicacy does not contain meat from a protected whale.
The agents must examine jewelry to ensure that the craftsman did not use the wing, bill, or shell of a
protected species in his art. The officials must scrutinize clothing and accessories in luggage, as well as
those worn by persons coming through ports of entry. No amount of inspection, however, can ensure
detection of parts of a protected species in every case. See King, supra note 59, at 260-62 (discussing
enforcement problems related to import-export).64. See T. LUND, supra note 60, at 105 (further decimation of wildlife stopped by marketing bans
and warden system).
65. See 1973 ES4 Hearings, supra note 48, at 306 (statement of S.R. Seater, Dir. of Public Relations,
Defenders of Wildlife) (destruction of natural habitat major reason for species' eradication).
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but no less deleterious, effects on wildlife populations are far more difficult to
control than hunting. "Habitat" means all of the natural factors and systems
necessary to support a wildlife species, and the term includes all of the limita-
tions on population expansion, such as amounts of food, water, and cover.66
Space precludes cataloging all the ways that human alteration of habitat is
detrimental to vulnerable species, but some prominent examples will illustrate
the general problem.
Conversion of land from nonuse to use, or from ohe use to another, has been
the factor most adverse to native wildlife. Turning the prairie into cropland
spelled the inevitable demise of the great bison herds, whether or not the buf-
falo hunters plied their bloody trade. Clearing the forests irrevocably changed
the population composition and distribution of native species, and the conver-
sion of remaining forests to monocultures by "even-aged management," that
is, replacement with trees all of the same age, continues the process. 67 Estua-
rine areas, marshes, and inshore wetlands provide prime habitats for many
species.68 As these areas disappear, their wildlife correspondingly diminishes.69
The same is true of some seemingly compatible activities: changing the Amer-
ican West over to livestock grazing reduced the diversity and abundance of
native species; not only has competition for scarce forage been heightened, but
cattle and sheep overgrazing has reduced overall land productivity for all spe-
cies.70 Urbanization, industrialization, transportation systems, mineral extrac-
tion, and associated land uses all have taken their toll.
Related to land conversion as a cause of endangerment is water resources
development, a focal point of recent legal controversy. 71 A great many species
are dependent upon a free-flowing stream habitat, but such streams are disap-
pearing under masses of dammed-up flatwater.72 Flatwater also provides
habitat, but for different species. The methods of operation for the vast sys-
tems of dams and diversions now in place also contribute to wildlife declines. 73
66. See R. WHITTAKER, COMMUNITIES AND ECOSYSTEMS 16 (1970) (habitat is physical and chemical
environment). "Critical habitat" is defined at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
67. A. Starker Leopold explains that "[ais even-aged planting progresses, the carrying capacity of the
land for wildlife will decrease progressively. Species dependent upon mature forest inevitably will
disappear, the process will produce the 'rare and endangered species' of tomorrow." Leopold, Wildlife
and Forest Practice, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 108, 113 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978). Species such as the
ivory-billed woodpecker that require mature vegetation tend to be the first affected by human forestry
practices. Ripley & Lovejoy, supra note 50, at 368.
68. See generally Cairns, The Modication ofInland Waters, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 146, 156-57
(H. Brokaw ed. 1978) (wetlands are vital habitat for many species).
69. The draining of marshes has meant the disappearance of species dependent on the marsh ecology
such as the endangered Florida Everglades kite.
70. See generally Wagner, Livestock Grazing and the Livestock Industry, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA
121, 123 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978) (wild ungulates less adaptable than livestock to vegetation changes
brought on by grazing).
71. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1978) (Tellico Dam completion prevented because of loss
of critical habitat of snail darter); Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 831 (6th Cir. 1981)
(construction of Columbia Dam halted because of endangerment to mussels); Sierra Club v. Froehlke,
534 F.2d 1289, 1305 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusal to enjoin Meramec Basin, Missouri, dams on ESA
grounds); Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin. 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156, 1181 (D. Neb.
1978) (guaranteed loan and permit for water power facility enjoined because of inadequate protection
for whooping cranes).
72. See generally Cairns, supra note 68, at 151 (dams can substantially alter habitat).
73. See Bodi, Protecting Columbia River Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 10 ENVTL. L.
349, 349 (1980) (salmon have declined dramatically due to competition for water use from irrigation
and hydroelectric power); Blumm & Johnson, Promising a Processfor Parity: The Pacific Northwest
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Habitat poisoning is another major cause of species mortality. The effects of
DDT on wild bird populations are now generally conceded: its persistence
and accumulation in the food chain results in reproductive failure, particularly
in predatory or scavenger species such as peregrine falcons and Cooper's
hawks.74 The EPA has cancelled the registration of DDT and a few other per-
sistent pesticides, 75 but considerable controversy surrounds many pesticides
and herbicides still on the market.76 The application of a poison meant to kill
one species, usually an insect or a plant, often kills nontarget species as well.77
In many areas poisoned baits intended for coyotes have been broadcast indis-
criminately over the landscape with predictably indiscriminate results. 78 A
larger problem is the toxic or harmful residues generated by industrial, agricul-
tural, municipal, and commercial processes, which pervade many natural sys-
tems. Rivers become overloaded with organic and inorganic wastes that
poison animals, deplete the water's oxygen, alter water temperature, and in
other ways destroy habitat qualities.79 Emissions of air pollutants from utility
generating plants, falling as acid rain, kill the life in lakes hundreds of miles
away.80
As the introductory quotation from Dr. Myers notes, the way people live is
the ultimate cause of domestic species endangerment. Problems of human
demographics and ecology are common to many areas of the world; 81 they are
exacerbated in this country by the frenetic quest for "convenience"-which
ordinarily is equivalent to "waste." The national reluctance to recycle materi-
als because it is too "expensive" or "disruptive" leads naturally to increased
exploitation of virgin resources, frequently in ecologically virgin areas.82 The
convenience of the personal automobile brought about the massive system of
superhighways that bisect and reduce habitat all across the country.
Electric Fower Planning and Conservation Act andAnadromous Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L. 497, 502-
03 (1981) (water managers focus on acceptability of power losses rather than benefit to wildlife).
74. See Risebrough, Pesticides and Other Toxicants, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 218, 229 (H. Bro-
kaw ed. 1978) (DDE, a derivative of DDT, shown experimentally to produce shell thinning in several
bird species); see also BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, TECHNICAL
NOTE, HABITAT MANAGEMENT SERIES FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES, REPORT No. 1, AMERICAN PERE-
GRINE FALCON AND ARCTIC PEREGRINE FALCON, 9.20-.24 (Nov. 15, 1972) (filing code 6601) (DDE is
most potent eggshell thinner); Snyder, Can the Cooper's Hawk Survive?, 145 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 432,
439.42 (1974) (DDT causes thin shells and also may disrupt reproductive behavior).
75. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding
EPA Administrator's action in cancelling almost all DDT registrations under Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide, and Rodenticide Act).
76. See Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 913-18 (D. Or. 1977)
(health problems, regulation, and litigation caused by phenoxy herbicides).
77. See United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 514 (E.D. Cal.) (registered pesticide
applied to alfalfa field killed number of American widgeons, a protected migratory bird), af'd, 578
F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
78. Cain, supra note 54, at 388 (unintended victims include badgers, foxes, golden eagles, bobcats,
reptiles, and songbirds). In 1972 President Nixon issued an order barring the use of all poisons for
predator control on public lands, except for emergency situations. Exec. Order No. 11,643, 37 Fed.
Reg. 2875 (1972). In that same year the Administrator of EPA suspended and cancelled the registration
of three chemical toxicants (strychnine, sodium fluoroacetate (1080), and sodium cyanide) used primar-
ily in coyote control. The cancellation was upheld in Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66, 73 (10th Cir.
1975), cert. deniedsub nom. Wyoming v. Kleppe, 426 U.S. 906 (1976).
79. See Cairns, supra note 68, at 148-50 (heated waste water from electric power plants harms
aquatic wildlife directly and indirectly).
80. See Risebrough, supra note 74, at 219-21 (acid rain falls on the entire Northeast).
81. See generally N. MYERS, supra note 30, at 8-9 (tropical developing countries also disrupt natural
habitats).
82. See id at 113-29 (detailing various encroachments being made on world's rain forests, and pre-
dicting dire consequences).
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Technologies intended to reduce human labor or to save money too often
have had unforeseen or unwanted adverse consequences. The expanding pop-
ulation requires food and building materials, a demand often translated into
forest and farm monocultures that are all but sterile in terms of wildlife abun-
dance and diversity.83 Rural and suburban development, industrial plants,
power complexes, and other artifacts of civilization all contribute to habitat
shrinkage and disruption.84 The replacement of traditional hook-and-line tuna
fishing with enormous purse-seine nets has "incidentally" killed millions of
dolphins and porpoises 8 5 Off-road vehicles (ORV's) invade, disrupt, and de-
stroy many areas of formerly tranquil habitat.8 6 Clearcutting has far more se-
vere effects on wildlife populations than less advanced methods of timber
harvest.87
In the absence of self-regulation or self-restraint-both conspicuously lack-
ing in the history of the United States-some form of "mutual coercion, mutu-
ally agreed upon"88 is necessary to preserve a resource base for the prosperity
of future generations. Hardin's classic phrase is, of course, merely a synonym
for law. In recent years Congress has supplied some of the needed coercion in
the form of rules for the conservation of America's natural and aesthetic
resources.
B. FEDERAL LEGISLATION AFFECTING HABITAT
If NEPA -caused delays continue, the wildlife manager will have two
choices. He or she can comply with NEPA by holding ritualistic hear-
ings, writing costly and unneeded impact statements, and collectingpub-•
lie input which contains little new information and does not contribute to
the decision. . . . On the other hand, the manager can simply go out in
the field and take action.
Schectman, The "Bambi
Syndrome" How NEPA's Public
Participation in Wildlife
Management is Hurting the
Environment, 8 ENvTL. L. 611, 636
(1978).
83. See Burger, Agriculture and Wildl/fe, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 89, 102 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978)
(even the most adaptable wildlife species cannot survive in the unbroken landscapes of today's
croplands).
84. See Steams & Ross, The Pressures of Urbanization and Technology, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA
199, 204-05 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978) (vast industrial parks and highways eliminate large areas of habitat).
85. See Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141, 1143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(purse-seine fishing causes substantial number of incidental deaths of porpoises). See generally Ander-
sen, Anderson & Searles, The Tuna-Porpoise Dilemma: Is Conflict Resolution Attainable?, 18 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 505, 506-07 (1978) (hundreds of thousands of porpoises killed yearly during 1960's and
early 1970's); Nafziger & Armstrong, The Porpoise-Tuna Controversy: Management of Marine Resources
After Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 7 ENVTL. L. 223, 223 n.l (1977) (esti-
mated six million porpoises and tuna killed since 1959).
86. See generally D. SHERIDAN, OFF-ROAD VEHICLES ON THE PUBLIC LANDS 7 (1979) (ORV's have
damaged every kind of ecosystem found in United States).
87. See Leopold, supra note 67, at 113 (selective logging of mature trees less harmful than clearcut-
ting); cf. 44 Fed. Reg. 53,928, 53,990-91 (1979) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219) (clearcutting, with
some limitations, permitted under National Forest System Rule).
88. Hardin, supra note 38, at 1247.
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Statutes other than the Endangered Species Act of 1973 impose land use
constraints that contribute to endangered species preservation. 89 State law has
had important local protective consequences both directly and indirectly. It
has been federal legislation, however, that has had a more general impact on
wildlife populations. 90
The better known federal laws are directed against environmental contami-
nants. Although the Clean Air Act,91 the Clean Water Act,92 the pesticide
laws,93 the Toxic Substances Control Act,94 and the Safe Drinking Water Act95
are aimed primarily at human benefit, the abatement of pollution also will be
felt in the wild.96 These laws have not yet brought about the reduced pollution
levels they require, but without them the national nest could have been irre-
trievably fouled, with the loss of many species. Some pollution control pro-
grams already have been successful in increasing wildlife populations.
Atlantic spawning fish, for example, are returning to Eastern seaboard streams
from which they have been absent for decades, and some avian species are
recovering from the brink of extinction because of new constraints on pesticide
and herbicide use.
Public land laws forbidding or controlling human uses that harm wildlife on
the third of the nation owned by the federal government also contribute to
species preservation. Wilderness designation pursuant to the Wilderness Act
of 196497 has exempted millions of acres from human development, and the
89. Lawsuits aimed at protection of wildlife habitat seldom are grounded on just one statute. More
often such controversies tend to be three- or four-sided with multiple-and sometimes conflicting-
statutory authority at issue. See Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1156, 1181 (D. Neb. 1978) (power project challenged under National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA), ESA, and Clean Water Act); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 598, 607, 613
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (Alaskan offshore oil leases challenged under NEPA, ESA, and Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act).
90. Most federal programs, however, contemplate state cooperation and participation. See Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (mandating cooperation with states
in carrying out program of Act); Sikes Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 670g-670o (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (Secretaries
of Interior and Agriculture to cooperate with state agencies in developing conservation programs on
public lands).
91. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West 1981).
92. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West 1981).
93. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, as amended by the Federal Environmental
Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (Supp. IV 1980).
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300j (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
96. Congress clearly intended that environmental legislation benefit organisms other than humans.
The Clean Water Act proclaims a national interim goal that, wherever attainable, water quality that
provides for the "protection and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife. . . be achieved by July 1,
1983." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1976). Under the provisions of the Federal Environmental Pesticide
Control Act of 1972, a pesticide may not be registered unless it can be used without unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). Environment "includes
water, air, land, and all plants and man and other animals living therein, and the interrelationships
which exist among these." Id § 1360) (1976). Similarly, the Toxic Substances Control Act, which
regulates chemical substances and mixtures presenting an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment, defines environment as "water, air, and land and the interrelationship which exists among
and between water, air, and land and all living things." 15 U.S.C. § 2602(5) (1976).
97. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
98. Commercial enterprises, permanent and temporary roads, motor vehicles, motorized equipment,
motor boats, other forms of mechanical transport, and landing of aircraft are prohibited in wilderness
areas, subject to preexisting uses. 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (c), (d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Mining and min-
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designation process continues. 99 Laws establishing new national parks and
wildlife refuges also preserve natural habitats.1°° The creation of refuges at
both ends of the whooping crane's migration route and at stopover points in
between has made possible the crane's comeback.101 Other federal land man-
agement agencies have set aside wildlife sanctuaries within their lands. The
Forest Service's California Condor Sanctuary 0 2 and the Bureau of Land
Management's Snake River Birds of Prey Natural Area in Idaho 0 3 are promi-
nent examples. Congress has extended the refuge concept to the adjacent seas:
the Marine Sanctuaries Act'04 empowers the Secretary of Commerce to reserve
eral leasing are permitted subject to regulation for protection of the wilderness character of the land
until January 1, 1984, when all minerals in wilderness areas will be withdrawn from all forms of appro-
priation, subject to existing rights. Id § 1133(d)(3) (1976). Hunting and fishing are allowed, subject to
state law. Id § 1133(d)(8). See generally J. HENDEE, G. STANKEY & K. LUCAS, WILDERNESS MANAGE-
MENT (1978) (discussing legal, scientific, and social aspects of wilderness management).
99. The Wilderness Act requires studies of all roadless areas of 5,000 contiguous acres or more in the
National Park System and National Wildlife Refuge System, 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1976), and all "prim-
itive" areas in the national forests. Id § 1132(b). Congress later mandated similar studies for the public
lands. Federal Land Policy and Management Act § 603, 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1976). Under these proce-
dures, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior make recommendations to the President, who in turn
recommends to Congress areas suitable for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System.
16 U.S.C. § 1132(b), (c) (1976); 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1976). See McCloskey, supra note 38, at 301-02, 312
(discussing wilderness designation of Wilderness Act); Ray & Carver, Section 603 of the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act: An Analysis ofthe BLMs Wilderness Study Process, 21 AIuz. L. REv. 3 3,
373-94 (1979) (discussing Interior Secretary Andrus' implementation of § 603 of Federal Land Policy
and Management At (FLPMA)) ; Short, Wilderness Policies and Mineral Potential on the Public Lands,
26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 39, 40-41 (1980) (discussing wilderness management from viewpoint of
energy and mineral developers). See generally J. HENDEE, G. STANKEY & R. LUCAS, supra note 98
(discussing wilderness study and management).
Areas under study also are protected to a limited extent. See Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793,
796-97 (10th Cir. 1971) (ordering Secretary to include study of area contiguous to designated wilderness
in report to President, and enjoining timber cutting in area until President and Congress make determi-
nation), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972); California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 499-500 (E.D. Cal.
1980) (enjoining development that would destroy wilderness character of area until suitable impact
study completed). But see Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383, 394 (D. Wyo.
1980) (Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior may not refuse to consider oil and gas lease applications
in wilderness study areas).
100. E.g., Redwood National Park Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C §§ 79a-79j (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Na-
tional Parks are governed by the preservation mandate of 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The authority for
National Wildlife Refuge Management is at 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
101. See Gwynne, Is Science Wildlife'r Best Hopefor the Future?, 12 NAT'L WILDLIFE, April-May
1974, at 46 (refuges in Canada and Texas have helped increase whooping crane's numbers). General
habitat maintenance, especially for endangered or threatened species, is now a high management prior-
ity for the National Wildlife Refuge System. New refuges have been established specifically for the
Key deer in Florida, the Attwater prairie chicken in Texas, and the Columbia white-tail deer in Ore-gon-all endangered specis. See Greenwalt, The National Wildife Refuge System, in WILDLIFE AND
AMERICA 399, 402-03 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978) (discussing the development of the National Wildlife Ref-
uge System from 1961-1974). The individual refuge units are managed by the Fish and Wildlife Serv-ice according to the mandate that the Secretary not permit the use of any area for any purpose notcompatible with the major purposes for which the areas are stablished. National Wildlife Refge
102. See Borland, supra note 49 (discussing sanctuary and other efforts to save endangered condor).
103. See Swanson, Wledi/fe on the Public Lands, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 428,435 (H. Brokaw ed.
1978) (discussing Natural Area, species nesting there, and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
wildlife
management measures).104. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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offshore areas for the benefit of the resident marine life. 05
Another group of federal statutes has the effect of protecting species in
trouble by directing federal land management agencies to take wildlife and
habitat considerations into account in their resource decisionmaking. Fore-
most are the National Forest Management Act 10 6 and the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act,' 0 7 both passed in 1976. The Sikes Act' 08 requires land
managers to consult and cooperate with state agencies for habitat enhance-
ment. 10 9 Water development projects are subject to the Fish and Wildlife Co-
ordination Act (FWCA) of 1958,I0 which requires "equal consideration" of
wildlife in project planning and submission of mitigation measures."' Other
statutes, such as the Coastal Zone Management Act," 2 also demand more at-
tention to habitat preservation." 3 In some cases Congress has directed that
specific measures be taken to protect certain species. The Trinity Project
Act,114 for instance, requires maintenance of a minimum stream flow to ac-
commoditte anadromous fish needs.' 5
Other ad hoc federal statutes protect selected groups of wildlife species. All
migratory birds are under the federal wing. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of
1918 (MBTA)"16 authorizes a comprehensive, cooperative regulatory system
intended to ensure that no eligible species becomes endangered or threatened.
The Fish and Wildlife Service monitors bird species' populations and takes
corrective action by setting seasons, limiting allowable take, and restricting
hunting methods nationwide when declines occur. 117 The Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA) 18 is similar in concept but more stringent in
some respects. Unless affarmatively authorized by the Secretary of the Interior
pursuant to strict statutory guidelines, the MMPA, with a few narrow excep-
tions, allows neither taking of nor commerce in marine mammals. 19 The
105. Id § 1432(a) (1976). Section 1432(f) gives the Secretary the power to issue regulations control-
ling activities within sanctuaries.
106. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
107. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1789 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
108. 16 U.S.C. §§ 670g-670o (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
109. Id § 670g.
110. Id §§ 661-667e (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
111. Id §§ 661, 662(a) (1976). But see Houck, Judicial Review Under the Fish and Wildlife Coordina-
tion Act: A Plaintyif's Guide to Litlgation, 11 ENrTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INsT.) 50,043 (1981) (arguing
that agencies have largely failed to implement FWCA); Parenteau, Unfulfilled Mitigation Requirements
of the Fish and Wildlfe Coordination Act, 42 TRANs. N. AM. WILDLIFE & NATURAL RESOURCES CONF.
179 (1977) (discussing "non-existent or feeble" mitigation efforts of most agencies); Veiluva, The Fish
and Wildlfe Coordination Act in EnvironmentalLitigation, 9 ECOLOrY L.Q. 489, 503-04 (1981) (discuss-
ing agencies' and courts' tendency to ignore FWCA since passage of NEPA).
112. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
113. See id § 1452 (declaring national policy of considering ecological values in coastal zone man-
agement programs).
114. Act of Aug. 12, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-386, 69 Stat. 719.
115. Id § 2. In County of Trinity v. Andrus, 438 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Cal. 1977), the court found
that the congressional mandate to "insure the preservation" of fish was qualified by the language, "ap-
propriate measures." Id at 1375. It held that "preservation" "merely requires that some fish life be
maintained," rather than that fish populations be maintained at preproject levels. Id at 1375.
116. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
117. Id §§703-704 (1976).
118. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The legislation was the product of public
outrage over whale endangerment, the slaughter of baby harp seals, crises in several marine mammal
populations, and the inability of states to deal with wildlife problems of international scope. H.R. REP.
No. 707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, 16, reprintedin 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4144, 4149.
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (1976).
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MMPA seeks to achieve and maintain "optimum sustainable populations";120
species with populations below that ill-defined level or that have declined sig-
nificantly are deemed "depleted"''2 and receive even more complete legal pro-
tection. 122 In 1976 the federal government instituted an overall management
regime for marine fish within 200 miles of the shore under the Fishery Conser-
vation and Management Act (FCMA). 23 The FCMA prohibition against
"overfishing" and its efforts to maintain "optimum yield ' 124 serve to prevent
severe population declines of fish and other species dependent upon them. 125
Federal law also specifically protects wild horses and burros 126 and bald and
golden eagles.' 27
The most important federal enactment for endangered species preservation,
aside from the ESA, is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).128 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, NEPA is merely a proce-
dural mechanism for evaluation of environmental and other problems in-
volved in "major federal actions."' 29 That description does no justice to the
practical effects of the Act, however, for NEPA has been the means by which
the revolution in federal environmental law has been accomplished.' 30 Com-
pliance with the Act is now accepted as a normal part of necessary federal
procedures, and it applies across the board. A federal agency must prepare an
environmental impact statement whenever it proposes an action-whether a
federal project or program or the licensing or financing of state or private ini-
tiatives-that will affect listed species.'31 In the course of such preparation, the
agency must delineate the adverse effects of the action, analyze the possible
alternative courses of action, invite public comment, initiate other agency re-
views, and explain agency reasoning.' 32
120. Id § 1361(6).
121. Id § 1362(1).
122. Id § 1371(a)(3)(B). See M. BEAN, supra note 44, at 342-46 (under MMPA "depleted" species
receive protection more complete in some respects than endangered species receive under ESA); Gaines
& Schmidt, Wildlfe Population Management under the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 6
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 50,096, 50,103 (1976) (same).
123. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
124. Id § 1851(a) (1976).
125. Id § 1801(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Schoenbaum & McDonald, State Management of
Marine Fisheries After the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 and Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, Inc., 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 17, 29-30 (1977) (determination of "optimal yield" under
FCMA takes into account factors other than value of harvest, including recreation and present and
future condition of habitat).
126. Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976 & Supp, IV
1980).
127. Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976).
129. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980). "NEPA,
while establishing 'significant substantive goals for the Nation,' imposes upon agencies duties that are
'essentially procedural' . . . . [Ojnce an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural
requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental
consequences; it cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of
the action to be taken.'" Id (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,
558 (1978), and Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).
130. See generally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AcT (1973) (analyzing NEPA procedures and their impact on federal
actions).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976); see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978). "[T]he NEPA cases
have generally required agencies to file environmental impact statements when the. . . governmental
action would be environmentally 'significant.'" Id at 188 n.34.
132. See McGarity, Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEX. L. REV. 801, 804
[Vol. 70:14331448
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In forcing federal agencies to take a hard look at the consequences of their
decisions, NEPA triggers deeper consideration of environmental problems
whenever the federal government is involved in land development. 33 The
studies and evaluations commanded by the Act should identify wildlife
problems.' 34 Identification will in turn invoke the substantive provisions of
other relevant statutes, particularly the Endangered Species Act.135 The scope
of NEPA and of the ESA is coextensive with the considerable reach of the
federal government into areas of private endeavor.136
In sum, the problem of endangerment is basically a reflection of the ecologi-
cal harm wrought by the scope and nature of human activity. Federal law
apart from the Endangered Species Act has been moving in the direction of
habitat protection by procedural and substantive means. The federal statutes
listed above attack many of the causes of habitat destruction or poisoning,
although their main aims are usually promotion of human health and safety.
This web of legal protection is not seamless: some of those laws are more hor-
tatory than mandatory. Although the federal environmental statutes of the
1970's eventually may transform the physical makeup of the country, they cur-
rently offer comparatively little assistance to wildlife species that have reached
the danger point. That job is to be performed under the aegis of the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973.
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973
It may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively small
number of three-inch fish among all the countless millions of species
extant would require the permanent halting of a virtually completed
damfor which Congress has expended more than $100 million ....
We conclude, however, that the explicit provisions of the Endangered
Species Act require precisely that result.
TA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1978).
(1977) (NEPA requirements not merely procedural; underlying purpose to place environmental ques-
tions "before the ultimate decisionmaker--the public").
133. Cf. Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67
GEo. LJ. 669, 718, 724-25 (1979) (Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must consider all reasonable
alternatives, including "doing nothing," even if issues have not been raised by parties or public).
134. The studies that discovered the snail darter, for instance, were impelled by earlier NEPA litiga-
tion over the Tellico project. See Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 812 (E.D.
Tenn. 1972) (continued construction of Tellico Dam enjoined pending filing of EIS), aj'd, 468 F.2d
1164 (6th Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (dis-
solving injunction against proceeding with Tellico project because EIS adequate), aft'd, 492 F.2d 466
(6th Cir. 1974); see also Foundation for N. American Wild Sheep v. United States, 681 F.2d 1172 (9th
Cir. 1982) (EIS required for reconstruction of road in wildlife habitat).
135. In Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156 (D. Neb. 1978),
the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) had determined in the NEPA evaluation that the power
project would have no detrimental effect on the endangered whooping crane, but the identification of
the whooping crane issue in the impact statement invoked § 7 of the ESA, requiring the REA to consult
with the Department of the Interior before taking action. 12 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1170. Because
the REA had not fully carried out this consultation and had not ensured that the whooping crane and
its critical habitat would not be jeopardized, the court enjoined continued construction of the project.
Id at 1170-71, 1181. See infra notes 297-309 and accompanying text (discussing Nebraska v. Rural
Electrfication Admin. ).
136. The Endangered Species Act actually has broader application than NEPA because the § 9 pro-
hibition against taking applies to all persons, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and NEPA
applies only to "major federal actions." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976).
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Congress has seen protection of endangered species as a critical concern.
Prompted by popular interest in species preservation, Congress has passed four
acts in the past fifteen years to confront the problem of species endangerment.
The first law was the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966 (ESPA);137
its purpose was to establish and maintain a program of "protection, conserva-
tion, and propagation of selected species of native fish and wildlife that are
endangered-that is, threatened with extinction."' 138 No such program devel-
oped because the Act's preservation policy was applicable only "insofar as is
practicable and consistent with the primary purposes" of federal agencies. t39
Otherwise, the 1966 Act was devoid of substantive provisions. The ESPA was
a part of the legislation creating the National Wildlife Refuge System,140 and it
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to acquire lands for protection of en-
dangered species. 141 Except for that authority, the 1966 version had little or no
impact on land use.
The statutory evolution continued with passage of the Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 1969 (ESCA).142 It extended coverage from native species
to endangered species worldwide, and it prohibited the importation of species
or subspecies so listed.143 But the ESCA did not strengthen the directive to
federal agencies, prohibit "taking,'"144 or institute any new protective meas-
ures. 145 Although a few state statutes were more sweeping than the 1969
ESCA,'46 most state legislatures and game agencies were unable or unwilling
to deal with the increasingly controversial problem.
The failure of federal and state agencies to take affirmative action in the face
of impending ecological catastrophe helped inspire Congress in 1973 to pass
the most far-reaching species preservation legislation ever enacted. 147 This sec-
137. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89- 669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed
1973).
138. Id § l(c).
139. Id § 1(b). See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174-75 (1978) (1966 Act "not a sweeping prohibition
on the taking of endangered species"); Palmer, Endangered Species Protection: .4 History of Congres.
sionalAction, 4 ENVTL. AFF. 255, 258-62 (1975) (1966 Act confined prohibitions to actions within Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge System).
140. The National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act of 1966 survives. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980).
141. Endangered Species Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, § 2(b), 80 Stat. 926, 927 (repealed 1973).
142. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (repealed 1973).
143. Id §§ 2, 3(a).
144. "Taking" in wildlife law is a term of art meaning roughly "killing or capturing." The ESA
broadened the definition considerably, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (Supp. IV. 1980). See infra notes 324-86
and accompanying text (discussing implications of ESA "taking" definition).
145. See Coggins, Conserving Wildi1fe Resources: An Overview ofthe Endangered SpeciesAct of1973,
51 N.D. L. REV. 315, 317-18 (1975) (discussing limitations of 1969 Act); Palmer, supra note 139, at 268
(same); Rosenberg, Federal Protection of Unique Environmental Interests: Endangered and Threatened
Species, 58 N.C. L. REv. 491, 502-03 (1980) (1969 Act had "minimal effect" on American endangered
species because of inadequate restriction on destructive federal activities).
146. See Harris Law, ch. 1047, 1970 N.Y. LAWS § 11-0535 (McKinney 1981) (prohibiting possession
or sale of any parts of federally listed endangered species); Mason Law, ch. 1048, 1970 N.Y. LAWS
§ 2758 (McKinney 1981) (prohibiting sale of any parts of certain species designated in law).
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of these laws mn A.E. Nettleton Co. v.
Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 264 N.E.2d 118 (1970) (federal law invites state participation and not pre-
emptive; compliance with both laws possible), appeal denied, 401 U.S. 969 (1971). See also Palladio,
Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (following Nettleton), af'dper curiam, 440
F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1971).
147. "As it was finally passed, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 represented the most comprehen-
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tion discusses the purposes and scope of the Endangered Species Act of 1973
and outlines the major provisions that have a bearing on land use control.
A. OVERRIDING PURPOSES
The purposes of the bill included the conservation of the species and of
the ecosystems upon which they depend and every agency ofgovernment
is committed to see that these purposes are carried out. . . . /f7he
agencies of Government can no longer plead that they can do nothing
about it. They can, and they must. The law is clear.
119 CONG. REc. 42,913
(1973) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
The way in which agencies and courts will apply the Act to sensitive land
use issues ultimately may depend on the decision-makers' perception of the
fundamental congressional aims.148 The debates in 1973 showed that Con-
gress' goal was crystal clear, but the means were less well defined: for various
reasons, Congress deemed extinction of any species intolerable' 49 and directed
federal agencies to use any and all means at their disposal to prevent it.150 The
senators and representatives who spoke in favor of the bill, and the votes were
nearly unanimous, 51 paid relatively little attention to the practical problems
of implementation. Congress apparently did not foresee the full scope of con-
flicts between endangered wildlife and other values. It did not debate precisely
how the Act would affect wholly private land uses, although the Act's legisla-
tive history does contain several examples of federal land use practices that
Congress meant the Act to alter or abolish.1
5 2
Congress specifically recognized that habitat was disappearing as a result of
sive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation." TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
148. That approach underlay the holding in Hill. Significantly, Congress in 1978 accepted the Hill
interpretation, see infra note 395 and accompanying text, and the Hill opinion should continue to gov-
ern ESA interpretation.
149. See Endangered Species: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Nildiffe Cons. and the
Environment of the House Comm on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 280 (1973)
(statement of Rep. Roe) (very survival of mankind may depend on preservation of "delicate balance of
nature"); id at 281 (statement of Rep. Whitehurst) (although impact of loss of one species may not be
readily discernable, each "occupies a niche and makes a contribution to the whole life"); H.R. RE.
No. 412, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1973) (species are potential resources; "sheer self-interest impels us to be
cautious"); S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2989, 2990 (biological diversity needed for scientific purposes).
The classic exposition of reasons for saving species is Ehrendfeld, The Conservation of Non- Re-
sources, 64 AM. SCI. 648 (1976) (natural diversity worth saving for "non-resource" reasons such as
respect for life and "artistic" value of nature, as well as economic values such as possible future use,
scientific research, and environmental monitoring).
150. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(5)(c) (1976). Congress ordered all federal agencies to seek to conserve endan-
gered and threatened species. Id The ESA defines "conservation" as "the use of all methods and proce-
dures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which
the measures [the Act provides] are no longer necessary." Id § 1532(3) (Supp. IV 1980). See generally
Coggins, supra note 145, at 324 (discussing broad definitions used in ESA).
151. The final roll call vote was 92-0 in the Senate, 355-4 in the House. 119 CONG. REc. 25,694,
42,915 (1973).
152. See H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973) (grizzly bears in Yellowstone Park should
be protected by curtailment of clearcutting in National Forest areas surrounding park); 119 CONG.
REc. 42,913 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Dingell) (Act would require change in practices of Air Force
bombing range near whooping cranes' wintering grounds).
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"economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and
conservation' 5 3 and cited habitat destruction as one of the two primary evils
to be overcome.' 54 Significantly, Congress dropped nearly all of the qualifying
language in prior versions, 55 so that the main provisions of the resulting Act
are phrased as mandatory and absolute.' 56 A fair reading of the 1973 legisla-
tive history is that Congress intended "to devote whatever effort and resources
were necessary to avoid further diminution of national and worldwide wildlife
resources."' 157 The Act clearly reflects that intention, and most courts have
used that goal as the lodestone of ESA interpretation.
B. SCOPE
Ironically, the question of how many species actualy exist on earth will
probably never be resolved Thepast 10years have seen only another
100,000 species ident/fed, bringing the total to 1.6 million. I/an overall
figure as low as 5 million is accepted, then another 3.4 million remain to
be discovered-more than twice as many as have already been listed,
and if the actual total is 10 million, then roughlyfive out of six species
remain completely unknown to us. Even were the number of specialist
scientists to be increased tenfold, it is doubtful if they could do more
than take a solidpoke at theproblem be/ore the end of the century. By
that time, it is virtualy certain that, unless there are massive changes in
conservation attitudes and activities, a sizable proportion of all present
species will have disappeared, forever.
N. MYERS, THE SINKING ARK 18 (1979).
The second key consideration for assessing the Act's effect on land use is its
scope: that is, the number, kind, and range of species that it protects. The
Act's impact will be minimal if few domestic species are deemed endangered,
but will expand in rough proportion to the length of the list of covered species.
Unlike other federal wildlife statutes in which Congress designated the pro-
tected species,' 58 the ESA contains a flexible administrative listing mecha-
nism.'59 No species.is entitled to the Act's protection until the Secretary of the
Interior has added it to the official list. 160
Although any species of wildlife in the world was theoretically eligible for
153. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(1) (1976).
154. S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2989,
2990 (two major causes of extinction are hunting and destruction of natural habitat).
155. This aspect of the Act's evolution is reviewed in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 182-84, 185-86 n.31
(1978) (language from earlier versions such as "insofar as is practicable and consistent with primary
purposes" dropped from Act as passed).
156. The only nonmandatory provision is section 4, which authorizes the listing of endangered or
threatened species and the promulgation of regulations to protect those listed as threatened. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Secretary's listing or delisting decisions are, however, subject to
judicial review under ultra vires or abuse of discretion standards. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978).
157. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 177 (1978) (quoting Coggins, supra note 145, at 321).
158. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text (discussing federal statutes that protect wildlife
species).
159. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
160. Id § 1533(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
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listing after 1969,161 the 1973 Act expands practical coverage in several ways.
The Act authorizes the listing of plants, as well as fish and animals.' 62 To date
the Secretary of the Interior has exercised the authority to list plants only spar-
ingly, 163 but scientific assessments indicate that, among native plants alone,
thousands meet the statutory criteria. 64 Further, the Act authorizes the listing
of a species as endangered even if it is not in danger of extinction throughout
all of its range, as long as it is in danger over a "significant portion" of its
range.165 Finally, to avoid the brinksmanship of acting only when the situation
is acute, the Act authorizes the listing of a species as "threatened" whenever it
is "likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future
throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 166 The distinction between
endangered and threatened species can be critical in many foreseeable land use
conflicts because the protective measures accorded endangered species apply
automatically and more or less absolutely,1 67 while threatened species are pro-
tected through regulation only by whatever measures the Secretary168 deter-
mines to be necessary. 169 One obvious consequence is that the Secretary holds
vast potential power over land users through his discretion in listing species,
defining critical habitats, and promulgating regulations.
The Act establishes procedures for adding species to the endangered or
threatened species list after 1973: various forms of consultation "as appropri-
ate" are mandated170 and a notice-and-comment regulation format is re-
quired.' 7 1 Any interested person can initiate the process.172 Foreseeing that a
species' status might become evident only when a development project further
threatens it, Congress also authorized emergency listing procedures.'
73
The Secretary is to judge the status of a species on five substantive criteria:
1. the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtail-
ment of habitat or range;
2. "overutilization" for various purposes;
161. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 3(a), 83 Stat. 275, 275
(1969) (repealed 1973).
162. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (Supp. IV 1980).
163. Only sixty-one species of plants, representing twenty-five plant families, had been listed as en-
dangered or threatened as of 1981. 50 C.F.R. § 17.12 (1981). Twenty-one of these species are members
of the cactus family. Id The FWS recently determined that a sixty-second plant, the orchid Spiranthes
parkrii, was an endangered species. 47 Fed. Reg. 19,539 (1982) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.12).
164. A report by the Smithsonian Institution lists approximately 3,100 species of endangered or
threatened plants. The report is reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 51, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
165. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
166. Id § 1532(20).
167. See infra notes 324-37 and accompanying text (discussing taking of endangered species).
168. The ESA defines the term "Secretary" to mean, except as otherwise provided in the Act, "the
Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce as program responsibilities are vested pursuant
to the provisions of Reorganization Plan Numbered 4 of 1970; except that with respect to the enforce-
ment of the provisions of this chapter and the Convention which pertain to the importation or exporta-
tion of terrestrial plants, the term means the Secretary of Agriculture." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (Supp. IV
1980).
169. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1976).
170. Id § 1533(b)(1).
171. Id § 1533(b)(1), (f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
172. Id § 1533(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
173. Id § 1533(f)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. IV 1980); Gf National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359,
367 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976) (emergency designation of Mississippi sandhill crane's
critical habitat made on day before trial of action seeking to protect species by enjoining construction of
highway).
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3. disease or predation;
4. the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; and
5. other factors affecting the continued existence of a species.'
74
The Act does not indicate any priority or ranking, and not all the factors need
be present to list or delist. 17 Congress neither limited the applicable criteria
nor dictated any numerical population standards. Although the Secretary
must rely on the best scientific and commercial data available,' 76 the last two
factors afford him great latitude in listing. The first criterion clearly requires
the Secretary to assess the land use practices that might affect the survival of
the species under consideration. If the listing goes unchallenged, it is unassail-
able in court later, when a conflict with a proposed land use occurs.
177
Because the listing and delisting process is the touchstone of the Act's appli-
cability, the relative dearth of litigation attacking agency decisions to list is
surprising. No reported opinions concern delisting or the failure to list. Of the
six known cases brought to challenge a listing decision, the Secretary's decision
was upheld in three cases and invalidated in one. The other two cases are still
pending.
The courts in two of the three decided cases upholding listing decisions did
not deal directly with the listing criteria, but both indicated that considerable
judicial deference is due secretarial discretion in the listing process. The first
case, Cayman Turtle Farm, Ltd v. Andrus,178 arose because the Secretaries of
the Interior and Commerce, in listing several species of sea turtles as either
endangered or threatened, refused to create an exception for captive-raised
turtles from the ban on importation of all turtle products.' 79 The plaintiff, a
commercial mariculture operator, sued to force an exemption for its products,
alleging that the Secretaries' action was beyond their powers and was arbitrary
or capricious.180 The court delved deeply into the administrative record and
concluded that the blanket ban on importation was lawful and reasonable.' 8 '
Plaintiff's basic claim was that its business assisted the maintenance and en-
hancement of turtle populations in the wild by captive propagation and re-
search.' 82 The defendants reasoned that any trade in turtle products would
have a deleterious impact on the wild populations because partial measures are
too often and too easily circumvented.' 83 The court deemed this basic conflict
174. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
175. Id
176. Id § 1533(b)(1). In addition, section 1533(b)(1) requires that the Secretary engage in appropri-
ate consultation with affected states, interested persons and organizations, and other federal agencies.Id
177. In reference to the listing of the snail darter as an endangered species and the designation of its
critical habitat by the Secretary, the Supreme Court in Hill stated: "[D]oubtless petitioner would prefer
not to have these regulations on the books, but there is no suggestion that the Secretary exceeded his
authority or abused his discretion in issuing the regulations. Indeed, no judicial review of the Secre-
tary's determinations has ever been sought and hence the validity of his actions are not open to review
in this Court." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978). In the 1973 ESA Congress provided that any
species listed as endangered pursuant to the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969 were auto-
matically protected pending the republication of the lists to conform with the 1973 mandates and that
republication did not require public hearings or comment. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(3) (1976).
178. 478 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1979).
179. Id at 128-29.
180. Id at 127.
181. Id at 135.
182. Id at 132-33.
183. Id
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a "technical" or "scientific" question and accorded the Secretaries' decision a
"strong presumption of validity."18 4 A review of the evidence convinced the
court that the administrative action had "an adequate factual and policy basis
in the administrative record."' 85
The second case, Pacfc LegalFoundation v. Andrus,18 6 is in many respects a
replay of the Snail Darter litigation. The TVA proposed and Congress author-
ized the construction of a dam; 18 7 conventional NEPA lawsuits against the
dam eventually failed.1 88 In the interim, however, the Secretary of the Interior
listed as endangered six species of pearly mussels found in the river'8 9 and
commenced a review of five species of snails that also resided there.' 90 The
Secretary had not completed the snail listings' 9 1 or officially designated the
critical habitat of the mussels.192 Nonetheless, it seemed clear that construction
of the dam could not go forward without violating the ESA. 193 At this point,
various interests anxious for completion of the dam brought suit, claiming that
the listing of the mussels and the proposed listing of the snails were invalid
because the Fish and Wildlife Service had failed to prepare the environmental
impact statement (EIS) required by NEPA.194 Arguably misreading prece-
dent, 95 the district court held that NEPA was inapplicable to the listing pro-
cess, 196 even though the court thought the listing was a major federal action. 197
184. Id at 131. The court gave full deference to the Secretaries' finding that "the benefits of scien-
tific research which would accrue from a mariculture exemption do not outweigh the risks to the sur-
vival of wild sea turtle populations." Id at 132, 133. In addition, the court credited the Secretaries'
finding that establishment of a mariculture exemption would be detrimental to the survival of wild sea
turtle populations because a mariculture operation continually requires procurement of both wild eggs
and breeding adults. Id at 132 n.4. Plaintiff also claimed that the ESA "does not apply to captive-bred
sea turtles which are hatched and raised in a controlled environment." Id at 129. The court disagreed,
pointing out that section 9(b) did not exempt from protection specimens that were "'held in the course
of a commercial activity."' Id at 129. The court therefore ruled that Cayman Turtle Farm could not
qualify for the exemption because its turtles were held in the course of commercial activity. Id
185. Id at 134.
186. 9 ENvrL. L. REp. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,413 (M.D. Tenn. 1979), a fd, 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir.
1981).
187. 9 ENVrL. L. RE. (ENVTL. L. INST.) at 20,413.
188. Id at 20,414.
189. Id
190. Id
191. Id
192. Id
193. "On February 16, 1977, the Director of the FWS issued a Biological Opinion concluding that
completion of the Columbia Dam would jeopardize the continued existence of the six endangered
mussels in violation of Section 7 of the Act." 9 ENVrL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INsT.) at 20,414.
194. Id at 20,413. Plaintiffs also alleged that the documents FWS relied upon in listing the mollusks
as endangered and in proposing to list the snails were inadequate under NEPA. They sought an order
invalidating the listing of the mollusks and directing that FWS promulgate regulations implementing
NEPA in the listing process. Id
195. Citing Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976), the court stated that
"[w]here there is a conflict between a statutorily mandated purpose and the provisions of the NEPA, the
statutory mandate takes preference." 9 ENvrL. L. REP. (EN vTL. L. INsT.) at 20,415.. The Supreme
Court in Flint Ridge held NEPA inapplicable because the Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment could not comply with statutory duties under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act and at
the same time prepare an environmental impact statement on proposed developments. 426 U.S. at 791.
No such conflict exists, however, between the Endangered Species Act and NEPA. The ESA does
p rescribe procedural steps to implement its policies, but these are not necessarily irreconcilable with
EPA's command that "each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set
out in [NEPA] unless the existing law applicable to such agency's operations expressly prohibits or
makes full compliance with one of the directives impossible." 115 CONG. Rc. 39,703 (1969) (House
conferees).
196. 9 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INsT.) at 20,415.
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On appeal the Sixth Circuit used a somewhat different rationale to affirm.' 98
The appellate court rejected the Government's arguments that compliance
with NEPA was impossible because of time constraints and that the listing was
the functional equivalent of an EIS.199 Instead, the court held that the ESA
conflicted with and thus superceded NEPA because the duty to list is
mandatory, its exercise is governed by the five listing criteria, and listing com-
ports with NEPA policies. 2°° A thorough examination of the relevant legisla-
tive histories produced indicia of supporting congressional intent.
201
In the third case upholding a listing decision, Glover River Or anization v.
Department of Interior,202 plaintiff sought to stop the proposed listing of the
leopard darter because the listing would have imperiled progress on the
Lukfata Dam in Oklahoma.20 3 The district court concluded that the Secretary
of the Interior should have prepared an EIS prior to listing the leopard darter
as a threatened species and designating its critical habitat, 2°4 a conclusion that
cannot be reconciled with the decision in Pacfic LegalFoundation. The Tenth
Circuit reversed on the ground that Glover lacked standing.
20 5
The one case invalidating a listing decision, Colorado River Water Conserva-
tion District v. Andrus,20 6 was a travesty of a lawsuit. Water districts in Colo-
rado brought an action ostensibly aimed at enforcing the ESA, but actually
meant to emasculate its operation and to shift the blame for noncompliance to
state governments and federal agencies. 20 7 The Colorado River squawfish, the
humpback chub, and the totoaba are endangered species that inhabit the Colo-
rado River.208 The complaint filed by the water districts sought a wide range of
remedies, including a declaration that the listing for each of the endangered
species was invalid.209 On cross motions for summary judgment, the Colorado
federal district court held that the squawfish and chub had not been listed
properly and thus were no longer officially endangered.
210
The squawfish and the chub had been listed in 1967,211 and federal defend-
197. Id Plaintiffs contended that the listing of the species in this case was "major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" because the listings would delay or stop
construction of the Columbia Dam. 9 ENVTL L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INsT.) at 20,413.
198. Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981).
199. Id at 834-35.
200. Id at 835-37. Application of NEPA to the listing process would complicate and delay an al-
ready intricate exercise, but likely would have little long-term detrimental effect. More significant is the
court's holding that listing is mandatory when the ESA criteria are satisfied. Id at 835.
201. 657 F.2d at 838-40.
202. 675 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1982).
203. Id
204. Id at 253.
205. Id at 255-56. The court reasoned that even if the preparation of an EIS led to removal of the
leopard darter from the threatened species list, this would not ensure the funding or construction of
future flood control projects on the Little River system, which was the result sought by Glover. Id
Glover therefore failed to establish the causation and redressability requisite for standing. Id
206. Civ. No. 78-A-1191 (D. Colo. Aug. 3, 1981) (granting summary judgment) (copy on file at
Georgetown Law Journal).
207. It was uncontroverted that plaintiffs were more interested in invalidating the listing of the pis-
cine species than in protecting their aquatic habitat. Colorado River Dist., slip op. at 1-2.
208. 32 Fed. Reg. 4,001 (1967).
209. Colorado River Dist., slip op. at 1.
210. Id at 9. While the totoaba listing was held deficient in failing to designate critical habitat, Id at
11, the proper remedy was designation, not invalidation.
211. 32 Fed. Reg. 4,001 (1967).
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ants conceded that Administrative Procedure Act212 (APA) rulemaking proce-
dures had not been followed in the listing process. 21 3 Apparently plaintiffs did
not argue that either species was substantively unqualified under former or
present listing criteria. The court deemed the question purely one of legal in-
terpretation: did the APA apply to species designation under the 1966
ESPA?21 4 Holding that the answer was affirmative, the court rejected the gov-
ernment's technical and statutory defenses and found the listing invalid.
215
The federal defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to exhaust the administra-
tive remedy of petitioning for a change in the species' status,216 that the APA
was inapplicable because the listing concerned public property,2 17 and that
subsequent enactments showed that Congress in 1966 did not intend to impose
formal rulemaking requirements.218 The court rejoined that no exhaustion is
required if the question is purely legal,219 that wild animals are the property of
no one, including the federal government,220 and that there was no applicable
APA exemption.221 Each of those rulings is questionable. The arguments that
either were not made or were not addressed, however, are more fundamental.
The court threw out an administrative decision made fourteen years earlier.
No objection had been made to listing in 1967, and no proceeding had been
commenced in the eight years after 1973 for reconsideration.222 In 1973 Con-
212. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1976).
213. Colorado River Dist., slip op. at 8-9. The listing had been repeated, with APA compliance, in
1970. The fact initially was ignored by both parties, but it was the basis for a subsequent motion to
reconsider by federal defendants, which is pending. Letter from attorney for plaintiffs to author (Oct.
12, 1981) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
214. Colorado River Dist., slip op. at 7.
215. Id at 8-9.
216. Id at 7. The "delisting" procedure is authorized by the ESA, and may be initiated by petition
of anyone. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
217. Colorado River Dist., slip op. at 8 (noting defendant's contention that, because § 553 of Act
inapplicible to public property, fish should be excluded).
218. Id The 1966 version of the ESA required only "consultation," while the 1973 Act explicitly
mandates APA notice-and-comment procedures. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0(1) (1976).
219. Colorado River Dist., slip op. at 7. Government emphasis on plaintiffs' failure to use the later
statutory remedy disguised the more serious problems of finality and laches. See infra notes 222-30
(discussing laches and finality issues).
220. Colorado River Dist., slip. op. at 8. The public property exemption never has had wide applica-
tion, and the court's rejection of it likely is correct. But the question is more interesting and difficult
than the court's offhand treatment would make it appear. Although dicta going back to Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416,434 (1920), have proclaimed that state ownership is a conceptual "slender reed,"
and although that ownership theory was interred in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1979),
the question offederal "ownership" has never received a onclusive answer. The piecemeal, prelimi-
nary judicial thinking indicates that federal ownership of federally protected species is not wholly spe-
cious. Refusing to decide the question in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 537 (1976), Justice
Marshall nevertheless commented that "it is far from clear. .,. that Congress cannot assert a property
interest in the regulated horses and burros superior to that of the state." Id The district court in the
Palla case went a little further in dictum: "But where endangered species are concerned, national
interests ome into play. . . [so that] the importane of preserving such a national resource may be of
such magnitude as to rise to the level of a federal property interest." Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and
Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 995 n.40 (D. Hawaii 1979), aft'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
221. Colorado River Dit., slip op. at 9. The court did not discuss whether the less demanding re-
quirements of the 1966 Act superceded the equivalent APA requirements.
222. The list has been republished dozens of times. There was no allegation that plaintiffs were
unaware of the listing at any time, even if such ignorance is a defense to laches. The failure to make a
seasonable challenge to the original listing should be fatal. See Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d
982, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (upholding regulations challenged on ground that comment period too short
because plaintifi's delay in bringing action inexcusable).
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gress had affirmed the validity of the preexisting list,2 2 3 and various interests
had relied on it in one way or another over time. The plaintiff districts cer-
tainly were aware of the listing for many years. The effect of the court's deci-
sion conceivably could be the extinction of two wildlife species, precisely the
result Congress took such pains to avoid.224 Further, the decision places all
pre-1973 designations and the species protected by them in jeopardy. Looked
at in this light, it is evident that the court's simplistic rationale should not
stand.
Accepted canons of administrative law also dictate reversal of the district
court decision. Procedural defects render an administrative decision voidable,
not void. Remand to the agency for reconsideration might have been proper
had the water districts timely challenged the "rule,"22 5 but such defects are
subsumed into the finality of the rule and are not subject to later collateral
attack. As the Supreme Court in TV v. Hill stated, "[T]here is no suggestion
that the Secretary exceeded his authority. . . in issuing the regulations [that
listed the species and designated critical habitat for it]. Indeed, no judicial
review of the Secretary's determinations has ever been sought and hence the
validity of his actions [is] not open to review in this Court. ' '226 The Sixth Cir-
cuit in Pacflc Legal Foundation agreed: "Such [listing] may be reviewed to
determine if it was arbitrary and capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. No review of
rulemaking was requested by appellants. They cannot now collaterally attack
the rulemaking as unsupportedby substantial evidence. '22 7 Further, none of
the four cases 228 cited by the court for its dispositive conclusion that "[r]ules
promulgated in violation of [APA] § 553 are invalid" 229 is on or anywhere
near the point: all four cases were reasonably direct and contemporaneous at-
tacks on the challenged regulation.230 The Colorado River District decision is
wrong on the law as well as shortsighted on the policy aspects of the
controversy.
The two pending cases involving challenges to listing decisions are DeKalb
County Commissioners v. Andrus 23' and Edwards Underground Water District
v. Andrus.Z32 In DeKalb the Alabama Power Company and others are oppos-
ing the listing of the green pitcher plant.2 33 In Edwards, the plaintiff district
seeks invalidation of four species listings for failure to assess economic im-
pacts; it fears that the designations may reduce the amount of water available
223. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(3) (1976).
224. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173-47 (1978) ("Congress intended endangered species to be
afforded the highest of priorities").
225. Whether the listing qualified as a "rule" was open to question, at least before Congress decided
to treat it as such, because it is more in the nature of a finding of fact than a generally applicable
standard for behavior or decision.
226. 437 U.S. at 172.
227. Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 1981).
228. The court cited NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S 759 (1969); Joseph v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Daniels, 418 F. Supp. 1074 (D.S.D. 1976);
and City of New York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
229. Colorado River Dit., slip. op. at 9.
230. Only in City ofNew York v. Diamond was there any gap between the publication of the regula-
tion and the challenge to it, and defendents failed to assert a laches defense. City of New York v.
Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
231. No. 80-C-1242 (N.D. Ala.), digestedin WILDLIFE NEWSLMTER, May-June 1981, at A-I (pub-
lished by Wildlife Section, Land and Natural Resources Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
232. Civ. No. 80 Ca 410 (W.D. Tex.), dgestedin WILDIFE NEWSLETTER, May-June 1981, at A-i.
233. WILDLIFE NEWSLETTER, May-June 1981, at A-I.
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for general use in San Antonio and neighboring cities. 234
At present the reach of the Act is limited to fewer than 200 species native to
this country. 235 The listing process was slow getting underway,236 it has been
periodically retarded by political considerations 237 and jurisdictional squab-
bles,238 and it came to a crashing halt to adjust to the 1978 Amendments,
239
which require critical habitat designation to accompany listing.240 Although
the present Administration appears more inclined to delete species from the
list than to add them to it, there is reason to believe that the list will expand in
coming years. A big backlog of candidate species, plant and animal, already
exists. State agencies are identifying local species that eventually should qual-
ify for federal listing. The listing process can be initiated by anyone and is
subject to judicial review;241 if the statutory criteria are satisfied, listing be-
comes a mandatory duty.24 2 More aggressive action by conservation organiza-
tions to take advantage of these procedures may be anticipated.
Finally, the surface of biological ignorance has barely been scratched: esti-
mates of the number of species in the world vary by millions; the number of
subspecies and distinct populations defies counting; the crisis of extinction
rates becomes daily better known;243 and zoological experts are discovering
precarious species at an accelerating pace.244 The flexibility in the listing pro-
cess contemplates some margin for error, and the Act as a whole dictates that
species in peril receive every benefit of the doubt. Expansion of the list of
endangered and threatened species will increase the potential for conflicts be-
tween wildlife and land development.
C. PROTECTION OF LISTED SPECIES
This shift in property rights from the private individual to the public
communiy... establishes endangered species as common resource
property much as we have come to treat our architectural heritage and
historical monuments. Essentially the approach says that no one has the
234. Id
235. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, .12 (1981).
236. Coggins, supra note 45, at 804.
237. "There was, however, some indication that the Fish and Wildlife Service deliberately had failed
to list two species of insects living in the vicinity of the ongoing New Melones Dam project in Califor-
nia for fear of provoking an adverse congressional reaction." Rosenberg, supra note 145, at 538 n.225
(citations omitted).
238. The jurisdictional problem was created by the 1973 Act. See Coggins, supra note 145, at 329-30
(Secretaries of Interior and Commerce jointly responsible for listing endangered and threatened spe-
cies). Sea turtle listings, for instance, were held up for years while the Interior Department argued with
the Department of Commerce over who had jurisdiction. The procedural history of sea turtle listing is
recounted in Cayman Turtle Farm, Ltd. v. Andrus, 478 F. Supp. 125, 127-28 (D.D.C. 1979).
239. One hundred eleven animals and 1,867 plants had been proposed for listing prior to the
Amendments, H.R. REP. No. 1026, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978); nearly all of these proposals were
abandoned thereafter.
240. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). See infra notes 396-413 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing critical habitat designation under 1978 amendment).
241. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2), (f)(l) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Over a hundred species have been listed at
the behest of private petitioners. See 41 Fed. Reg. 24,062 (1976) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1981))
(159 species listed as endangered on petition of Fund for Animals, Inc.). The decision not to list is
reviewable.
242. Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 841 (6th Cir. 1981).
243. Ramsay, supra note 31, at 598.
244. N. MYERS, supra note 30, at 17-19.
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right to obliterate a species any more than anyone has the right to build
highrise apartments on the site of Independence Hall, the Alamo, or the
Statue of Liberty and that this should hold whether the land be held
privately or publicly.
Ripley & Lovejoy, Threatened and
Endangered Species, in WILDLIFE AND
AMERICA 365, 377 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978).
Once a species is listed as endangered, the Act surrounds it with a cocoon of
legal protection. The Act removes markets: no one may import, export, sell,
transport, barter, or possess a listed animal or products made from It.2 4 5 The
Act "freezes" articles made from endangered species before they were listed:
no one may buy or sell them even if they were acquired lawfully. 246 The Act
forbids all killing, harm, and harassment of an endangered species, 247 with
only a few well-circumscribed exceptions. 248 The Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) forms a "recovery team" for each listed species. Teams are composed
of biological specialists who study the species and recommend measures for its
preservation and further propagation.249 If the Secretary has classified the spe-
cies only as threatened, he may impose those same measures, and others dis-
cussed below, by regulation.250
The restrictions on hunting and commerce are standard means of wildlife
245. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See M. BEAN, supra note 44, at chs. 5 & 12 (dis-
cussing prohibition and regulation of trade involving endangered and threatened species); Coggins,
supra note 45, at 804-05 (same); King, supra note 59, at 254 (same).
246. In Delbay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, 409 F. Supp. 637 (D.D.C. 1976),
the court held that spermaceti derived from the endangered sperm whale and imported pursuant to a
valid economic hardship exemption permit under the 1969 ESCA was subject to all provisions of the
1973 ESA. Id at 643. The court further held that such permits for importation did not give the right to
sell or transport the substance in interstate commerce. Id; see also United States v. Richards, 583 F.2d
491, 496 (10th Cir. 1978) (permit authorizing possession of birds protected by 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1976)
does not give full property rights or allow sale); cf United States v. Fuld Store Co., 262 F. 836, 836 (D.
Mont. 1920) (1918 Migratory Bird Act prohibiting sale of parts of protected bird does not apply to sale
of plumage lawfully acquired prior to Act). The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of a
prohibition on the sale of lawfully acquired property in Andrus v. Allard, 44 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979)
(rejecting challenges based on fifth amendment taking clause to regulations forbidding sale of legally
acquired wildlife artifacts). See Coggins, supra note 44, at 335-43 (discussing problem of illegal sale of
artifact legally acquired).
247. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1976). See infra notes 324-86 and accompanying text (discussing ESA's
"taking" provision).
248. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1976). Exemptions are available in the discretion of the Secretary for persons
who have entered into contracts involving an endangered species prior to notice in the Federal Register
that the species is under consideration for listing if application of the Act's prohibitions will cause that
person to suffer an undue economic hardship. Id § 1539(b). Alaska natives are not subject to prohibi-
tions of the Act if protected species are taken primarily for subsistence purposes. Id § 1539(0.
249. Congress did not specifically include statutory authority for designation of a recovery team in
the 1973 ESA, but the broad definition of "conservation" in section 1532(2) ("all methods and proce-
dures" necessary to bring endangered and threatened species to a point where protective measures are
no longer necessary) is adequate general authority. Such teams were common before the 1978 amend-
ments to the ESA gave them statutory recognition. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural
Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 988 & n.4 (D. Hawaii 1979) (FWS recovery team accumulated data used
by FWS in determining ESA violation), a§'d, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981); Fund for Animals v. An-
drus, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189, 2190-91 (D. Minn. 1978) (recovery team composed of Park
Service, Forest Service, and state officials had authority to develop plan for recovery of endangered
timber wolf).
250. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1976). Such regulations are binding on the agency. Fund for Animals v.
Andrus, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189, 2192-93 (D. Minn. 1978).
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protection derived from many predecessor state and federal statutes. 25' But
they do not directly confront the overriding problem of habitat destruction and
alteration, and Congress was not satisfied with halfway measures. Some provi-
sions of the 1973 Act are clearly directed at habitat preservation, and other
sections are capable of being interpreted to serve that end.
1. Land Acquisition
The 1973 ESA increased the authorization of funds for the purchase of en-
dangered species habitat.252 Actual appropriations and spending have not met
original expectations, and the immediate purchasing prospects are dim.253 The
Secretary's land acquisition powers, however, plus his rulemaking authority
under other statutes such as the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,254 provide several
indirect means of controlling private land use.255 For instance, courts have
upheld orders forbidding hunting on private lands adjacent to refuges to pro-
tect the birds using them.
256
2. Federal Agency Actions: The Duties Created by Section 7
Section 7 of the Act as passed in 1973 is obviously directed at habitat
protection:
The Secretary shall review other programs administered by him and
utilize such programs in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.
All other Federal departments and agencies shall, in consultation
with and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities
in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out pro-
grams for the conservation of endangered species and threatened spe-
cies listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title and by taking such
action necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried
out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of such endan-
gered species and threatened species or result in the destruction or
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the
Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with the affected States,
to be critical.257
The quoted provision is now only one subsection of section 7, but it remains
251. See generally M. BEAN, supra note 44, at ch. 4; T. LUND, supra note 60, at 105-07; J.
TREFETHEN, supra note 56, at pt. IV; Palmer, supra note 139 (discussing provisions of Lacey Act, En-
dangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, and Endangered Species Act of 1973).
252. 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
253. The Reagan Administration has slashed Fiscal Years' 1982-85 funding for the Interior Depart-
ment, and Secretary Watt has announced a policy against land acquisition for parks.
254. 16 U.S.C. § 704 (1976).
255. See Coggins & Patti, Resurrection andExa nsion of the Migratory Bird TreatyAct, 50 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 165, 182 nn.138-39 (1979) (discussing criminal liability and prosecution under Migratory Bird
Treaty Act).
256. See Bailey v. Holland, 126 F.2d 317,322 (4th Cir. 1942) (government power to prohibit hunting
migratory water fowl not confined to land to which it holds title; prohibition on adjacent land valid as
necessary to fulfill statutory goals). See generally Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616, 619 (7th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939 (1951) (Secretary of Interior's discretionary prohibition of hunting
protected birds on adjacent lands does not render United States liable for crop damage caused by those
birds); M. BEAN, supra note 44, at 76-85.
257. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. IV 1980)).
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substantially intact.258 It also remains the key to land use control over any
project or activity with a substantial connection to federal powers or largesse.
Read literally, it creates four distinct duties binding on every federal agency.
The procedural duty, which was substantially expanded in 1978,259 requires
consultation whenever an action may affect protected species; it triggers the
process leading to land use control but provides no substantive guidance. The
negative injunctions forbid jeopardizing a listed species or destroying its "criti-
cal habitat." The affirmative command requires the agency to conserve endan-
gered and threatened species.
The Duty to Insure Against leopardization. In some reported cases,
courts have tended to lump together the prohibitions against critical habitat
modification and species jeopardization without differentiating between
them.260 Although closely related, they are nevertheless analytically distinct,
and the distinction can have practical importance.
In TVAI v. Hill the Supreme Court settled any doubts concerning whether the
dual prohibition should be read literally and strictly. An earlier Eighth Circuit
decision had treated section 7 as merely requiring a NEPA-like consultation
process by the agency with the Secretary of the Interior, imposing few, if any,
actual limitations on the content of the agency decision.26' The Hill Court em-
phasized that the duties to insure against modification of habitat and species
jeopardization are distinct, absolute, and judicially enforceable.262
The Fifth Circuit in an earlier case had opined that the Act did not give the
Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service a veto power over the ac-
tion agency (and then entered an order that effectively gave the FWS such a
veto).263 The Supreme Court did not directly discuss the issue of veto power,
but it squarely held that if the project would result in species jeopardization, it
could not go forward.264 The FWS thus has an initial de facto veto over land
258. The 1978 Amendments added procedural refinements and an exemption procedure but did not
change the operative wording quoted. See infra notes 387-548 and accompanying text (discussing 1978
Amendments to ESA). In 1979, "do not jeopardize" was changed to "is not likely to jeopardize." Act of
Dec. 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4(1), 93 Stat. 1225, 1226.
259. See infra notes 420-71 and accompanying text (discussing consultation process).
260. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1976).
261. Id at 1303-04 & n.39. The Froehlke court relied on National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529
F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 979 (1976), in holding that the concerned agency and not the
Secretary of the Interior had the ultimate decision making power on a federal project. The Froehlke
court, however, ignored the Coleman court's deferral to the Secretary of the Interior's determination on
ultimate agency decision. 529 F.2d at 375; see infra note 263 (discussing Coleman).
262. The words of section 7 "affirmatively command all federal agencies 'to insure that actions au-
thorized, funded or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence' of an endangered
species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species .... This language
admits of no exception." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (emphasis in original).
263. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 979 (1976).
The court stated that "once an agency has had meaningful consultation with the Secretary of Interior
concerning actions which may affect an endangered species the final decision of whether or not to
proceed with the action lies with the agency itself. Section 7 does not give the Department of Interior a
veto over the actions of other federal agencies." Id at 371. But in shaping relief, the court accorded
Interior the key role: "Because the Department of Interior has primary jurisdiction for administering
the Endangered Species Act, and the subject matter of this lawsuit is within the specialized field of the
Department we defer to its determination of what modifications are necessary to bring the highway
project into compliance with § 7. Id at 375.
264. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 186-87 (1978).
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uses that require federal participation or permission because the FWS makes
the biological forecast in the consultation process.
The key terms in section 7 are "insure," "action," and "jeopardize the con-
tinued existence." The Hill Court gave expansive readings to the first two, but
had no need to construe the third phrase because the parties conceded the
likelihood of extinction.265 The Court decided that "actions authorized,
funded, or carried out" means literally every decision that federal agencies
make.266 In contrast to NEPA, there are no qualifying words such as "major"
or "significantly affecting," 267 and the scope of section 7 is limited only by the
requirement of a nexus to federal agencies. That limitation is less significant
than it may appear, for the federal government is in one way or another inti-
mately associated with many types of large-scale private activity.268 Similarly,
"insure" was assumed by the Hill majority to carry its ordinary connotation.269
The ceitral problem of interpretation is whether "jeopardize the continued
existence" means "result in extinction," or "contribute somehow to the process
that ultimately may lead to extinction," or something in between. Must the
action adversely affect the entire species, or will the likelihood of harm to one
or more species' members suffice to invoke section 7 protection? Population
compositions of species range from single local populations that are vulnerable
to one sizable development (such as the snail darter) to solitary, widespread,
and wide-ranging species (such as bald eagles) whose total population would
not be much affected by any single human project. If "jeopardization" is inter-
preted to require a drastic effect on the entire population, the reach of section 7
will be narrowly circumscribed for the latter varieties.
No judicial opinion preceding the 1978 Amendments adequately defined
"jeopardization."270 In Sierra Club v. Froehlke271 plaintiff sued to enjoin con-
struction by the Army Corps of Engineers of the Meramec Dam in Missouri,
alleging that it would both violate section 7 and "take" the endangered Indi-
ana bat.272 The evidence indicated that the project would cause flooding in
265. Id at 171-72.
266. Id at 172-74. Justice Powell in dissent argued that the phrase "actions authorized, funded, or
carried out" was ambiguous and should apply only to prospective actions in which an agency still has
reasonable decision making alternatives available, not to all actions that an agency can ever take. Id at
205 (Powell, J., dissenting). In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that "[o]ne would be
hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endan-
gered Species Act," id at 173, and held that Justice Powell's interpretation would make the words "or
carry out" in section 7 superfluous; if Congress had meant to limit the Act to require agency compliance
with section 7 only at the planning stage, it would have used appropriate language, such as that in the
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A), (C) (1976). Id at 173 n.18.
267. The requirements of NEPA do not become applicable until it is determined that the activity in
question is "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976); see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 403-06 (1976) (EIS only required
when major federal involvement). In contrast, the section 7 mandate in the ESA is directed to all
actions of federal agencies. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
268. See infra notes 685-95 and accompanying text (discussing extensive reach of federal regulatory
power over private projects).
269. 437 U.S. at 173-74, 182-84.
270. One of the best analyses of legislative intent is in Note, Obligations of Federal Agencies Under
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 28 STAN. L. Rav. 1247 (1976).
271. 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
272. Id at 1301-02.
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several caves containing bats.273 One cave that had been proposed for critical
habitat designation contained a "large number" of bats.274 Flooding would
occur only if the reservoir reached flood pool level, a level that would be
reached, statistically, once in a period exceeding 10,000 years.275 Even assum-
ing the worst consequences, it was evident that Meramec by itself would not
cause the extinction of the species because only a few thousand bats out of an
estimated population of 700,000 would be affected. Without much illuminat-
ing discussion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the
dam would cause neither jeopardization nor a taking.276
The situation of the Mississippi sandhill crane in National Wildlife Federa-
tion v. Coleman277 differed dramatically. Road building agencies proposed to
construct an interstate highway through or adjacent to the only habitat for the
remaining 40-odd cranes.278 The highway itself would not have extirpated the
species, but the commercial development in its wake, combined with other fac-
tors that had contributed to its endangered status, conceivably could have
eliminated the species over the years.279 Without defining the degree of harm
requisite to jeopardization, the court enjoined the project for failure to insure
that no jeopardy would occur.280 TVI v. Hill,2 81 the Snail Darter case, posed
an even starker situation: unless transplantation was successful, 282 closing the
273. Id at 1303.
274. Id
275. Id at 1302 n.37, 1303. The court thought it significant that although the Secretary of the Inte-
rior has the power to designate critical habitat immediately, he chose not to do so in this instance. ld
at 1302 n.37. The evidence showed that 10 to 15 thousand Indiana bats would be affected by the waters
of the reservoir, that the normal pool level of the reservoir would flood several caves, and that recrea-
tion in the area would be detrimental to the remaining habitat. Id at 1303.
276. The court found no clear error in the district court's determination that the defendants had
violated neither section 7 nor section 9 of the ESA and that plaintiffs had failed to show that the
Meramec Dam activities were adversely affecting Indiana bats. Id at 1305. The court stated that "in
reviewing on its merits the substantive agency decision before us our review is narrow and limited in
scope." Id at 1304.
277. 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
278. Id at 362.
279. Id at 365. The sandhill crane population had been "declining 'chiefly because of reduction of
suitable habitat which is semi-open and wet savannah by changing land use including drainage, plant-
ing of trees, suburban development, and highway building."' Id (quoting the Final Environmental
Impact Statement Interstate Route No. 10, Jackson County, Mississippi, at 23-24 (1975), quoting FISH
AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THE THREATENED WILDLIFE OF THE UNITED
STATES (1973)). "[Ift is questionable whether the crane can survive the additional loss of habitat caused
by the indirect effects of the highway ...." 529 F.2d at 373.
280. "[Section] 7 imposes on all federal agencies the mandatory obligation to insure [nonjeopardiza-
tion] .... Although ... the appellees have recognized and considered the danger the highway poses
to the crane, they have failed to take the necessary steps 'to insure' that the highway will not jeopardize
the crane or modify its habitat." 529 F.2d at 373. The "injunction is to remain in force until the
Secretary of the Department of Interior determines that the necessary modifications are made in the
highway project to insure that it will no longer jeopardize the continued existence of the Mississippi
Sandhill Crane or destroy or modify critical habitat of the Mississippi Sandhill Crane." Id at 375
(footnote omitted).
281. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
282. To facilitate completion of the Tellico Dam without destroying the snail darter, Congress ap-
propriated specially two million dollars to finance relocation of the snail darter and other endangered
species which threatened to stop or delay TVA projects. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 170-71 (1978) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 379, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977); S. REP. No. 301, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1977));
Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriation Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-96, 11 Stat. 797 (1977). The Secretary of the Interior had found that experimental
transplantation into the nearby'Hiwassee River did not prove that the snail darter could survive in that
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Tellico Dam gates would cause the extinction of the little fish.283
A reasonable definition of "jeopardize" is any substantial harm to any popu-
lation segment of any listed species. That a species is listed as endangered
itself indicates that any adverse effect could contribute to its extinction. The
use of "jeopardize" in the statute instead of "result in extinction" suggests that
Congress contemplated a less demanding standard. The administrative inter-
pretation, which is entitled to some deference, 284 takes a middle-of-the-road
approach: an agency action does not "comply if it might be expected to result
in a reduction in the number or distribution of that species of sufficient magni-
tude to place the species in jeopardy, or restrict the potential and reasonable
expansion or recovery of that species . "285 Since an endangered species is
already in jeopardy, and a threatened species is close to it, only a de minimus
impact on the species should be tolerable in applying section 7.286
In sum, the duty to insure against jeopardization, although subject to some
dispute over the magnitude of the effect of the action on a listed species, is
nevertheless a considerable barrier to land development. Virtually any federal
participation in the decision will trigger the application of section 7, and any
federal action, no matter how far along the project may be, qualifies. No
agency may construct, license, finance, authorize, act on, or assist in a project
unless it first has consulted with the FWS and received official assurances that
the action will not harm listed species. The agency must be able to insure that
such damage will not occur; neither biological uncertainty nor future inten-
tions to mitigate harm should serve to circumvent the statutory requirement.
The Duty to Insure Against Critical Habitat Destruction. Closely related
to jeopardization, and perhaps more to the point for land use purposes, is the
requirement that the federal agency insure against destruction or modification
of critical habitat. In the 1973 Act, section 7 contained only the reference to
"habitat . . . determined by the Secretary . . . to be critical. 287 Congress
failed to specify any criteria, definitions, or procedures for that determination.
Given the unlimited number of ways in which human activities have ad-
versely affected animal habitats, and the congressional recognition that habitat
loss is the primary cause of endangerment, 288 protection of critical habitat will
habitat and did not negate evidence that biological and other factors in the Hiwassee would preclude
successful transplantation of the snail darter. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 162-63, 163 n.13 (1978) (citing
Fed. Reg. 47,506 (1975)). The evidence on transplants is not all in yet, and later reports claim that snail
darter populations have been discovered in other locations.
283. "[I]t is clear that TVA's proposed operation of the dam will have precisely the. . . effect...
[of] eradication of an endangered species." Hill, 437 U.S. at 174. But cf. supra note 282 (possibility of
species survival even with dam).
284. Cf. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975) (reviewing court will
not overturn EPA construction of Clean Air Act if sufficiently reasonable); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S.
1, 18 (1965) (courts will defer to Interior Department construction of Executive Order if reasonable
even though alternative constructions possible).
285. 40 Fed. Reg. 17,764 (1975).
286. This would partially reconcile the Indiana Bat, Mississippi Sandhill Crane, and Snail Darter
cases discussed supra in notes 270-83 and accompanying text. Although any harm to the crane popula-
tion of approximately 40 would be a violation, some negative effects on a few of the estimated 700,000
bats would be tolerable in the absence of cumulative detriments.
287. 16 U.S.C § 1536 (1976) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980)).
288. See supra note 48 (discussing habitat destruction as cause of extinction).
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be a sweeping restriction on land use if administratively implemented. Section
7 forbids adverse modification as well as destruction of habitat. It only ap-
plies, however, to federal actions and to areas that have been officially desig-
nated. The second of these is the more important limitation because the
critical habitat designation process has been slow, tentative, and incomplete.
2s9
Fearing political reaction and unsure of its powers and duties in this area,
290
the FWS to date has made designations for only a fraction of the listed spe-
cies-and then frequently with reluctance.
29
'
Even so, such designations have been significant in the reported litigation.
The Supreme Court in Hill noted that the snail darter's official critical habitat
would necessarily be disrupted by the closing of the dam gates. 292 The Eighth
Circuit in Sierra Club v. Froehlke293 cited the failure to complete the habitat
designation process for the Indiana bat as a reason for finding no violation.
294
In the Mississippi Sandhill Crane litigation,295 the FWS, on the eve of trial,
issued an emergency habitat determination to which the Fifth Circuit gave full
credence.296 And in Nebraska v. RuralElectriffcation Administration,297 the Ne-
braska District Court was willing to protect a designated habitat many miles
downstream from the project at issue.298
The latter decision was handed down after Hill but before enactment of the
1978 Amendments. The whooping crane, perhaps the best known endangered
species, used a stretch of the Platte River in Nebraska as stopover habitat in its
annual migration.299 The proposed Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir in Wyo-
ming on a Platte tributary could have reduced flow in the Platte River, ad-
versely altering the crane habitat.300 The defendant federal agency concluded
that there would be no negative impact on the whooping cranes.30' The FWS
demanded consultation, however, and concluded that there was a possiblity of
adverse consequences, although further studies would be necessary to deter-
mine the effects more precisely.302 With matters in that posture, the court en-
joined further construction, holding the loan guarantees given by Rural
289. Only 29 critical habitats had been designated prior to the 1978 Amendments. COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 334 (tables 7-8) (1979). See generally Rosenberg,
supra note 145, at 533-39.
290. See Schreiner, CriticalHabitat: What It Is-andIs Not, I ENDANGERED SPECIES TECH. BULL.,
No. 2, at 1 (1976).
291. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, .50 (1981) (listing endangered species and designated habitats); see also
supra notes 289-90 (discussing critical habitat designation).
292. "The proposed impoundment of water behind the proposed Tellico Dam would result in total de-
struction ofthe snail darter's habitat." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 162 (1978) (quoting 40 Fed. Reg.
47,505 (1976)) (emphasis in original).
293. 534 F.2d 1289, 1301-02 n.37 (8th Cir. 1976).
294. Id at 1301-02 n.37.
295. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 367-68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979
(1976).
296. Id at 367-68.
297. 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156 (D. Neb. 1978).
298. id at 1175-76.
299. Id at 1162.
300. Id at 1161. It was difficult to assess the impact that the dam construction could have on the
downstream habitat of the whooping crane since little was known about the crane's exact habitat pref-
erences and stopover locations. Id at 1162.
301. Id at 1162.
302. Id at 1170-71.
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Electrification Administrations (REA) to the private project sponsors illegal on
ESA grounds, among others, and overturning a Corps of Engineers permit for
the project.30 3
The court acknowledged that REA may have been justified in concluding
that "no adverse impact on the habitat had been demonstrated at the time
REA decided to proceed with its commitments to the Sponsors.' '3°4 It held,
however, that this answer does not meet REA's burden under the ESA:
[T]he difficulty is that the Endangered Species Act places the burden
upon the agencies who are authorizing, funding, or carrying out pro-
grams to insure that those programs do not jeopardize endangered
species or the habitat of the species. The burden is not upon someone
else to demonstrate that there will be an adverse impact. It may well
be true that REA was justified in concluding that no adverse impact
had been demonstrated, but the question is whether it has met its
burden of insuring that there will be no jeopardy. Unless REA has
done that, it has not complied with the Act. That is true, even though
the whooping crane issue was first raised well after many of the plans
had been made and a great deal of money already spent.
30 5
The court attributed the same broad duty to the Corps of Engineers.30 6 The
Corps had issued a permit for construction with a list of safeguards attached as
a "Special Note" to the permit, the gist of which was that the Corps could
require modification of reservoir operations upon completion of the FWS's
study of the habitat requirements for the continued existence of the whooping
crane and other migratory waterfowl "if such is deemed to be in the best public
interest. '307 The court found that this arrangement fell short of the insurance
against habitat modification required by section 7:
The Corps' duty is much broader than that. If it has insufficient in-
formation to "insure" that the Project will not endanger a critical
habitat, it must get that information. Requiring the permittee to use
certain restrictions regarding withdrawing water from the Grayrocks
Reservoir, without having information which satisfies the Corps of
what is needed to protect the critical habitat downstream, does not
amount to an insurance.308
The district court also rejected the Corps' arrogation to itself of policy deci-
sionmaking, stating that "it is not up to the Corps to decide whether saving a
critical habitat is 'in the public interest.' Congress has already decided that it
is."309
In Hill there was no dispute over the biological effect of the federal action,
but such clarity is a rare phenomenon. The Nebraska v. Rural Electrification
Administration court was confronted with the more common problem of bio-
303. Id at 1180-81.
304. Id at 1171.
305. Id (emphasis in original).
306. Id at 1172.
307. Id at 1172-73.
308. Id at 1173.
309. Id; accord Roosevelt Campobello Internat'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1055, 1057
(lst Cir. 1982).
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logical uncertainty. Its solution was to force the proponents of the possibly
destructive federal action to carry the burden of showing that the possible de-
struction would not occur. This comports with the requirement that the action
agency "insure" that no consequential harm will ensue. If the court's burden
of persuasion holding is followed, the party so burdened in future land use
disputes of this nature will lose unless it can overcome the uncertainty.
310
Equally significant is the court's rejection of good intentions as a substitute for
present insurance. It is very tempting for an agency to say that "we will take
adequate measures later" and let the commitment of resources create a project
momentum far more difficult to halt at that later time.
The definition of habitat makes the agencies' duty to insure against critical
habitat destruction very broad. Habitat is the sum of the factors supporting the
life of the species, 311 so any action that intrudes on any attribute of a species'
existence could be a modification if not a destruction of habitat. Thus one can
argue that federal actions violate the ESA if they result in poisoning of the
environment, or excessive, disruptive noise levels, or diminution of prey or
other food sources, or general urbanization, or any other activity adversely
affecting--directly or indirectly-the amenities required for an endangered
species to survive.
The Duty to Conserve. Judicial and administrative attention has been
focused on the foregoing "thou shalt nots" of section 7, but another of its com-
mands may turn out to be as important. Section 7 directs all federal agencies
to "utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by
carrying out programs for the conservation of" listed species.312 The wording
is mandatory, but the direction is unclear. Although section 7 clearly obligates
each federal agency to do more than refrain from harming listed species, the
Act nowhere spells out the nature and extent of that duty.
The starting point of the inquiry into the duty to conserve is the definition of
conservation: it means "the use of all methods and procedures which are nec-
essary to bring any endangered or threatened species to the point at which the
measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary. Such
methods and procedures include, but are not limited to, all activities associated
with scientific resources management .... ,,3"3 This definition obviously does
not limit the scope of the administrative duty. Congress apparently has di-
rected each agency to do whatever is in its power to improve the status of a
listed species. That Congress did not intend to confine conservation to tradi-
tional wildlife management techniques is shown, not only by the "not limited
to" language, but also by the "purposes" of the Act, which include providing
"a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
310. In ordinary judicial review of an agency action, the challenger bears a heavy burden of demon-
strating that the action is arbitrary or capricious, and the court will affirm if any reasonable ground
supports the agency determination. The ESA as interpreted by the Grayrocks court stands the pre-
sumption of regularity and reasonableness on its head: the agency has the burden of demonstrating
that its action will not have the undesirable consequences; if the evidence is inconclusive, the agency
has failed to carry its burden and must lose.
311. See R. WHrrTAKER, supra note 66, at 77.
312. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
313. Id § 1532(3).
[Vol. 70:14331468
HeinOnline  -- 70 Geo. L. J. 1468 1981-1982
ENDANGERED SPECIES AND LAND USE
threatened species depend may be conserved." 314 This language, of course, re-
fers to habitat and thus indirectly to land use control.
Existing precedent on the question of whether this command of section 7
creates an independent, affirmative duty to conserve is sketchy and mixed. In
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus315 the FWS had issued regulations permitting
game shooting of certain migratory birds from one half hour before sunrise
until sunset, to provide hunters more shooting time.316 Plaintiffs sought to
overturn the regulations on the ground that the decreased visibility before
dawn and near sunset increased the possibilities that hunters, mistaking an
endangered species for a shootable variety, would kill or wound a listed spe-
cies. 31 7 This, they claimed, violated section 7.318 The federal district court, in a
brief opinion, agreed. First, because the agency adduced no adequate infor-
mation on the likely effect of hunting in the disputed periods, the court held
that the failure of FWS to study and evaluate the problem was itself a viola-
tion of the Act.319 Beyond that, the court held that the ESA created an affirma-
tive duty to conserve that would be violated if misidentification possiblities
were in fact increased by the administrative decision.
320
In a later and somewhat similar case that went the other way,3 21 the court
also conceded that an affirmative conservation duty was created by the Act.
322
In each case the conservation claim was that unintentional taking of endan-
gered species should be avoided to the maximum extent possible, even at the
expense of a considerable recreational interest. No other opinions on the na-
ture and scope of this affirmative duty have been located. Thus, although
courts recognize its existence, the conservation duty is largely an unknown, the
boundaries of which await further litigation for definition.323
3. Taking Endangered and Threatened Species
The Act's "taking" provisions create potential threats to many other inter-
314. Id § 1531(b).
315. 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
316. Id at 168-69. The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16
U.S.C. § 704 (1976). Id at 168.
317. Id at 168-69.
318. Id at 168. Plaintiff also alleged that the Secretary had violated his own Migratory Bird Treaty
Act (MBTA) regulations stating that hunting regulations should "limit the taking of protected species
where there is a reasonable possibility of hunter identification error between game and protected spe-
cies." Id (quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 9177 (1973)).
319. Id at 169.
320. Id at 170. The court stated:
It is clear from the face of the statute that the Fish and Wildlife Servie ... must do far more
than merely avoid the elimination of protected species. It must bring these species back from
the brink so that they may be removed from the protected class, and it must use all methods
necessary to do so. The Service cannot limit its focus to what it considers the most important
management tool available to it, i.e., habitat control, to accomplish this end.
Id
321. Connor v. Andrus, 453 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
322. Id at 1041. The Connor court invalidated a regulation that protected the then-endangered
Mexican duck by prohibiting hunting in several areas. The legal bases on which the court rested were
questionable. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 255, at 20,204; Rosenberg, supra note 145, at 511-12 &
n.91.
323. See infra notes 676-84 and accompanying text (discussing federal agencies' duty to conserve).
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ests. Section 9 of the ESA prohibits, without exception or qualification, the
taking of endangered wildlife species by any person subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States. 324 Civil and criminal penalties of up to twenty thousand
dollars per violation may be assessed.325 "Person," under section 9, means all
officers and instrumentalities of federal, state, and foreign governments, as well
as private individuals and entities.326 "Take" is defined to mean "harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to en-
gage in any such conduct." 327 Although this prohibition might appear to be
simply a hunting law forbidding the intentional killing of a listed species, such
a narrow interpretation is unwarranted. Section 9 is an important land use
control.
The fundamental issue is whether habitat modification that indirectly kills
endangered species is a "taking" within the meaning of the Act. An answer
depends on three critical questions: whether the section requires intent to
harm or to violate the Act as an element of the offense; whether negligent
conduct or indirectly caused harm are violations; and whether future foresee-
able takings may be enjoined. Persuasive evidence in the statute and its legis-
lative history, administrative interpretations, several judicial decisions, and
analogous, parallel precedent support the startling conclusions that any con-
duct that will foreseeably harm a species directly or indirectly by adversely
affecting its habitat is a violation and that such conduct can be enjoined.
Section 9 is not qualified with language requiring scienter, either intentional,
willful, malicious, knowing, or otherwise, 328 and it is directed at actions of less
than lethal design: "harm" and "harass" cover far more conduct than "hunt"
or "kill. 329 Significantly, Congress intended to define "take" in the broadest
possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can
"take" or attempt to "take" any fish or wildlife.330 Because Congress in 1973
meant to use all means and methods necessary to reverse the decline of spe-
cies, 33' it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature meant to outlaw "tak-
ings" in any form, direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional.332 Courts
have adopted that interpretation in cases arising under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, imposing criminal liability when maintenance of a nuisance,333
324. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
325. Id § 1540 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
326. Id § 1532(13) (Supp. IV 1980).
327. Id § 1532(14).
328. Id § 1538 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Scienter is an element of the criminal offense under the
Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burrows Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(3) (1976), and under the Bald Eagle
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C § 668(a) (1976). It is not specified in the ESA, in the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1375(b) (1976), or in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 707
(1976). See Margolin, Liability Under the Migratory Bird TreatyAct, 7 EcOLOGY L.Q. 989, 994-1001
(1979) (courts have not required intent for violation of Migratory Bird Treaty Act); cf. Note, The
Courts Take Fight: Sc/enter and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 241, 246-57
(1979) (analysis of congressional intent and court decisions indicates scienter requirement).
329. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1981).
330. S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2295 (1973).
331. See supra note 150 (discussing broad scope of 1973 ESA).
332. Coggins & Patti, supra note 255, at 193-96.
333. See United States v. Equity Corp., No. 75-51 (D. Utah Dec. 8, 1975) (applying MBTA to bird
deaths resulting from open oil sump pits), discussed in United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp.
510, 527 n.7 (E.D. Cal. ), aft'd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Stuarco Oil Co., No. 73-
127 (D. Colo. July 11, 1973) (applying MBTA to bird deaths resulting from open oil sludge pits),
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negligent conduct,334 and accidents in the course of a hazardous activity
335
resulted in unintentional bird mortality.336 The Migratory Bird Treaty Act
construction easily could be transferred to ESA cases as the similarities be-
tween the two statutes are much more numerous and striking than their
differences. 337
The contemporaneous FWS interpretation of section 9 also supports the
conclusion that habitat degradation is a prohibited taking. The agency by reg-
ulation defines "harm," one form of taking, to include
an act or omission which actually injures or kills wildlife, including
acts which annoy it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt essen-
tial behaviorial patterns, which include ... breeding, feeding, or
sheltering; signjfcant environmental modfcation or degradation which
has such effects is included within the meaning of "harm. "1 338
The interpretive regulation is presumptively valid. In addition to specific rule-
making authority,339 the Secretary has power to promulgate such regulations
as may be advisable and appropriate to enforce the Act,340 and violations of
those regulations are separate crimes. 341 The interpretation of a statute by an
agency charged with enforcing it is entitled to deference;342 in some cases, the
Supreme Court has accepted an administrative interpretation even though the
Court might have read the statute differently as an initial matter, as long as the
agency version was sufficiently reasonable.
343
The implications of the FWS regulation are obviously broad and deep. In-
numerable human endeavors could run afoul of this protective mechanism if a
listed species resides in the vicinity-river pollution, suburban development,
timber harvesting, water resources projects, transportation systems, and back
country leisure activities are all likely candidates. Seeing such implications,
several commentators have criticized the administrative position as duplicative
of section 7 and beyond congressional contemplation.344 Those critical opin-
discussed in United States v. FMC Corp., 428 F. Supp. 615, 617 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) and United States
v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 533 (E.D. Cal.), aft'd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978). See also
Coggins & Patti, supra note 255, at 184 (discussing above cases).
334. See United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 536 (E.D. Cal.), a 'd, 578 F.2d 259
(9th Cir. 1978) (courts constitutionally can impose criminal penalties under MBTA for bird deaths
resulting from negligent insecticide spraying).
335. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding conviction for
bird deaths caused by accidental discharge of wastewater from pesticide manufacturing process).
336. See generally Coggins & Patti, supra note 255, at 182-93 (discussing scienter and Migratory Bird
Treaty Act); Margolin, supra note 328, at 992-1001 (same); Note, Courts Hold Scienter Not RequiredforConviction Under Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 8 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,029, 10,092-94
(1978) (same); Note, supra note 328, at 246-57 (same).
337. Coggins & Patti, supra note 255, at 193-94; Note, supra note 328, at 244-46.
338. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1981) (emphasis added).
339. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1976).
340. Id §§ 1533(d)-(e), 1538(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
341. Id § 1540(a), (b) (Supp. IV 1980).
342. See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (Communications Act of 1934);
Udall v. Talman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (Mineral Leasing Act of 1920).
343. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975) (Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970).
344. M. BEAN, supra note 44, at 395-97; Lachenmeier, supra note 16, at 39-41; Note, supra note 270,
at 1251 n.31. The Reagan Administration is also critical of the regulation, and it proposed modifica-
tions of June 1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490 (1981). The FWS later backed down. See 12 ENv'T. REP.
(BNA) No. 31, at 939 (Nov. 27, 1981).
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ions, however, were rendered before the Supreme Court concluded in TV.4 v.
Hill that the Act was to be interpreted liberally to accomplish its aims, regard-
less of asserted economic costs. Even more to the point, the Court quoted the
FWS regulation with seeming approval and stated: "We do not understand
how TVA intends to operate Tellico Dam without 'harming' the snail
darter." 345 That the Court indeed understood the implications of this state-
ment is borne out by Mr. Justice Powell in dissent: "[Tihe reach of this regula-
tion-which the Court accepts as authorized by the Act-is virtually limitless.
All one would have to find is that the 'essential behaviorial patterns' of any
living species as to breeding, feeding or sheltering are significantly disrupted
by the operation of an existing project. ' 346 The Court's statement regarding
section 9 does not amount to a holding because the Court's analysis of congres-
sional intent underlying section 7 was dispositive. Even as dictum, however, it
has ominous implications for many land users.
An all-inclusive interpretation of the taking provision might render the con-
troversial section 7 requirements and procedures superfluous, because no fed-
eral connection to the challenged activity would be required.347 Moreover, the
degree of harm to the species as a whole would be irrelevant for the taking of
just one member is a violation of the statute.348
The few judicial decisions on the question are mixed, but the emerging posi-
tion seems to be that habitat modification does constitute a taking and may be
enjoined in appropriate circumstances. Neither the Snail Darter nor the Mis-
sissippi Sandhill Crane courts had occasion to rule on the question. The court
in the Indiana Bat case held that no violation of section 9 occurred even
though some habitat destruction and some direct mortality appeared inevita-
ble.349 The Indiana Bat opinion, however, may be safely disregarded because
345. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184-85 n.30 (1978).
346. Id at 208 n.16 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting the FWS regulation).
347. Section 9 applies to any person subject to the jurisdiction ofthe United States and to any species
within the United States or the territorial seas of the United States. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1976).
The best illustration is Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D.Hawaii 1979), aj'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981), discussed infra at notes 359-84 and accompanying
text. The court held that the state's maintenance of feral sheep and goat herds that destroyed the
mamane-naio forest essential to the Palila's survival was clearly within the definition of a "taking"
since that term includes "harm," which was defined by FWS to include "significant environmental
modification or degradation." 471 F. Supp. at 995. The case did not involve a section 7 question be-
cause there was no federal involvement in management or projects within the area.
348. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1976). Section 1533(e) empowers the Secretary of the Interior to treat
any species as an endangered or threatened species if he finds that it so closely resembles a listed species
that enforcement personnel would have substantial difficulty in differentiating between the two, that the
similarities between the two pose an additional threat to an endangered or threatened species, and that
such designation will contribute to furtherance of the policies of the Act. This power tends to confirm
that the "taking" of just one member is a violation.
349. The court in Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976), stated:
The bats inhabiting the area are found primarily in caves in and around the [proposed reser-
voir] area. Caves which will be flooded as a result of the creation of the Meramec Reservoir
will, of course, no longer furnish shelter for the bat ....
... In addition it was pointed out from the EIS that Mud Cave 1 and Bat Cave, in the flood
pool, hibernating areas for about 5000 bats, "will be inundated periodically and could become
a trap for hibernating bats."
534 F.2d at 1303. It then held that plaintiff's section 9 allegation rested "upon the asserted ground that
the erection of the dam is a 'clear attempt to harass or harm' the Indiana bat. We are cited to no portion
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it conflicted with Hill and, therefore, was effectively overruled.350
Two more recent decisions are far more valuable as precedent. In North
Slope Borough v. Andrus35l plaintiffs sought to keep the Secretary of the Inte-
rior from authorizing the sale of oil and gas leases in the Beaufort Sea north of
Alaska.352 The district court's attention was devoted to questions arising from
section 7 and other statutes, and it enjoined further steps in the lease sale on
those grounds.353 Plaintiffs also alleged that the consequences of the lease sale
would constitute a taking of the endangered bowhead whale, other marine
mammals, and migratory birds.354 The evidence indicated a strong possibility
that some mortality and habitat modification would result from drilling and
support activities.355 After canvassing the relevant statutes, treaties, and regu-
lations, the court wrote:
The statutes and treaties do not require the government to halt all
activity merely because there is a possibility that agency action will
result in a "taking" at some future time. Rather, the government must
proceed with caution to ensure that agency action does not eventually
violate the aforesaid laws.
While the EIS indicates that the government might well encounter
serious difficulty in complying with the above mentioned statutes and
treaties, injunctive relief should not herein issue unless danger to the
protected species is sufficiently imminent or certain. Otherwise, gov-
ernment activity would be prematurely halted, and statutes authoriz-
ing specific activity-like the OCSLA-would be undermined. The
lease sale itself threatens no species. The Secretary has both the
power and the obligation to ensure that the applicable laws are en-
of the record so stating nor do we believe that from a fair reading thereof any such attempt may be
found." Id at 1304.
350. See generally supra notes 261-69 and accompanying text (discussing Hill Court's interpretation
of congressional intent in § 7 of ESA).
351. 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
352. Id at 339.
353. See infra notes 440-55 and accompanying text (discussing § 7 aspects of North Slope).
354. The plaintiffs alleged violations of four federal statutes other than NEPA and ESA. In response
to their claim that the Secretary of the Interior had shirked his trust responsibility to protect the In-
upiats, the district court held that the EIS had alerted the Secretary to the impact that the lease sale and
its activities would have on the native Alaskans' lifestyle; to the extent the Secretary had not complied
with the ESA, he also had breached his trust responsibilities. 486 F. Supp. at 344. The Court rejected
plaintiff's claim that the Department of the Interior had violated three sections of the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1339-1343 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 486 F. Supp. at 358-60. The court
also rejected claims that the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980), and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 706-712 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), were being
violated because activities resulting from the lease sale would take species protected by those acts. See
infra text accompanying note 356 (quoting from district court opinion in North Slope).
355. The EIS for the proposed lease sale observed that serious environmental impacts might occur if
an oil slick developed: "'Some consequences will probably be the oiling and subsequent death of seals
or large flocks of birds that swim or dive through the slick. Numbers of both these groups of animals
(ringed seals, old squaw, and other ducks) would be unavoidably reduced. Polar bear populations
would also be reduced."' 486 F. Supp. at 340-41 (quoting EIS). The EIS also stated that acute and
chronic oil spills could directly cause the loss of large numbers of birds or damage their habitats; that
unavoidable effects of increased development and disturbance could result in a general "reduction in
wildlife; and that based on the worst case assumptions, which plaintiffs argued were not really the worst
possible assumptions, the bowhead and gray whales could be severely affected. The EIS disclosed that
"'the lack of scientific data precludes quantitative or qualitative assessment of positive or negative
impacts of oil and gas development on the Bowhead and Gray whales."' Id (quoting EIS).
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forced. Until the species are so significantly threatened that contin-
ued activity by the Secretary would be arbitrary and capricious, this
Court cannot, without further Congressional direction, enjoin the ac-
tivity, pursuant to the aforementioned statutes and treaties.356
In other words, the action may proceed up to the point at which the harm is
"sufficiently imminent and certain"; when the protected species are "signifi-
cantly threatened," injunctive relief may be proper. As the court already had
enjoined further lease sale activity, the quoted remarks appear to be dicta. If
meant as a holding, they will be difficult to implement: in cases when the dan-
ger to species is only a possibility, such as the possibility of an oil spill in the
North Slope case, the imminence or certainty of the risk cannot be ascertained
before it occurs.
The North Slope court's reluctance to use the wildlife laws in the manner
suggested by plaintiffs is understandable. Just as the district court in the Snail
Darter litigation could not fathom how an enormous dam could be stopped
merely for the sake of an obscure fish,357 so too is it difficult for a court to
enjoin a billion dollar transaction because of results that might never occur. In
spite of the dearth of citation or discussion in the North Slope opinion on this
point, its most noteworthy aspect may be the court's asserted willingness to
enjoin a section 9 violation in more dire circumstances. The case was later
reversed in part on other grounds. 358
The second decision construing section 9 went all the way. In Palila v. Ha-
waii Department ofLand and Natural Resources359 the court entered an injunc-
tion requiring the state agency to dismantle an otherwise proper program
because its continuance constituted an indirect taking of an endangered bird
through loss of habitat.360 The case was a pure "taking" problem: because
there was no federal action, section 7 did not apply.361 The palila is a
nonmigratory bird, a small honeycreeper that lives only in Hawaiian mamane
forests.3 62 It was listed as endangered in 1967,363 and the remaining ten percent
of its original range was designated critical habitat in 1977.364 One major rea-
son for the shrinking of the mamane habitat was the presence of feral sheep
and goat herds that the State maintained to provide sport for hunters.365 A
federal recovery team had recommended removal or curtailment of the herds
because of their destructive effect on the forest habitat of the palila, but state
decisionmakers refused to inconvenience the hunters. 366 The Sierra Club
brought suit in the name of the species367 for protection of the palila from
356. Id at 362.
357. That court termed the eventual result unreasonable. Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D.
Tenn. 1976), rev.d sub nomr. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); see id at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(district court termed result "absurd").
358. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See infra notes 440-55 and
accompanying* text (discussing D.C. Circuit's opinion in North Slope). The reversal did not affect the
"taking" language of the district court opinion.
359. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979), aft'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
360. Id at 995.
361. Id at 987.
362. Id at 988.
363. 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (1967); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1981).
364. 50 C.F.R. § 17.95 (1981).
365. 471 F. Supp. at 989 & n.9.
366. Id at 900 n.13, 991.
367. The suit was filed by the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, and an individual, on
their own behalf and as next friends of the palila. Id at 987; f Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-
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harm caused by the sheep and goats.368
Most of the district court's opinion dealt with questions of constitutional
power. The court held that Congress could forbid state activities on state lands
in order to protect a nonmigratory species of no known commercial value
369
and that the legislation could be enforced against the state by private parties in
federal court. 370 In contending that the state agency's refusal to dispatch the
sheep and goats was not a taking, the State argued that the palila population
was not yet at its lowest sustainable population;37' that its population had in-
creased and the present habitat had room for further increases;372 that captive
propagation had not yet been attempted; 373 that the mamane forest condition
had improved;374 that remedies less drastic than total removal of the sheep
would protect the forest;375 that further studies should be. made;376 and that no
taking occurred because the forest was regenerating. 377 The court rejected all
such contentions in view of the experts' testimony and recommendations. The
court noted that census information only proved that few palilas remained.
378
That the population was less than the asserted carrying capacity of its habitat
only emphasized the species' plight.379 Captive breeding would have been
pointless without a habitat that would sustain the birds upon release.380 The
State's request to use "intensive management" (more shooting) for keeping the
number of feral animals lower was met with judicial skepticism:
Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 450 (1972) (proposing legal rights for
"natural objects"); Favre, supra note 39 (same).
368. 471 F. Supp. at 987.
369. The court held that "the 10th Amendment does not restrict enforcement of the Endangered
Species Act, both because of the power of Congress to enact legislation implementing valid treaties and
because of the power of Congress to regulate commerce." Id at 995. It explained that:
Congress has determined that protection of any endangered species anywhere is of the utmost
importance to mankind, and that the major cause of extinction is destruction of natural
habitat. In this context, a national program to protect and improve the natural habitats of
endangered species preserves the possibilities of interstate commerce in these species and of
interstate movement of persons, such as amateur students of nature or professional scientists
who come to a state to observe and study these species, that would otherwise be lost by state
inaction.
Id at 994-95 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), and Brown v. Anderson, 202 F. Supp. 96 (D.
Alaska 1962)), as authority for theory that federal power over wildlife is derived from interstate move-
ment of persons who study or use wildlife).
370. 471 F. Supp. at 999. The court adhered to the general principle that a state may not be sued
without its consent, but officials of the state may be enjoined from violating federal laws or the United
States Constitution. Id at 996. In applying that rule to the facts of the case, the court noted that
§ 1540(g) of the ESA expressly authorizes citizens to bring suit to enjoin violations of the Act, including
those of any government agency or instrumentality to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment.
To interpret this section as creating blanket sovereign immunity to private enforcement of the Act
would "seriously impair the achievement of the broad Congressional purposes underlying an effectivereme y." Id at 997. The court also stressed that H waii, by nacting the Hawaii Enda ered Species
Act-so it could receive federal funds and avoid federal preemption of Hawaii's authority in regulating
endangered species-had bound itself to refrain from "taking" endangered species and so had im-
pliedly consented to be sued under the Act. Id at 998-999.
371. Id at 988 n.2.
372. Id at 989 n.6.
373. Id at 989 n.7.
374. Id at 990.
375. Id at 990-91.
376. Id at 999.
377. Id at 995 n.41.
378. Id at 988 n.2.
379. Id at 989 n.6.
380. Id at 989 n.7.
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[L]ooking realistically at the feasibility of such a program, I conclude
that defendant's intensive management program would be an ineffec-
tive solution to regeneration of the forest because of the inevitable
hunter pressure to increase the feral sheep herd as long as any sheep
remain in the forest, defendants' demonstrated susceptibility to that
pressure, and the destructive effect on the forest of even a small
number of sheep .... 381
The court determined that "the undisputed facts bring the acts and omissions
of defendants clearly within [the FWS definition of "harm"].3 82
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed Paila in
1981.383 The Pa/i/a decision is absurd and outrageous, or wise and wonderful,
depending on one's point of view. If accepted by the other circuits, 384 this
interpretation of the ESA likely will generate considerable land use litigation.
At issue in Palila was a long-established, ongoing program conducted by a
sovereign state to serve its conception of the public interest in recreation. The
State had no intention or desire to harm the birds. The harm was doubly indi-
rect as the offense was the failure to remove sheep that ate the seedlings of
trees that would have provided a critical habitat for an expanding palila
population.
Previous attention concerning the conflict between endangered species and
human activities had focused on new projects such as dams and refineries.
The Palla rationale jeopardizes any program or traditional activity by anyone
if a causal nexus can be established between it and the decline of a listed spe-
cies: clearcutting and the decline of certain birds, overgrazing and the decline
of Sonoran pronghorn antelopes, poisons and the decline of predators such as
bald eagles and kit foxes, borax mining operations and the decline of Califor-
nia condors, farming and blackfooted ferrets-the list of examples is as long as
the list of native endangered species because such activities were primary or
secondary causes of endangerment in the first place.385 Remarkably, Congress
did not amend the sections on taking in 1978. It instead inserted a provision in
section 7 that appears to recognize that one action or project can give rise to
violations of both section 7 and section 9.386
III. THE 1978 AMENDMENTS
The congressional reaction to the Hill decision was swf/, immediate and
indecisive.
W. RODGERS, ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
467 n.5 (1979).
381. id- at 990.
382. Id at 995.
383. Palla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
384. The First Circuit apparently concurs with Palla. See Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835,
858 (1st Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub non. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 1798
(1982).
385. See Ripley & Lovejoy, supra note 50, at 365-67.
386. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o) (Supp. IV 1980) ("any action for which an exemption is granted ... shall
not be considered a taking of any endangered or threatened species with respect to any activity which is
necessary to carry out such action").
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The Hill Court was fully aware that its decision had the effect of stopping
progress on a massive, virtually completed federal project that was authorized
long before the Endangered Species Act was conceived or the snail darter dis-
covered. Recognizing that many would consider the result "curious" or absurd,
the Court termed the situation a "paradox," especially because Congress con-
tinued to appropriate funds for the project with knowledge of the darter's dan-
ger.387 The majority rejected Justice Powell's plea to water down the statutory
language "with some modicum of commonsense and the public weal, '388 for it
found the statute and legislative history unambiguous. 389 The Court rested ul-
timately on a separation of powers theory, emphasizing that proper judicial
review precludes inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative choice.390 The
holding was essentially conservative in that the law was applied as it was writ-
ten, forcing the political branch to make the political judgments and adjust-
ments. Both the majority and the dissent recognized that the practical result of
the decision was to remand the fate of the Tellico Dam, and perhaps that of
the ESA, to the mercy of Congress.
391
The legislature acted quickly but inconclusively. The 1978 Endangered Spe-
cies Act Amendments392 have been the subject of numerous jeremiads fore-
casting wholesale extinction of species. 393 But it is plausible that the awkward
and complex new procedural structure that Congress erected is a relatively
minor injection of flexibility into the process. Little of substance was changed:
the most important provisions narrow the Secrtary's discretion in critical
habitat designation and set stringent criteria for giving exceptional projects
precedence over species' welfare. The amendments create two new adminis-
trative bodies to resolve conflicts arising under section 7.394 In the end the most
significant aspect of the hastily passed 1978 amendments probably will be the
congressional affirmation of the Hill holding embodied in the amendments.395
This section summarizes the statutory changes relevant to the Act's effects on
land use.
387. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978).
388. Id at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting).
389. Id at 184. "Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the
balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities, thereby
adopting a policy which is described as 'institutionalized caution."' Id at 194.
390. "[I]n our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental
for us to preempt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and
the public weal.'" Id at 195. The Court noted that it lacked both expert knowledge on the subject of
endangered species and a mandate from the people to "strike a balance of equities on the side of the
Tellico Dam." Id at 194. It further stated that "[o]nce the meaning of an enactment is discerned and
its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of
review, nor are we vested with the power of veto." Id at 194-95.
391. Id at 195 ("[o]ur Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches"); id at 210
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("I have little doubt that Congress will amend the Endangered Species Act to
prevent the grave consequences made possible by today's decision").
392. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978,'Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (codified at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1532-1536, 1538-1540, 1542 (Supp. IV 1980)).
393. See Goplerud, supra note 28, at 504-09 (flexibility added by amendments "could spell doom for
plants and wildlife"); Rosenberg, supra note 145, at 529-39 (amendments reflect congressional- shift in
doctrine); Stromberg, supra note 28, at 529-39 (same). But cf Comment, Endangered Species Act
Amendments of.1978: 4 Congressional Response to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 5 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 283, 304-15 (1979) (presenting background and balanced evaluation of amendments).
394. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e), (g)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
395. The affirmation was both inferential in that Congress failed to revise substantively the language
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A. CRITICAL HABITAT LISTING
'71f critical habitatfor the grizzly is designated asproposed it is hard to
say which may haveprioriy, the ghetto 's child and the need he has/or
decent housing, or the grizzly bear's safeqyfrom man 'r incursion into his
habitat."
Rogers, Are Our Natural Resources on
the Endangered Species List? XI NAT.
RESOURCES LAW 267, 270 (1978).
In the 1978 amendments, Congress for the first time 'defined critical
habitat396 -somewhat narrowly-and decreed that its designation take place
contemporaneously with listing unless such designation would be impru-
dent.397 Prior to 1978, the FWS had by regulation defined critical habitat as:
any air, land, or water area (exclusive of those existing man-made
structures or settlements which are not necessary to the survival and
recovery of a listed species) and constituent elements thereof, the loss
of which would appreciably decrease the likelihood of the survival
and recovery of a listed species and may include additional areas for
reasonable population expansion. 398
By 1978 critical habitat had been designated for only twenty-nine species. 399 In
some cases failure to designate was easily justified on the ground that designa-
tion itself could have led to a decline of the species: delineating the area occu-
pied by rare plants or shy animals could have resulted in the plants' being
stolen by collectors or the animals' being disrupted by spectators.400 In other
cases, such as that of the ivory-billed woodpecker, designation would have
been extremely difficult due to a dearth of information about the species.40
Administrative timidity apparently caused the failure to designate in many
other instances.402
Designation of critical habitat for the threatened grizzly bear was the most
acute problem. Although present grizzly populations are perilously low com-
pared to historic numbers and distribution, the remaining bears range over
millions of acres. The Service boldly proposed critical habitat designation of
construed by the Hill Court, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. IV 1980), and also explicit in that many legisla-
tors conceded the correctness of the judicial construction.
396. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
397. Id § 1533(a)(1).
398. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1981).
399. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlfe Conservation andthe Environment of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 859 (1978) (statement of Lynn A.
Greenwalt, Dir. of FWS).
400. It was reported, for instance, that some zealous-but prudently anonymous--supporters of the
Dickey-Lincoln Project in Maine threatened to eradicate the Furbish lousewort to remove the barrier to
the project. Similarly, pinpointing the location of American ginseng plants would almost certainly haveharmed the species, because it commands a high price as a potency restorative.401. Si~.tings of this woodpecker are rare and unconfirmed, and it may be extinct. 12 NAT'L WILD-LIFE (April-May 1974), at 30, 33. 36.
402. See supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text (discussing critical habitat designation).
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much of that area,4°3 all the while emphasizing that critical habitat did not
mean no use at all by humans.4°4 Congressional reaction was negative,40 5 and,
for whatever reason, the proposal was never translated into a final regulation.
Similar political problems face the FWS today in determining the critical
habitat of other wide-ranging or widely-distributed species such as bald eagles
and bowhead whales. Because severe restrictions on human use automatically
attach to the designation of an area as the critical habitat of an endangered
species, political battles and agency reluctance to trigger such battles are
inevitable.
In the 1978 Amendments Congress partially cooled the political heat but
considerably increased the administrative burden of critical habitat designa-
tion. "Critical habitat" is now defined by statute as:
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the
species, at the time it is listed. . . on which are found those physical
or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species
and (II) which may require special management considerations or
protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the spe-
cies at the time it is listed. . . upon a determination by the Secretary
that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species.
40 6
Habitat designations for species already listed may be accomplished under the
same criteria.4°7 Congress further stated: "Except in those circumstances de-
termined by the Secretary, critical habitat shall not include the entire geo-
graphical area which can be occupied by the threatened or endangered
species."'408
These provisions apparently narrow the concept of critical habitat from the
area in which species do or could live to a smaller area necessary for survival
at present levels with "special management." The ban on activities that ad-
versely modify habitat, therefore, will not extend to the entire area in which
the species may be found, but only to certain specified areas within the range
that are identified as needing special protection. The Secretary retains discre-
tion to designate the entire geographical range of small, confined, fragile popu-
lations, such as that of the snail darter.4°9 An unresolved question is how the
habitat designation limitations will mesh with the Secretary's unchanged
power to list a species endangered in only a significant portion of its range.
410
In addition to narrowing the geographic scope of critical habitat, Congress
also provided:
403. See S. RFP. No. 874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978) (as much as 10 million acres of Forest
Service land involved in critical habitat proposed for grizzly bear by FWS).
404. See Schreiner, CriticaltHabitat: What It Is--andIs Not, I ENDANGERED SPECIEs TECH. BULL.
(DEPT. OF INTERiOR) No. 2, at 1 (1976) (critical habitat restrictions apply only to actions requiring
federal funds or approval and do not create sealed off area).
405. See S. REP. No 874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978) (expressing congressional concern over
extent of proposed critical habitat for grizzly bears).
406. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (Supp. IV 1980).
407. Id § 1532(5)(B).
408. Id § 1532(5)(C).
409. Id
410. Id § 1533(c)(1).
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In determining the critical habitat of any endangered or threatened
species, the Secretary shall consider the economic impact, and any
other relevant impacts, of specifying any particular area as critical
habitat, and he may exclude any such area from the critical habitat if
he determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the bene-
fits of specifying the area as part of the critical habitat, unless he de-
termines, based on the best scientific and commercial data available,
that the failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in
the extinction of the species.
41
'
The balancing process is now in the hands of the Secretary, who is free to
avoid or further restrict designation if, in his view, its impact would be unduly
harsh. The matter thus rests in the Secretary's unfettered judgment, except in
cases in which extinction will result or perhaps in cases of obvious
arbitrariness.
Critical habitat designation already has caused an administrative break-
down: most of the species that were candidates for listing in November 1978
were later withdrawn because the FWS was unable to make the simultaneous
critical habitat determinations. 412 In spite of the administrative difficulties and
the probability of future listing delays, wildlife proponents have some reason
for optimism. Requiring both determinations to be made initially should re-
sult in better and more thorough studies of the species nominated, and the
information generated should assist the recovery team and eventually the spe-
cies. Prior designations are not affected, although the Secretary has the power
to revise them in light of the new criteria. Each listed species eventually will
live in quasi-sanctuaries, of more limited geographic area, where it will be
protected to the full extent of the law.41 3 That extent remains considerble even
with the advent of the Endangered Species Committee, also known as the God
Committee.414
B. THE CONSULTATION AND EXEMPTION PROCESSES
"If that's all the good the /Endangered Species] committee can do, to
put us right back where we startedfrom, we might'as well save the time
and expense."
Senator Howard Baker, quoted in
Goplerud, The Endangered Species Act."
Does It Jeopardize the Continued
Existence of Species?, 1979 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 487, 507.
The amendments to section 7 added numerous new provisions to clarify and
411. Id § 1533(b)(4).
412. 44 Fed. Reg. 12,382 (1979). Designation of critical habitat for species already listed at the time
of the Act may be accomplished by the procedure set forth in section 1532(5)(A).
413. See supra notes 287-311 and accompanying text (discussing federal agencies' duty to ensure
against critical habitat destruction).
414. As explained in infra notes 492-543 and accompanying text, the ESC is given literal life-or-
death power over the fate of endangered species, thus the nickname.
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expand the procedures necessary for compliance with the original section.415
The additions established the cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee
(ESC) with power to grant exemptions from the requirements of the section,416
delineate the powers of that Committee,417 and define the procedures to be
followed by an entity seeking exemption for a project.418 The legislative his-
tory of the amendments reveals that Congress wished to introduce flexibility
into the process-to allow important federal projects to go forward despite
their effects, while retaining the basic legal protection earlier accorded listed
species.419 The resulting statute is schizoid: Congress attempted to legislate the
best of both worlds but succeeded only in passing responsibility to a vague new
entity. Although some members of Congress apparently decided that the ex-
ceptional federal project should take precedence over the endangered species
when the two irreconcilably conflict, the Act's procedures and criteria defining
the mission of the Committee create a strong presumption in favor of the spe-
cies. An agency may win an exemption only after it demonstrates good faith
compliance with the Act, especially in the consultation process, and a willing-
ness to minimize the harm the project in question would cause an endangered
species.
1. Consultation
The amended version of the Act retains and reemphasizes the procedural
requirement that all federal agencies consult with the Secretary of the Inte-
rior.420 Both the wording of the statute and the legislative history indicate that
consultation with the Secretary is crucial.421 Before 1978 consultation was an
ill-defined, informal process, the results of which were exaggerated and bally-
hooed.422 The consultation requirement is now formal and mandatory to fa-
cilitate resolution of conflicts at this stage.
423
Congress added four provisions to "expedite and improve the consultation
process"; 424 from these a new series of procedures has emerged; First, new
subsection 7(b) requires that consultation be completed within ninety days "or
within such other period of time as is mutually agreeable to the Federal agency
and the Secretary." 425 Second, after the consultation is concluded, the Secre-
tary must submit to the action agency a written opinion explaining how the
415. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. IV 1980).
416. Id § 1536(e).
417. Id § 1536(h)(1).
418. Id § 1536(g)(1), (2).
419. See 124 CONG. REC. 21,131-33 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Culver) (discussing need for flexibility
without sacrificing integrity of Act).
420. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
421. See H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1978) (declaring consultation process central
to resolution of conflicts under Act). Senate Bill 3238 would have allowed agencies and departments
with in-house wildlife expertise to consult with the Secretary "only as they desire" or upon published
request of the Secretary. 124 CONG. REC. 21,567 (1978). Rejection of this provision underscores the
congressional intent that the consultation process is significant and cannot be fragmented or truncated.
422. The Secretary of the Interior, in the wake of Hill, made much of the purported fact that only
three or four of the almost 5,000 consultations undertaken by the FWS had gone to litigation over
unresolved conflicts. He also estimated a future consultation load of 20,000 per year. 1978 ES4 Hear-
ings, su.pra note 4, at 113 (statement of Mr. Herbst).
423. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (Supp. IV 1980); H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978).
424. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978).
425. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
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action will affect the species or its critical habitat, providing the information on
which the opinion is based, and suggesting "reasonable and prudent alterna-
tives" that would avoid endangering the species or its habitat.426 The language
of section 7(b)427 and the report on the House Bill 428 indicate that the only
alternatives that may be considered at this stage are those within the existing
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior and the action agency. Third, new
subsection 7(c) requires the action agency to conduct a biological assessment of
its proposal after the Secretary determines that listed species or those proposed
to be listed may be in the area.429 Fourth, after the consultation has begun,
section 7(d) precludes the federal agency from making any "irreversible or ir-
retrievable" commitments of resources that would effectively foreclose the im-
plementation of reasonable and prudent alternatives.
430
One can hardly overstate the importance of the consultation requirement:
failure to consult or failure to fulfill the expanded duties relating to consulta-
tion precludes the action agency from obtaining an exemption from the
ESC.431 The agency therefore has several incentives to consult and cooperate
fully with the FWS from the inception of its project planning. If no listed
species or detrimental impact is ascertained in the process, the project can pro-
ceed with the FWS's biological seal of approval.432 If trouble looms, early con-
sideration can be given to alternative means or mitigation measures before
investment of resources and emotion renders the conffict irreconcilable. Fur-
thermore, if the action agency refuses to take advantage of the consultation
process, the project is dead because the absolute rule of Hill is resurrected and
no exemption is available-unless, of course, Congress chooses to act as it did
in the Tellico Dam imbroglio, by overriding the ESC determination.
433
Before the 1978 Amendments, the action agency's failure to consult in Ne-
braska v. Rural Electrjcation Administration was fatal.434 Post-1978 cases in-
volving offshore oil leases have evolved the principles that consultation is a
phased, ongoing process coinciding with the various pre-production lease sale
steps and that consultation need not be exhaustive in the first phase. An exam-
ple is Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Andrus.435 In that case, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit refused to enjoin the Georges
Bank lease sale.436 Plaintiffs asserted that the lease sale would violate section
426. Id
427. "The Secretary shall suggest those reasonable and prudent alternatives. . . [that] can be taken
by the Federal agency or the permit or license applicant in implementing the agency action." Id
428. See H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1978) (discussing broader scope of review
board's consideration).
429. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
430. Id § 1536(d).
431. Id § 1536(g)(5).
432. If, however, after an agency action has commenced, additional information shows that an en-
dangered species is threatened, consultation must begin and additional resources may not be committed
to the project. Id § 1536(d). In Hill, the Tellico Dam was 75 percent completed at the time the snail
darter was discovered. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 197 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
433. See infra notes 544-49 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' directions that Committee
decide projects' fate). Congress later exempted Tellico from the ESA, and the dam was completed.
434. See supra notes 297-309 and accompanying text (discussing Nebraska v. Rural Eectricallon
Admin.).
435. 623 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979).
436. Id
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7(d) of the ESA because the Secretary of the Interior would be making an
irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources, thereby foreclosing the
implementation of alternatives that would avoid jeopardizing the existence of
any endangered species. 437 The court reasoned, however, that the Secretary
through contract stipulation retained adequate regulatory power over lessees to
prevent any future action that could violate the ESA.438 The implicit ruling
was that no violation of section 7(d) occurred because no resources were irre-
trievably committed.439
The District of Columbia courts eventually adopted the rationale of the
Georges Bank opinion in North Slope Borough v. 4ndrus,440 a suit attempting
to halt the sale of oil leases in the Beaufort Sea. The National Marine Fisher-
ies Service (NMFS), which performs biological assessments on marine species,
had consulted and studied the possible effects of lease activities on endangered
bowhead whales.441 Because of insufficient information, the NMFS was un-
able to reach any definitive conclusions other than that the whale "is expected
to be seriously impacted by any perturbation that increases stress on the popu-
lation."'442 The district court enjoined the sale. It found that the analysis was
"woefully inadequate as a biological opinion," 443 not because of inadequate
factual bases, but because it failed to address the statutory requirements of
impact assessment and delineation of alternatives. 4" The court ruled that the
consultation process does not end until the action agency issues a biological
opinion based on adequate information.445 Before that time the action agency
proceeds at its own risk and can be enjoined from committing resources to the
project that might foreclose adoption of reasonable alternatives.446 "Thus,
once a § 7(a)(2) issue arises, the consultation process is activated, § 7(d) is ef-
fective, and resources may not be committed in violation of this section."
447
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
quickly vacated the injunction.448 The appellate court first distinguished Hill
by pointing out that no critical habitat had been designated and no finding of
total jeopardy had been made.449 Although it agreed with the district court
that the biological opinion could not be limited exclusively to any one particu-
lar stage of a project, it nevertheless held that the NMFS letter was such an
437. Id at 714.
438. Id at 715. See Martin, The Interrelationships ofthe Mineral Lands Leasing Act, the Wilderness
Act, and the kgdangered Species Act: A Conflict in Search of Resolution, 12 ENVTL. L. 363, 390-96
(1982) (discussing impact of section 7 on oil and gas leasing decisions).
439. 623 F.2d at 715.
440. 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C.), rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
441. Id at 340.
442. Id at 353. The bowhead whale is a filter feeder whose plates could be contaminated with even
small amounts of oil, leading to unsuccessful feeding. One problem inherent in the attempt to assess
the impact that the lease sale could have on the whales was the inability to predict the extent of petro-
leum pollution that would accompany lease activities. Id
443. Id
444. Id at 354.
445. Id "While a biological opinion can be based on inadequate information, in such cases the
obligation to consult continues. Since there is no biological opinion in the instant case, much less an
opinion based on adequate data, the consultation process has not ended." Id
446. Id at 352.
447. Id at 355.
448. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
449. Id at 607.
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opinion, primarily because it purported to be.450 The letter was deemed ade-
quate in the circumstances because it alerted the Secretary to the dangers, and
its mitigation suggestions were adopted as lease stipulations.451 The main
ground for allowing the lease sale to proceed was the stage-by-stage segmenta-
tion of environmental evaluation of offshore leasing.452 The sale of leases itself
would harm no whales, and the Secretary could later take whatever measures
were necessary to avoid or mitigate damage to the endangered wildlife.453 The
court emphasized that the lessees proceeded at their own risk.454 Their invest-
ment is subject to continuing administrative control and, should the danger to
the bowhead become insurmountable, to total loss. 455 A federal court in Cali-
fornia subsequently adopted a similar rationale in litigation over lease sales in
the Santa Maria Basin.456
The cases in combination hold that an agency can continue to implement a
phased project so long as it is not irrevocably committed to it when its impact
on an endangered species is in doubt. While this interpretation involves a
close question of degree, it arguably contravenes the congressional intent to
prevent "steamrolling" of projects. Prior non-ESA cases had established that
the offshore leasing process may be segmented for environmental analysis,
457
but it is questionable whether, as a practical matter, lease operations that are
underway may later be stopped in their tracks.458
Two subsequent cases involved section 7 and land use, but neither is very
illuminating. In Romero-Barcelo v. Brown,4 59 the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico sought an injunction against training operations at a United States Navy
base on the ground, among many others, that the operations were jeopardizing
or disturbing one or more of the six endangered and threatened species found
in the vicinity.460 The district court was persuaded that the Navy was more a
help than a hindrance to the wildlife because military ownership and use in
effect created a sanctuary from which all other human activities were
barred.461 The appellate court vacated and remanded.462 It held that the dis-
trict court's findings were not a proper substitute for an official biological opin-
450. Id at 608-10.
451. Id
452. Id at 607-09.
453. See id at 608-09 (adopting analysis of Conservation Law Foundation that Secretary has continu-
ing obligation to assure compliance with ESA).
454. Id at 611.
455. See id at 608-09, 611 (Secretary retains strict control of project until completion; lessees pre-
pared for risk of losing resources).
456. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981), afld, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982).
457. See County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1377 (2d Cir. 1977) (project
must be broken down into stages with separate EIS and evaluation by Secretary at each phase), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978).
458. According to the court in Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 750-52 (9th Cir. 1975), the
benefits of an offshore lease cannot be denied indefinitely because of subsequent reasons without effect-
ing an unconstitutional taking. In any event, the reports are barren of cases in which a lessee was
permanently deprived of leased oil for such reasons.
459. 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979), af'd inpart, vacatedinpart, and remanded inpart, 643 F.2d 835
(1st Cir. 1981), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 1798 (1982).
460. 478 F.Supp. at 651, 688-89.
461. Id at 689.
462. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 863 (.st Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub nonL
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 1798 (1982).
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ion pursuant to section 7(a)(2)463 and remanded both the section 7 and section
9 claims for further proceedings.464
The District of Columbia district court in Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v.
Peterson465 seemingly retreated from Hill by accepting a conclusory biological
opinion without further inquiry.466 Plaintiffs challenged the approval by the
Forest Service of private mineral exploration in a wilderness area because the
prospecting and extraction allegedly jeopardized a pocket of grizzly bears, a
threatened species.467 The agency apparently did not know whether grizzlies
actually lived in the area or whether the mineral operations would adversely
affect them. The court took the biological opinion, which laid down some con-
ditions and recited a lack of significant impact, at face value, and dismissed the
suit.468 It held that only the arbitrary and capricious standard of review should
be applied, that exploration is only a preliminary step, and that plaintiffs had
not met their burden.469 The latter holding disregarded the statutory language
requiring the agency, not the plaintiff, to "insure" against jeopardy.470 In the
end, the court proclaimed that it would not speculate on whether there were
any bears in the area and whether they would be scared away by drilling oper-
ations.471 The lack of information in the opinion precludes evaluation of the
court's substantive holding, but its comments on review standards and the ju-
dicial role indicate that the decision could be vulnerable on appeal.
472
2. The Review Board
After the agency has completed the expanded consultation procedure and an
immediate, unavoidable conflict has been identified, the agency, the governor
of the state in which the proposed action will occur or the permit or license
applicant may request an exemption. 473 The application must be submitted in
writing to the Secretary of the Interior within ninety days of the completion of
the consultation process474 and must describe the consultation process and the
reasons the action cannot be modified to avoid species jeopardy or habitat
degradation. 475 The exemption application cannot be filed until the consulta-
463. 643 F.Supp. at 857.
464. Id at 856-57.
465. 510 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1981).
466. Id at 1189-90.
467. Id at 1187.
468. Id at 1191.
469. Id at 1189-91.
470. See supra note 310 (discussing Act's placement on agency of burden of demonstrating agency
action will not have impermissible consequences).
471. Id at 1191.
472. In August 1982 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, 17 ENV'T REP. CAs. (BNA)
1844 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
473. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The wording of§ 1536(g)(5)(B) makes it clear that the
consultation process is a mandatory prerequisite for application for an exemption. Id § 1536(g)(5)(B).
Any project granted exemption from the provisions of § 7 also receives exemption from §§ 9(a) and
4(d). Id § 1536(o).
474. Id § 1536(g)(2)(A). In the case of an agency action involving a permit or license applicant, the
application must be submitted not later than 9.0 days after the date the agency concerned takes final
agency action. Id
475. Id § 1536(f). Pursuant to this section the Secretary is required to promulgate regulations that
specify the form and manner in which applications shall be submitted and the information that must be
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tion is completed 476 and the license denial is final.4 77
After the Secretary receives an application for exemption, he must request
from the governor of each state affected by the proposed action nominations of
individuals to serve on the review board and the Endangered Species Commit-
tee, the bodies forming the two tiers of the exemption process.478 A three-
person review board then is established to consider the particular exemp-
tion.479 Within sixty days of receipt, the Secretary submits to the review board
the exemption application and a written statement of his views and recommen-
dation on the project4 80
The review board is only a device to screen out bad faith applications and to
focus the controversy. Congress empowered it to compile a record, to deline-
ate alternatives, and to summarize evidence obtained in hearings.48' Although
the board reviews the entire prior consultation process, its decision is limited to
the threshold determinations of whether an irresolvable conflict exists and
whether the applicant has lived up to the requirements of the consultation pro-
cess.482 If the board determines that the conflict is not irresolvable or that the
agency has not demonstrated good faith in attempting to resolve the conflict or
to accomplish the purposes of the project by alternatives, the exemption pro-
cess is foreclosed. 483 Judicial review is available at this point.484 Positive find-
ings on the threshold questions will not be considered final agency action
because Congress confided the substantive decision to the full Endangered
Species Committee (ESC).485
Once the conflict and good faith thresholds are crossed, the review board
must prepare a report for the ESC containing the written recommendations of
the Secretary, the results of the board's own adjudicatory hearings,4 8 6 and the
opinions of other federal agencies on whether the action is in the public inter-
est and is of national or regional significance.487 The board's report also
should discuss the availability and benefits of reasonable and prudent alterna-
tives to the proposed action,488 but it cannot recommend any particular dispo-
sition on the merits of the application.489 Finally, the board must discuss
presented. The Secretary may require information beyond a description of the consultation process
and an explanation for impossibility of modification. Id
476. See 1d § 1536(g)(5)(B)(i) (requiring review board to determine whether applicant has carried
out consultation responsibilities).
477. Id § 1536(h)(); Pittston Co. v. Endangered Species Comm., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1257,
1263 (D.D.C. 1980)
478. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
479. Id § 1536(g)(3)(A).
480. Id § 1536(g)(4).
481. Id § 1536(g)(5)-(7). The Senate bill did not contain the review board step of the exemption
process; it was adopted from the House version. H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-23, 46.48
(1978). The board is to serve in a capacity similar to an administrative hearing examiner who makes
recommendations to a federal agency under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id at 14.
482. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(5)-(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
483. Id § 1536(g)(5).
484. Id (negative board determination is final agency action subject to review under Administrative
Procedure Act).
485. Id § 1536(g)(6).
486. Id § 1536(g)(7).
487. .1d § 1536(g)(7)(B), (g)(8).
488. Id § 1536(g)(7)(A).
489. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978).
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appropriate mitigation and enhancement measures that the Committee should
consider as possible conditions to a grant of exemption.
490
The board is primarily a factfinder and summarizer, but its determination of
the relative benefits involves the exercise of judgment. It has the opportunity
to provide creative approaches in its discussion of mitigation and enhancement
measures. The scope of the review board's consideration is clearly broader
than that of the Secretary in the original consultation process: the alternatives
it may consider are not limited to those within the power of the Secretary or
the agency proposing the action.491
3. The Endangered Species Committee
The 1978 Amendments gave a cabinet-level group denominated the Endan-
gered Species Committee492 the final decision493 on whether the project or the
species will survive. Congress empowered the ESC to hold hearings, but the
legislative history to the amendments suggests that the Committee should not
duplicate the function of the review board in gathering data relevant to the
project or to the availability of reasonable alternatives or mitigation
measures.
494
The Committee must grant or deny an exemption within ninety days of re-
ceipt of the review board's report.495 To grant an exemption, the ESC must
determine by a vote of not fewer than five496 of its seven members that (1) there
are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the action; (2) the benefits of the
490. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(7)(C) (Supp. IV 1980).
491. See id § 1536(g)(7)(A) (requiring board to report on availability of reasonable alternatives).
The Conference Report recommended that the scope of the alternatives considered should be broader
at the review board level than the consideration of alternatives during consultation. Section 7 consulta-
tion is intended to focus on the agency action which gave rise to the problem initially and on means of
solving the problem in a way that is clearly within the jurisdiction and expertise of the consulting
parties. In contrast, the review board and the Endangered Species Committee should focus on a wider
variety of alternatives. The Conference Committee did not intend that the review board should con-
sider only alternatives that are both technically capable of being constructed and prudent to implement.
H.R. RP . 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sass. 20-21 (1978); see Rosenberg, supra note 145, at 545-49.
492. The Committee is composed of the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense and Interior the Chair-
man of the Council of Economic Advisors; the Administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and an appointee of the President from
each affected state. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). Unlike that of the review board, the com-
position of the Committee does not vary with each application, with the exception of the presidential
appointees. The President makes the latter appointments pursuant to the recommendations of the gov-
ernor of each affected state. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). If there is more than one
appointee, presumably they constitute one member and cast one vote collectively.
493. Although Congress can override the Committee's decision as it did in TVA v. Hill, the decision
of the Committee is final in that it completes the procedure provided by the statute. The decision also is
subject to judicial review. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n) (Supp. IV 1980). Congress rejected an amendment that
would have made congressional review routine when extinction of a species would be a likely result of a
decision by the Committee. 124 CONG. REc. 38,127 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Jeffords).
494. The Endangered Species Committee should seldom hold a second adjudicatory hearing. H.R.
REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1978). Nevertheless, Congress empowered the Committee to
receive additional evidence and testimony, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(7)(A) (Supp. IV- 1980), and to issue
subpoenas. Id § 1536(e)(9). The subpoena power should be exercised with restraint. S. RaP. No. 874,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978). Finally, the Committee may promulgate rules, regulations, and proce-
dures, and issue orders in furtherance of its duties. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(8) (Supp. IV .1980).
495. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
496. Id § 1536(h)(1). The Senate, at the request of Senator Scott, changed the quorum requirement
from seven to five members to prevent frustration of the operation of the Committee. 124 CONG. REc.
21,580 (1978).
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action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action that are
consistent with the ESA; (3) the agency action is in the public interest; and (4)
the action is of regional or national significance.497 In addition, the Committee
must establish reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures to minimize
the adverse effects of the agency action.4
98
Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives. Congress rejected the original
amendment language of "feasible and prudent" for the "reasonable and pru-
dent" language of the Senate version because the latter allowed the Endan-
gered Species Committee "to consider a wide range of factors" and gave the
Committee more "flexibility in reviewing irresolvable conflicts. '499 The Com-
mittee thus may consider factors such as community impacts and economic
feasibility as well as engineering feasibility of alternatives under considera-
tion.50° The percentage of project completion may be considered under this
rule of reason. Congress intended that the range of alternatives considered by
both the review board and the Committee should be wider than that specified
in the section 7(a) consultation process.50
Bene.)ts. The second determination that the Committee must make
before granting an exemption involves balancing the benefits of the proposed
action against the benefits of alternative courses consistent with conserving the
species. 502 To underscore the exceptional nature of the novel exemption pro-
cess, the statute requires that the benefits of the proposed action "clearly out-
497. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)()(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
498. Id § 1536(h)(1)(B).
499. 124 CONG. REC. 21,590-91 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Baker). Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton
-Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,411 (1971) (interpreting "feasible and prudent"), quotedin 124 CONG.
REc. 21,590 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Baker).
500. 124 CONG. REC. 21,590 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Baker).
501. Id at 21,590-91.
502. The scope of the benefits to be considered is broad:
[Tihe second criteria [sic] considered by the committee involves an evaluation of the bene-
fits of the agency action and an evaluation: of the benefits associated with alternatives which
would avoid an adverse impact on the species or its habitat.
In the context of this provision, the committee intends that the term "benefits" shall include,
but not be limited to, ecological and economic considerations. Among the economic criteria
which may be examined and considered by the Endangered Species Committee are those set
forth in OMB Circular A-107 and in Executive Order 11,949. These include:
(1) the cost impact on consumers, business markets, Federal, State, and local governments;
(2) the effect on productivity of wage earners, businesses and government;
(3) the effect on competition;
(4) the effect on supplies of important materials, products, and services;
(5) the effect on employment; and
(6) the effect on energy supply and demand.
The committee does not intend, however, that the Endangered Species Committee evaluation
should be limited to these criteria. They should also consider the national interest, including
actions authorized, funded or carried out by the Secretary of Defense; the esthetic, ecological,
educational, historical, recreational and scientific value of any endangered or threatened spe-
cies; and any other factors deemed relevant.
H.R. Ran. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978).
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weigh" the benefits of alternatives.50 3 This standard presents conceptual
difficulty when read together with the first criterion because, when the Com-
mittee makes the second determination, it already has determined that no rea-
sonable and prudent alternatives to the project exist. Does the statute require
that the Committee spend time balancing the benefits of alternatives that are
unreasonable and imprudent albeit consistent with the purpose of conserving
the species?5°4 Or is it now limited to the choice between the project as pro-
posed or no project at all? Despite the balancing language, the reports of both
Houses and of the Conference Committee make clear that the ESC is not to
balance the value of the species against the value of the proposed action.505
Nevertheless, the inescapable reality of the exemption process is a choice be-
tween these two values. The "clearly outweigh" language creates a strong pre-
sumption in favor of the endangered wildlife.
Public Interest. To decide that the project is "in the public interest," the
Committee must find that such action will "affect some interest, right or duty
of the community at large in a way which they would perceive as positive."
506
As the community at large probably would be sharply divided over the posi-
tive qualities of a project that would harm or exterminate a species, the public
interest standard is less than definitive. If construed to require something like
local unanimity, no project is likely to meet it. Although "public interest" is an
amorphous criterion and affords little basis for judicial review, Congress obvi-
ously intended that it limit ESC discretion in some fashion. Even in cases of
expensive government boondoggles and ventures for purely private profit,
however, some public interest argument always will be available.
507
Signfcance. The fourth determination necessary to sustain an exemp-
tion is a finding that the project is of regional or national significance. As
indicated in the House and Conference Committee reports, Congress intended
"regional significance" to be a broad standard involving other factors than a
mere finding that the project affects more than one state.50 8 The Committee
may consider the nature of the project as well as its geographical scope.5 9
This standard appears to be a tighter, and thus more reviewable, 510 limitation
503. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV 1980).
504. The Conference Report merely reiterates that benefits to be considered include national inter-
est, esthetic, educational, historical, recreational, scientific value, and any other relevant factors as well
as ecological and economic benefits. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978).
505. H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1978); S. REP. No. 874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978).
506. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978).
507. The Tellico Dam itself may be an example of an expensive government boondoggle that had
been justified in the planning phase by cost benefit analysis. .Even TVA Chairman S. David Freeman
later questioned the value of the dam, given the damage that could result from flooding the land. Note,
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill: Protection of Endangered Species Under Section 7 of the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 913, 922 n.41 (1978).
508. The House debates indicate that a project could affect only a single state and yet be of regional
significance. 124 CONG. REc. 38,126 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Bowen).
509. H.R. RaP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978). The Conference Committee indicated that
action affecting the Port of Sacramento, California, would be an example of a project of regional signif-
icance. Id
510. At least in obvious cases, "regional significance" is the "law to apply" in review of the adminis-
trative decision. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,413 (1971) (exemp-
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on the Committee's discretion than public interest. Simply as a factual matter
it will be very difficult to conclude that a shopping center or a suburb or a
manufacturing plant (or even another TVA dam in a heavily dammed region)
is of more than local or statewide significance.
Taken together, these criteria make up a complex formula for deciding
whether to grant or deny an exemption. But the complexity masks inherent
vagueness and indecision. With such broad and conceptually cumbersome
standards, Committee members may be encouraged to predicate their votes on
the outcome desired rather than on the discrete factors. Moreover, a court
called upon to review any decision based on this mire of considerations may
have no recourse but to affirm the Committee holding since it would be diffi-
cult to find a basis for holding that the decision was clearly arbitrary.51'
Nevertheless, the combination of factors demonstrates that Congress did not
intend the ESC to be a rubber stamp for economic land use development. The
statutory balance is clearly weighted on the side of endangered species; they
are still entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Developers bear a heavy burden in
showing that on the national priority list their proposal is higher than the con-
tinued existence of a species. In this public interest balancing, very few
projects are in fact of such national or regional importance that their continu-
ance should outweigh a unique form of life.
In addition to determining that the criteria discussed above are met, the
Committee is charged with prescribing "reasonable mitigation and enhance-
ment measures" to minimize the adverse impact of the exempted project on the
species or habitat. 512 Insofar as "enhancement" differs from "mitigation," the
former buttresses the affirmative conservation duty.51 3  The costs of these
measures are to be borne by the agency as project costs, 5 14 but they are to be
excluded from the computation of the benefits and costs of the project.5 15 This
curious provision seems to insure that agency guidelines or NEPA will not
preclude a project even though its real cost, including the cost of measures
necessary to mitigate species damage, exceeds its worth.5 16
tion for action "committed to agency discretion" inapplicable when there is "law to apply"). An
exemption for a purely local project, for example, could be seen as arbitrary and capricious under this
test. "National or regional significance" is nevertheless a flexible standard with much room for creativ-
ity in argument and administrative construction.
511. Any person (defined in 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (Supp. IV 1980)) may invoke review of the Com-
mittee's decision by filing within 90 days of the issuance of the ESC's determination a petition in either
the court of appeals for the circuit where the agency action will be carried out or, if the action will be
carried out outside of any circuit, in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 16
U.S.C. § 1536(n) (Supp. IV 1980).
512. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
513. See supra notes 312-23 and accompanying text (discussing federal agencies' affirmative duty to
conserve).
514. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(1)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
515. Id
516. Flood control projects must have a benefit-cost ratio greater than unity, Flood Control Act 33
U.S.C. § 701a (1976), but all other major projects are subject to the less mathematical balancing re-
quired by NEPA. See County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1384 (2d Cir. 1977)
(NEPA requires broadly defined cost-benefit analysis of major federal activities), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1064 (1978). If, therefore, costs of project redesign to avoid harm to endangered species lowered the
flood control project benefit-cost ratio below unity or showed a lack of justification under NEPA, those
costs seemingly could be ignored.
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4. Other Substantive Constraints on ESC Discretion
Other provisions in the 1978 amendments to section 7 can dictate the result
reached by the Endangered Species Committee. Notwithstanding any other
criterion, an exemption must be granted if the Secretary of Defense finds it
necessary for "national security." 517 Such a broad and ill-defined standard,
subject to little judicial oversight, could easily lend itself to abuse, as it has in
the past.518 The Defense Secretary may properly use this authority in connec-
tion with massive weapons systems such as the MX missile transportation sys-
tem proposed for Nevada and Utah.519 Whether the Secretary will choose to
exempt lower level projects and activities will depend on his definition of na-
tional security, which could embrace refineries, pipelines, transmission lines,
airfields, shipyards, and so forth.520
The Defense Secretary's authority, however, is not exempt from judicial re-
view. Challengers have two avenues of appeal. First, because the amendment
directs the Secretary to "find" (rather than using words such as "determine in
his judgment" or other words implying informal discretion) the national secur-
ity necessity, the factual bases on which the finding rests should be open to
.review. Assume, for fanciful example, that water pollution discharge from a
naval installation destroyed the habitat amenities of an endangered species. If
the Defense Secretary decided that the pollution was necessary to the national
security, a court should be able to reverse the decision as arbitrary, unsup-
ported, and perhaps unlawful. Second, the meaning and application of "na-
tional security" ultimately must be a matter of judicial interpretation, at least
in instances beyond the normal scope of the term. The Secretary could argue,
for instance, that yet another TVA dam is necessary for national security be-
cause it enhances the local economy, which contributes to national prosperity,
which means more tax receipts, which make more money available to the De-
fense Department, which provides national security. One must fervently hope
that courts will not abdicate their responsibility to throw out that or similar
arguments. Even with judicial review, however, this mandatory exemption
does remove the major defense installations from the reach of the Endangered
Species Act, at least at the ESC level.
521
The Supreme Court recently accepted a national security defense in a case
peripherally involving endangered species protection. In Weinberger v. Catho-
lic Action,52= the Navy's environmental impact assessment of a weapons stor-
age facility located within 750 feet of the endangered Hawaiian stilt's habitat
did not discuss possible effects of nuclear weapons storage at the facility. In
517. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j) (Supp. IV 1980).
518. Readers with short memories should be reminded of the role played by asserted national secur-
ity considerations in the Watergate imbroglio.
519. Although an exemption for a weapons system deemed vital to national defense appears well
within the statute, it is less likely that all details of implementation are similarly exempt. See infra notes
620-24 and accompanying text (discussing scope of national security exemption under ESA).
520. Cf Catholic Action of Hawaii v. Brown, 643 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1980) (prohibition of disclosure
of information on nuclear weapons storage does not preclude EIS on particular storage site known to
public as possible storage site), rev'dsub nonr. Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 102 S. Ct. 197 (1981).
521. The statute also provides summary exemption for replacement of a public facility in an area
declared a major disaster area by the President. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(p) (Supp. IV 1980).
522. 102 S. Ct. 197 (1981).
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denying plaintiffs motion to enjoin permanently use of the facility for nuclear
weapons storage, the district court ruled that national security interests pro-
tected the refusal to disclose whether nuclear weapons would be stored, and it
accepted defendant's conclusion that the Hawaiian stilt would not be af-
fected.5 23 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that an impact statement could
assess generally and hypothetically the impact of nuclear weapons storage
without violating security requirements. 524 The court remanded the ESA claim
for further consideration in light of the EIS to be prepared by the Navy.5 25 The
Supreme Court reversed the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the suit,
holding that nuclear weapons storage was a matter of national security and
that NEPA does not require hypothetical assessments. 5 26 No court interpreted
the statutory exemption provision of the ESA because no exemption applica-
tion had been filed, and the Supreme Court ignored the possible endangered
species problem.
Another provision of uncertain origin restricts the exemption process to an
undetermined extent by introducing, perhaps unwittingly, a set of different,
complex, and conflicting criteria. Section 7(i) flatly forbids the ESC from con-
sidering an exemption if the Secretary of State certifies in writing that an ex-
emption "would be in violation of an international treaty obligation or other
international obligation of the United States. '527 Assuming (perhaps without
good reason) that the Secretary of State will use this certification authority,528
a Pandora's box of treaty interpretation will be opened. The wildlife-related
treaties to which the United States is a signatory comprise over twelve hundred
pages. 529 They are filled with obscure provisions that have never been inter-
preted or applied. Some are general, providing only that the United States has
committed itself to species preservation530 and habitat protection.531 Some are
more specific, requiring that the habitat of certain migratory birds is to be
protected from development and pollution.5 32 Sorting out all of the possibili-
ties inherent in the frequently vague language would require a small army of
lawyer-diplomats and will not be undertaken here. Suffice it to say that this
provision is a sleeper that gives the State Department enormous potential
power over the exemption process. Capricious use of the power should be
523. Catholic Action v. Brown, 468 F. Supp. 190, 193 (D. Hawaii 1979), revd, 643 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.
1980), rev'dsub nom Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 102 S. Ct. 197 (1981).
524. 643 F.2d at 572.
525. Id
526. 102 S. Ct. at 203.
527. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(i) (Supp. IV 1980).
528. The State Department has been loath to advocate increased wildlife protection if international
friction might ensue. See S. REP. No. 863, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 41-44 (1972) (letter from Mr. David M.
Abshire, Asst. Sec. of State, to Sen. Magnuson expressing opposition to bill to protect ocean mammals
because other national and international means were appropriate and bill might require violation of
U.S. treaty obligations).
529. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVIcE, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
ON FISHERIES, OcEANOoGRAPHIc RESOURCES, AND WILDLIFE INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES (1977)
(Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp. Print).
530. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3,
1973, 277 U.S.T. 1087, T.LA.S. No. 8249.
531. Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, Oct.
12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354 (1942), T.S. No. 981.
532. Convention on Protection of Migratory Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment,
March 4, 1972, United States-Japan, 25 U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 7990.
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subject to judicial oversight because the question whether a treaty has been
violated, however much tinged with political considerations, is in essence a
legal one.5 33
5. Finality: The Secretarial Veto and Judicial Review
Once a project has been exempted from compliance with section 7, the dis-
covery of additional endangered species that will be jeopardized by the project
does not necessitate further consideration of the project.534 An exemption
granted by the Committee is deemed permanent unless the Secretary finds that
the agency action will result in extinction of the newfound species, in which
case he must veto the exemption.5 35 The Committee can override this determi-
nation notwithstanding the Secretary's finding.536 Neither an additional ESC
determination nor a greater majority is required to override the Secretary's
veto. The provision seems aimed only at insuring that the Committee is aware
that extinction of the species is the probable effect of its decision. Thus a pro-
ject may go forward even in the face of clear evidence that a species will be
extirpated by the action.53
7
The Act provides for judicial review of the Endangered Species Committee's
decision upon the filing of a petition by any person within ninety days thereaf-
ter.538 The court charged with reviewing the ESC's decision will face a task
far more difficult than the ordinary review of agency actions. Standards of
review are not specified in the Act. Review, therefore, will proceed under the
general standards of the Administrative Procedure Act,539 which in effect
means that the reviewing court can look as deeply into the decision as it
chooses.54° Whether the substantial evidence test will apply to all or any part
of the proceeding is questionable, but it likely will make little difference. 541
More crucial will be whether the court chooses to interpret independently the
broad standards that control the Committee's discretion. 542 In the end, an
ESC determination probably will be reversed only if the court is convinced
533. See Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 402 F. Supp. 35 (D.D.C.), a 'd, 530 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
in which the lower court was unsure whether plaintiff had standing to assert convention violations, but
went on to hold that no violations occurred. Id at 38.
534. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). Representative Beard suggested the amendment to
H.R. 14,104 that added the "permanent exemption" language, stating that its purpose is to ensure that
an exempted project would not be affected by addition of new species to the endangered or threatened
lists, or later discovery of listed species in the project ares. 124 CONG. REc. 38,Pr39 (1P78) (remarks of
Rep. Beard).
535. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1980).
536. Id § 1536(h)(2)(B)(ii).
537. Id § 1536(h)(l).
538. Id § 1536(n).
539. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
540. See Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67
GEo. LJ. 699, 712-18 (1979) (Supreme Court made clear in Vermont Yankee that courts should apply
more than APA minimum procedure only in compelling circumstances).
541. The "substantial evidence" test applies only in review of adjudicatory hearings. 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1976). Regardless of whether the exemption process is deemed "adjudicatory," the so-called test does
not add much to judicial review.
542. See Rodgers, supra note 540, at 712-18 (discussing judicial imposition of procedures beyond
statutory minima of APA). A court should do so because the ESC is neither expert in wildlife matters
nor charged with general interpretation and implementation of the statutes.
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that it is so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious. 543
6. Summary
The state of post-1978 endangered species law can be summarized as
follows:
a. The four major duties created by section 7 are intact: whenever a federal
action will affect a listed species, the action agency must consult with FWS and
insure that the action will neither jeopardize the species nor destroy or ad-
versely modify its critical habitat. In addition, each agency has an undefined
duty to use its authority affirmatively for endangered species conservation.
b. If, after considering alternatives, FWS consultation ends in an impasse,
the action agency must refrain from committing unrecoverable resources to the
project, and the only recourse is to the Endangered Species Committee.
c. The ESC can exempt the project or activity, but only after certain proce-
dures have been completed and relatively stringent criteria satisfied. The Sec-
retaries of Defense and State and the President can dictate the result in some
limited circumstances.
d. The prohibition against "taking" endangered species overshadows the
exemption procedure. Left unchanged by Congress, it poses conceptual and
practical constraints on land users as significant as those inherent in section 7.
e. The ESA cannot be viewed in isolation. It is just a part-albeit a crucial
part-of the overall statutory system for enhanced environmental quality.
Only actual experience will tell how well the "God Committee" mechanism
will achieve the reconciliation of the conflicting values that Congress entrusted
to its determination. The supplementation of a simple substantive command,
expressed in a paragraph, with another seven pages of detailed procedures for
overriding that command, has created several more bureaucracies and the like-
lihood of delay and confusion. These results are inevitable because the polit-
ical branch was unable to make an either/or decision and, instead, delegated
the problem to another body. This buck-passing is not a complete retreat from
endangered species protection. Congress in 1973 did not foresee all of the po-
tential problems that could arise in the application of the ESA. Nevertheless,
in 1978 it rejected all attempts to repeal the ESA's central substantive protec-
tive provisions and directed that its new, awkward safety valve be used only in
exceptional circumstances. Given the impassioned oratory in the wake of Hill,
the reenactment of original sections 7 and 9-and the explicit validation of
their drastic land use constraints-is more significant than the new procedures.
The limited performance of the Endangered Species Committee to date also
confirms that the exemption process does not amount to an open season on
species in the path of human projects and activities. Congress directed in the
1978 Amendments that the Committee decide the fate of theTellico Dam and
of the Grayrocks Project within ninety days of enactment.544 As to the latter,
543. This follows from the lack of stringency in the standards applicable. See supra notes 499-5 10
and accompanying text (discussing standards for ESC exemption). An ESC decision also could be
overturned for "illegality" if it gave no credence to the standard that other benefits must "clearly out-
weigh" detriments to the species.
544. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(i) (Supp. IV 1980).
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the Committee accepted a settlement between the parties by which the project
sponsors agreed to pay an additional thirteen million dollars to avoid any ad-
verse effects on whooping crane stopover habitat.5 45 The Committee unani-
mously rejected the exemption application for Tellico.546 Influenced by the
inadequate cost justification for Tellico-one Committee member termed it
"ill conceived and uneconomical '5 47 -- the Committee found that the statutory
criteria had not been met. Reasonable and prudent options existed, and the
benefits of Tellico did not clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative solu-
tions.548 If the Committee follows this precedent in future disputes, the appli-
cant will have the burden of demonstrating that its proposal is not only
significant, in the public interest, and clearly more beneficial than any alterna-
tive, but also that it is well planned and economically justifiable. Given the
broad criteria, the party with the burdens of proof and persuasion will lose in
all but the. truly exceptional cases.
IV. ENDANGERED SPECIES AND FUTURE LAND USE DILEMMAS
/97e think it is time to come to grips with the negative impact of this Act
on man. In addition to the Act's adverse effects on the use offederally-
owned lands, its potentialfor infringing upon private property rights is
frightening. I/a threatened or endangered species has a critical habitat
on private land, theprivate landowner could beprevented/rom enjoying
his constitutional right to full use of his land
Hearings on H.R. 10,883, S. No.
95-39, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 48
(1978) (joint statement of the
National Cattlemen's Ass'n, Public
Lands Council, and National
Woolgrowers Ass'n).
The 1978 amendments created a complex, if not tortuous, process for bal-
ancing the continued existence of wildlife species with other societal goals.
Before an exemption may be sought, the applicant must run an obstacle course
of studies, consultation, evaluation, and other procedures. The Endangered
Species Committee is the court of penultimate resort. After the ESC grants or
denies an exemption, the parties can still seek relief from courts and Con-
gress.549 The game may well be worth less than the candle foK all but the
largest and most important projects. The presence of an endangered species
545. Endangered Species Committee, Dep't of Interior, Application for Exemption for Grayrocks
Dam & Reservoir (1979) (available upon request from the Department of Interior).
546. Endangered Species Committee, Dept of Interior, Application for Exemption for Tellico Dam
& Reservoir Project (1979) [available upon request from the Department of Interior].
547. Id at 3.
548. Id
549. After the Endangered Species Committee denied an exemption for Tellico, proponents sought
special legislative relief, claiming that the Committee's annual benefit/cost ratio was inaccurate. 125
CONG. REc. S12,278 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1979). Relief was denied several times in 1979. Supporters of
the dam finally secured an exemption by appending the Tellico provision to the Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 97-99, 93 Stat. 437 (1979). Rosenberg, supra
note 145, at 521-24; Goplerud, supra note 28, at 506-07.
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probably will spell the doom of a run-of-the-mill proposal, a result that Con-
gress contemplated and approved.
Even after the amendments, endangered species still are accorded the high-
est legal priority of any facet of the natural environment ever dealt with by the
federal legislature. In most wildlife management matters, and in most admin-
istrative decisionmaking generally, the expert agency is expected to identify,
juggle, and balance the many factors and interests at issue in order to reach a
decision that accommodates most and gives proper weight to all.550 But when
one of those factors is an adverse impact on an endangered species, the meth-
ods and the equation change drastically: the discretion of the action agency is
suddenly confined to one legal result, and only a resort to higher bodies can
change it.
Reaching the result mandated by law does not occur automatically, how-
ever, because government agencies have human tendencies that must first be
overcome. The action agency must abjure the temptation to conceal the pres-
ence of an endangered species in the vicinity, and it must enter into the consul-
tation process in good faith.551 The Fish and Wildlife Service must resist the
bureaucratic desire to avoid entanglement in violent political controversies by
liberally consulting away the welfare of the species. The Justice Department
must disavow its proclivity to adopt the action agency as its client and the
federally protected wildlife species as its opponent.552 All line agencies are
subject to pressures from departmental superiors whose philosophies may not
coincide with the ideal embodied in the Act. 553 Without an additional stimu-
lus, the government agencies and officials could be expected to implement and
enforce the Act with something less than exuberance, for its application inevi-
tably will breed hostilities, and angry people cause many more problems for
officials than do snail darters.
Individuals and organizations lumped together under the epithetic labels of
"environmentalists" or "preservatiomsts" provide such a stimulus. They typi-
cally are shrill, impecunious, and overworked, but they have sharpened the
cutting edge of the law. Although the Fish and Wildlife Service has stood up
for endangered species more strongly than some considered politically wise or
possible in some instances,554 the FWS is constrained by budgets, politics, and
550. An example is the Forest Service mandate to administer lands under its jurisdiction for multiple
use and sustained yield of five resources: wildlife and fish, outdoor recreation, watershed, range, and
timber. Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976). An agency's flex-
ibility depends of course on the statutes governing its operations.
551. Cf Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1170-71 (D. Neb.
1978) (REA failed to consult with FWS within meaning of§ 7 prior to making loan guarantee commit-
ment to sponsors of Missouri Basin Power Project).
552. In all known instances when the FWS issued an adverse biological opinion and the action
agency decided to continue in the face of it, the Justice Department has chosen to support the action
agency in subsequent litigation. After the T7'4 v. Hill decision, if not before, the Department's choice
to litigate against the objects of congressional solicitude seems questionable, especially since it, as an
agency, is also bound to conserve listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
553. The Secretary of the Interior oversees water development agencies (eg., the Bureau of Recla-
mation) and resource development agencies (gg., the Bureau of Land Management), as well as the
FWS. Even before the Reagan Administration took office, most ESA conflicts between the positions of
FWS and the other agencies apparently were decided in favor of the latter (e.g., all of the litigated
offshore oil lease sales).
554. The Tellico Dam controversy is an example of such courage. The dam was well underway when
the agency listed the snail darter as endangered, thereby setting into motion the powerful arm of section
7. The FWS persisted in its view all the way to the Supreme Court. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 161-
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the governmental structure.555 Environmental organizations brought the law-
suits to protect the Indiana bat,5 56 the Mississippi sandhill crane,55 7 the snail
darter,558 the pala,559 and the bowhead whale,560 after FWS or NMFS con-
sultation failed to deter the action agency from its allegedly destructive course.
Fulfillment of ESA goals will continue to rest to a large extent in the hands of
private persons and organizations who are willing to devote their resources to
policing the police. In any event, the human factor will always be a critical
element in species protection. Threatened and endangered species have de-
scended to that state largely through causes of human origin. Wildlife popula-
tion declines will be reversed only if people enforce the statutes to the
detriment of other people.
Taken together with fragments of the common law and prior judicial law-
making, the provisions of the ESA amount to the assertion of a federal public
trust in the listed species.561 The public trust notion long has been applied to
ownershili of wildlife562 and to justify stringent controls over wildlife exploita-
tion,563 but the concept seldom has been seen as imposing enforceable duties
on the public body to protect the populations of any particular species. 564 Sec-
tion 7 of the ESA now explicitly imposes that duty on federal and many
state565 agencies that list species.5 66 The trust doctrine does not transcend or
outweigh any specific ESA provision, but it should be the overriding theme in
62 (1978) (notwithstanding near completion of Tellico Dam, Secretary listed snail darter as endangered
species and found area affected by dam to be its critical habitat).
555. In this connection, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has enormous influence over
policy, and the OMB often appears to be the most "anti-environmental" agency in the federal establish-
ment. See Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172, 173-75 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Interior
Department exonorated of previously found failure to perform duties under federal park statutes; fail-
ure due to intransigence of 0MB in.refusing funds or increased regulatory authority).
556. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
557. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979
(1976).
558. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
559. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979),
ad, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
560. See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
561. The relationship between wildlife and the government has long been thought special. The no-
tion that state governments hold wildlife in trust for the people goes back further than Geer v. Connect-
icut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). See W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.16 (1977) (public trust doctrine
developed at common law to protect resources against dissipation); Coggins, .supra note 44, at 304-08
(nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions established rule that wildlife is owned by the several
states in trust for the people); e. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp.
985, 993-95 (D. Hawaii 1979), aj'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (Endangered Species Act recites that
United States has pledged self as a sovereign state in international community to cnserve species
facing extinction).
562. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896), overruled, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979).
563. See Delbay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, 409 F. Supp. 637, 642 (D.D.C.
1976) (ESA, which focuses state and federal government resources toward goal of protecting endan-
gered species, prohibits shipment in interstate commerce of legally imported substance derived from
endangered species).
564. Cf. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1172, 1173 (E.D. Va. 1980) (under
public trust doctrine, state and federal governments have duty to protect and preserve public's interest
m natural wildlife resources).
565. The Endangered Species Act authorizes the Secretary to enter into cooperative agreements with
states that establish and maintain programs for the conservation of endangered and threatened species,
16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (Supp. IV 1980), and most state agencies are grantees of such programs.
566. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. IV 1980).
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the judicial review of land use conflicts arising under the acts.567
This section assesses the possible impact of the amended ESA on many ma-
jor land uses in this country. The subsections that follow arbitrarily divide
land uses into federal projects, federal programs and activities, state and pri-
vate projects and activities that require federal licenses or federal money, and
purely private projects and activities. The Endangered Species Act promises
or threatens to have some effect in each category.
A. FEDERAL PROJECTS AND PROJECT OPERATION
The dilemma of dealing in absolutes instead of using risk-benetot analy-
sis to arrive at a balancedpublic interest is easily shown. At the base of
the Tellico Dam are several varieties of snails, at least one of which is
threatened I/'preservation of the Snail Darter which feeds on snails
endangers the threatened snail, must preservation of the Snail Darter
cease? What fftheprimefood of the threatened snail is an endangered
aquatic plant?
1978 House Hearings, at 854 (state-
ment of Donald Simpson, Pacific
Legal Foundation).
All federal departments and agencies require some physical facilities, even if
just office buildings, and from time to time they will undertake construction of
some project. The standard federal projects in Washington, D.C. and other
metropolitan areas are not likely to affect listed species. The federal develop-
ment projects for transportation, water resources, and defense have higher con-
flict potential.
The federal government is heavily involved in many areas of transportation:
"federal trust funds finance highways and airports; federal agencies to some
degree regulate airlines, railroads, and truckers; barge traffic relies on federal
navigation improvements; and public transportation in cities may become a
high federal priority in coming years. Transportation projects that could harm
endangered species pose fairly straightforward questiojns. Transportation sys-
tems oriented toward developed municipalities are unlikely to spark section 7
conflicts, but highway construction is likely to generate such controversy.
Amendments to the Federal-Aid Highway Act and the Department of Trans-
portation Act as interpreted in the classic 1971 Overton Park opinion,568 some-
what subdued the proclivity of road builders for routing new superhighways
through publicly owned natural areas, but those tendencies cropped up again
when the roadbuilders opted to bisect the Mississippi sandhill crane habitat
with a segment of Interstate 10.569 Future conflicts will be resolved by FWS
567. See Wilkinson, The Field of Public LandLaw. Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions,
1 PuB. LAND L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1980) (courts should apply public trust doctrine to scrutinize strictly
public land law issue); Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REv.
269, 311-13 (1980) (public trust doctrine should be used as rule of construction for statutes related to
public lands). For an example of judicial review utilizing the public trust doctrine, see United
Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
568. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
569. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979
(1976).
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determination of impact, assessment of alternate routes if critical habitat will
be disturbed, and resort to the ESC if other routes are not reasonable and
prudent.
The major focus of endangered species litigation to date has been on water
resources projects. Environmental interests challenged the Tellico Dam, the
Meramec Dam, and the Grayrocks Reservoir, while proponents of the Colum-
bia and Lufkata Dams have sought court orders to remove from the official list
the endangered species impeding their progress.570 Another equally abrasive
dispute over a project in Nevada has not yet reached the courts,57' and the
court in the litigation over Colorado River development has not entered a final
judgment.5 72 Because water is a critical element in the habitat requirements of
all species, many of which are intimately dependent upon aquatic habitats,
573
the federal government as water engineer likely will be embroiled in many
similar disputes in the future. The biggest dangers posed by water resource
projects for listed species are destruction of free-flowing river characteristics,
barriers to passage, reduction of water levels, reduction of water flows, and salt
water intrusion. The Army Corps of Engineers and the TVA have been in the
legal spotlight so far, but the Bureau of Reclamation and the Soil Conserva-
tion Service also construct dams and diversions.
The easy case from the legal standpoint will still be the one in which the
federal project will alter the entire habitat of the species and will likely render
the species extinct. Under section 7 of the ESA, the conflict is unavoidable.
The action agency seldom concedes that alternative means of achieving the
same human end without destructive effects are adequate.5 74 After consulta-
tion with the FWS has confirmed those conclusions, the dispute must be taken
to the review board and the ESC for resolution. The review board must pass
on the existence of an irreconcilable conflict and the agency's good faith coop-
eration in consultation "575 Assuming the review board finds good faith, the
critical criteria for the ESC's exemption decision will be the regional impor-
tance of the project and the public interest in its completion. 576 If the ESC
grants an exemption, the section 9 problem of taking ceases to exist,577 but the
action agency must use all possible mitigation measures.5 78 If the ESC denies
570. See supra notes 178-205 and accompanying text (discussing cases challenging Secretary's deci-
sions to list species as endangered or threatened).
571. See Hearings Before the Subcomm on Fisheries and W7ldife Conservation and the Environment of
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries onH 10883,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 404-04 (1978)
(statement of Ival Goslin) (LaVerkin Springs Salinity Control Unit).
572. See supra notes 206-30 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado River District).
573. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (Devil's Hole pupfish, to spawn in spring-
time, require underwater algae from rock shelf); Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156, 1161 (6th Cir. 1978) (migratory waterfowl and fish require adequate river flow).
574. While NEPA analyses and NEPA-generated controversies have forced water development
agencies into higher levels of sophistication and more skeptical attitudes toward their own ideas, Con-
gress still regards dam building as a political plum, above mere cost or ecological considerations. Presi-
dent Carter's abortive attempt to curtail pork-barrelling with a "hit list" is instructive, as is Senator
Baker's success in reinstating the concededly boondogglish Tellico project.
575. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
576. See supra text accompanying notes 506-10 (discussing "public interest" and "regional or na-
tional significance" criteria for ESC exemption). *
577. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o) (Supp. IV. 1980) provides that any action for which an exemption is
granted "shall not be considered a taking of any endangered or threatened species with respect to any
activity which is necessary to carry out such action."
578. Id § 1536(h)(1)(B), (1)(1).
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an exemption, the project proponents may seek judicial relief-which, if
granted, probably will be limited to requiring ESC reconsideration 579-or con-
gressional reversal.
Water projects with less direct or immediate effects on listed species raise
more difficult issues of interpretation and application. Suppose, for example,
that an endangered butterfly lives only in a freshwater marsh in the delta re-
gion of California,580 a part of which has been designated critical habitat, and
that the Bureau of Reclamation proposes an immense project to divert delta
waters for irrigation and municipal purposes in Southern California.58s Sup-
pose further that it is possible, if not probable, that the diversion wil result in
some intrusion of salt water into the delta that may-or may not-eventually
alter the composition of marsh plants on which the butterfly depends, possibly
but not probably resulting in the extinction of the insect over a period of years.
Such unintentional, indirect habitat modifications are more frequent occur-
rences than the cataclysmic, direct effect of a single project, and scientific un-
certainty about the ultimate consequences is more the rule than the exception.
The application of the Act and the reactions of the various levels of deci-
sionmakers to this conflict are difficult to predict. The project as described
arguably violates the ESA in three separate ways: its ultimate effect is to jeop-
ardize the continued existence of the species;582 its intermediate effect is the
adverse modification of critical habitat;583 and it will, in the aggregate, consti-
tute a taking of an endangered species.584 A finding that either of the first two
of these violations will occur supports an injunction against the further com-
mitment of resources to the project;5 5 an imminent taking also may afford a
ground for injunctive relief.586 If the Bureau of Reclamation or the FWS can
demonstrate that the project will not in fact harm the species, the ESA problem
will be resolved at this point. But uncertainty over whether and to what extent
the project will adversely affect the butterfly should not be a defense: the Bu-
reau has the burden of insuring that no significant harm will ensue.
58 7
579. Id § 1536(n). The statute specifies that any party may obtain judicial review of any decision of
the ESC under the Administrative Procedure Act. The courts cannot, of course, substitute their judg-
ment on the merits but must instead remand to allow the ESC to reconsider the matters found arbitrary
or illegal.
580. Seven species of butterflies in California are listed as endangered. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1980).
581. The notion is not far-fetched. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 290-91 (1981)
(describing state and federal projects to divert water from Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta to central
and Southern California).
582. This assumes that 'jeopardization" will be construed as set out supra at text accompanying
notes 262-86.
583. Cf. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156, 1171-72 (D. Neb.
1978) (finding that REA had not taken action necessary to ensure that Missouri Basin Power Project
would not jeopardize continued existence of whooping crane or its habitat).
584. Cf Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1981)
("taking" of endangered species under ESA includes "harassing," which regulations define to include
intentional or negligent acts or omissions that significantly disrupt species' behavior patterns).
585. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 165-66, 168, 173 (1978) (activities incident to Tellico project
enjoined because they caused adverse modification of critical habitat that probably jeopardized endan-
gered species).
586. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 999 (D. Hawaii
1979) (defendant enjoined from acts that significantly modify Palila's critical habitat and thus consti-
tute taking of endangered species), aj'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981); see also supra text accompanying
notes 324-86 (discussing interpretation of "taking" under ESA).
587. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (Endangered Species Act commands all federal agen-
cies to ensure that their actions do not jeopardize an endangered species or adversely modify its
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A determination that a conflict does exist is only the first step. Without an
agreement with the FWS that is supportable factually and acceptable to moni-
toring environmental organizations, the agency must cease construction and
apply to the ESC for an exemption.58 8 The diligence with which the agency
seeks alternatives may determine the project's fate. If the Bureau is adamantly
against any change in its plan, the project will die, leaving only the hope of
congressional resurrection, because the failure to seek alternatives demon-
strates bad faith that bars recourse to the exemption procedure.589 The best
interests of the Bureau, therefore, lie in cooperating fully with the FWS in the
consultation process. Open-mindedness likely will make possible the location
of "reasonable and prudent alternatives" to the initial diversion plan, such as
project modifications, intrusion barriers, or lower level operating criteria.
If the alternative selected is expensive, however, an inadvertent problem
arises under the Act: whereas mitigation decreed by the ESC as a condition to
an exemption does not count in the calculation of the project's benefit/cost
ratio,590 no such exception is set out for measures voluntarily adopted by theagency in the consultation process.591 Thus, if the costs of the corrective meas-
ures lower the ratio below unity, the action agency will be forced either to seek
an ESC exemption or to abandon the project.5 92 Even if the ratio remains
above unity, the project will appear, accurately, to be less valuable.
Assuming that the action agency incorporates protective features into the
project design sufficient to satisfy FWS that significant harm to the species will
be avoided, continuation of the dispute is then in private hands. A project of
the magnitude imagined, with effects on a wide range of environmental, eco-
nomic, social, and other interests, is bound to attract vocal opposition and
probably litigation. If the FWS biological opinion evidences uncertainty over
the possibility of jeopardization or habitat modification, or if the opponents
can adduce persuasive evidence of such consequences, the challenging litigants
still might be able to obtain an injunction against resource commitment, forc-
ing an application to the ESC.593 Time could be a problem in such a case
habitat); Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156, 1171 (D. Neb.
1979) (ESA places burden upon agencies who are authorizing, funding, or carrying out programs to
ensure that those programs do not jeopardize endangered species or habitat of species); Defenders of
Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.D.C. 1977) (ESA requires Interior Department to do more
than just avoid elimination of endangered species; it requires Department to bring species back to point
at which it can be removed from protected class).
588. Construction is an irretrievable commitment and thus, under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (Supp. IV
1980), may not be continued if it would foreclose reasonable and prudent alternatives that would not
jeopardize an endangered species or adversely affect its critical habitat.
589. Under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(5) (Supp. IV 1980), a determination by the review board that the
agency has not made a reasonable and responsible effort to develop and fairly consider modifications or
reasonable and prudent alternatives is considered final agency action. The agency's only resort then is
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, which likely would be limited to an examina-
tion of the review board record. See supra notes 481-85 and accompanying text (discussing review
board determinations and availability of judicial review).
590. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(l)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). See upra notes 512-16 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing mitigation and enhancement measures and their exclusion from project cost computations).
591. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(1) (Supp. IV 1980) refers only to mitigation measures established by the ESC.
592. Although the process by which benefit/cost ratios for dams are calculated can be farcical, as
illustrated by Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1362-81 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974), the agency is legally required to find that benefits
will exceed costs. 33 U.S.C. § 701a (1976).
593. Water projects are not segmented in the same fashion as offshore oil lease sales, so the step-by-
step rationale of North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980), should be rejected in
15011982]
HeinOnline  -- 70 Geo. L. J. 1501 1981-1982
1502 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1433
because the Act requires application within ninety days of final agency action,
and more than ninety days will have passed since the rendition of the biologi-
cal opinion and the Bureau's decision to proceed.594 The Act does not cover
this problem;595 the reasonable solution is that the application time runs from
the date the judicial order becomes final.
If the FWS opinion recites that the project will not cause significant harm,
challengers will have a tougher row to hoe, but the obstacles to judicial relief
may be surmountable. Several arguments militate against the conclusion that
the biological opinion is conclusive. First, courts are aware that the FWS, al-
though certainly the "expert" agency in wildlife matters, is neither infallible
596
nor immune from the influence of political pressures.597 Second, Congress did
not say that the biological opinion would be conclusive. Instead, the standard
remains that the action agency must insure against dire consequences, and the
burden of persuasion is still on the agency to demonstrate that insurance. In
other words, if the litigant can demonstrate the possibility of jeopardization,
habitat modification, or taking, the agency thereafter has the burden of per-
suading the court that the dire effects will not occur. 598 The FWS opinion may
be evidence tending to prove that no jeopardization will occur, but the statute
does not warrant finding the opinion conclusive.599
favor of that in Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156 (D. Neb.
1978).
594. The sequence of events and deadlines for their completion under the consultation process are
arranged somewhat awkwardly. The consultation process must be concluded within 90 days of the date
on which it was initiated. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (Supp. IV 1980). The deadline for completion of the
biological assessment, which is a required part of consultation, is 180 days after the initiation of the
consultation process. Id § 1536(c)(1). The ESA does not resolve the timing problem on this point, but
section 1536(b) allows the consultation period to be extended to a period of time mutually agreeable to
the action agency and the Secretary.
595. The ESA does provide that a citizen's suit may not be commenced prior to 60 days after written
notice of the violation has been given to the Secretary and to the alleged violator of the Act. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g)(2)(A)(i) (1976). This provision seems to give the alleged violator time to submit an applica-
tion for exemption prior to the initiation of the suit, assuming that the 90 day period has not lapsed.
596. See Connor v. Andrus, 453 F. Supp. 1037, 1041-42 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (court could find no ra-
tional basis to sustain FWS regulations restricting all duck hunting in selected areas as protective meas-
ure for endangered Mexican duck).
597. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 455 F. Supp. 446, 449 (D.D.C. 1978) (regulations for use
of Ruby Lake National Wildlife Refuge declared unlawful because in adopting regulations FWS bal-
anced economic, political, and recreational interests against primary wildlife purpose of refuge and
reached compromise not in the best interest of refuge or in conformity with its purposes).
598. This follows not only from the statutory language, "insure," but also from basic congressional
purposes. "Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance
as been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities, thereby adopting a
policy which it described as 'institutionalized caution."' TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). Butsee
Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2081, 2083 (D.D.C. 1981) (courts
should not overturn agency determinations of no jeopardization unless determination arbitrary and
capricious).
599. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (Supp. IV 1980) (biological opinion and assessment under ESA). Even so,
the FWS opinion is entitled to deference in the rest of the exemption process. The review board may
only determine whether the FWS correctly concluded that an irresolvable conflict exists, and seems
powerless to quarrel with the substantive content. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). The FWS
opinions, as well as the opinions of other agencies responsible for certain species, have carried great
weight in reviewing ourts. S~ee, a., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173-74 (1978) (Court accepted Secre-
tary's determination that TVA's acts would cause eradication of endangered species); North Slope Bor-
ough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (court considered biological opinion of NationalMarine Fisheries Service to be pivotal in ESA analysis); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d
359, 372, 375 (5th Cir.) (district court attached special significance to testimony of author of FWSreport circuit curt deferred to Interior Department's judgment on requirements for compliance with
§ 7 of ESA), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
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Even more interpretational difficulty will be encountered when the chal-
lenge is to the operation of the water resource project after construction. As-
sume-as is the case-that the series of dams on the Columbia River and its
tributaries under the management of the Bonneville Power Administration
(BPA) have caused or contributed to the decline of anadromous salmon runs
in those rivers.6°° Assume further-as may become the case601 -that a species
in one of those rivers is listed as endangered in a significant portion of its
range.602 Assume finally-as seems to be the case-that if the dams operated
at lower levels of power production and with higher levels of stream flow, the
change would enhance the spawning capabilities of the listed species,603 but
also would require the breach or modification of BPA contracts to supply
power.6°4 A lawsuit to force the BPA to insure a minimum streanflow below
its dams60 5 would present significant questions of Endangered Species Act
interpretation.
Prior cases lend some support to the initial conclusion that the combination
of the dams' existence with their year-to-year operation constitutes a taking of
the species and an adverse modification of their aquatic habitat. Hill teaches
that listing of a species after project authorization is no bar to ESA applica-
tion,6°6 and that the operation of the dams is an action, because each year it
remains to be carried out.60 7 The Snail Darter case differed from the BPA
hypothetical in that the action yet to be taken in the former was completion of
construction. The difference appears immaterial, however, because the Palila
case held that an established, ongoing program with a less direct impact on the
species is still a taking within the meaning of the Act.60 8 Federal agencies, as
600. Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Paclc Northwests Anadromous Fish Re-
sourcesfor a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal Columbia River Power System, I I ENVTL. L. 211,
216-17 (1981); Bodi, Protecting Columbia River Salmon Under the Endangered SpeciesAct, 10 ENvTL. L.
349, 349 (1980).
601. The FWS and National Marine Fisheries Service are reviewing the biological status of upriver
Columbia Basin salmon and steelhead trout to determine whether either species should be proposed for
listing as endangered or threatened. Bodi, supra note 600, at 350 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (1978)).
After two years of study, the agencies had not completed the review. Id
602. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(1) (1976) requires the Secretary of the Interior to publish a list of all species
he has determined to be endangered and to specify over what portion of its range each is endangered.
603. See Swinomish Tribal Community v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 627 F.2d 499, 506
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (when downstream flows are substantially lowered over short penods of time,
anadromous fish fry are left stranded on sandbars and gravel bottoms and die). See also Blumm, supra
note 600, at 220-21 (discussing seasonal flow manipulations on the Columbia River); Bodi, supra note
600, at 367-69 (discussing factors that have caused decline in population of anadromous fish in Colum-
bia River).
604. See Blum- & Johnson, Promising a Processfor Parity: The Pac#c Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act andAnadromous Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L. 497, 539-49 (1981) (dis-
cussing BPA's long-term contracts and implications for congressional goal of parity of fish and wildlife
protection with hydropower generation).
605. Cf. Swinomish Tribal Community v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 627 F.2d 499 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (suit challenging validity of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders permit-
ting raising of height of Ross Dam in Washington State by 121 feet); United States v. Washington, 506
F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (treaties ensuring Indians' right to adequate quantities of fish incorpo-
rate right to environmental protection of fishery habitat). See Note, United States v. Washington
(Phase II): The Indian Fishing Conflict Moves Upstream, 12 ENV'rL L. 469 (1982).
606. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978).
607. See id at 173 ("[iut has not been shown.. . how TVA can close the gates of the Tellico Dam
without 'carrying out' an action that has been 'authorized' and 'funded' by a federal agency").
608. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979),
aj'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981); see supra notes 359-84 and accompanying text (discussing Palila).
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"persons" subject to the ESA, 609 are forbidden to take endangered species, as
is anyone else.
If plaintiff bases the suit to enjoin high level operations only on section 9,
and the court agrees that a continuing taking violation has occurred, the ques-
tion will arise whether the section 7 exemption procedure is available. The
major congressional themes of the ESA directly conflict. On the one hand,
Congress intended the 1978 Amendments to introduce sufficient flexibility to
allow consideration of other significant public goals and interests,610 and the
distribution of cheap, subsidized power is certainly important in the regional
economy. On the other hand, section 7 is self-contained; it appears directed
more at initial construction than subsequent operation,611 and the importance
of the fishery resource to the region buttresses the goal of species protection.
612
The better view is that the Endangered Species Committee has jurisdiction
over the matter and the power to grant an exemption. This conclusion stems
from the obvious truth that the magnitude of the takings caused by the dams'
operation necessarily must be an adverse habitat modification, if not an in-
stance of partial jeopardy to the continued existence of species, either of which
triggers section 7. The litigation strategy of the plaintiff need not blind the
court to the biological realities nor limit judicial discretion in shaping appro-
priate relief. Although many "takings" will not also invoke section 7 and thus
the ESC consideration, 613 such invocation will be proper when the operation
of a federal project is capable of widespread harm to a listed species.
This conclusion, of course, only gets the BPA from the fire into the frying
pan. Plaintiff presumptively has established a violation of section 9, and the
judicial finding of a section 7 violation is probable. The BPA could have con-
tested the initial listing of the species, but if FWS had done its homework, the
challenge would have failed in view of the conceded perilous declines of many
anadromous species from pre-dam abundance. 614 When a species is listed as
endangered, even in only part of its range, the ESA mandates agencies to use
all means and methods for restoration of the species.615 Courts are bound to
give effect to that legislative judgment.6 16 Under those guidelines, the court
should find both that the action of BPA in running its dams to the detriment of
the fish jeopardizes the continued existence of the fish run and that the action
modifies if not destroys its critical habitat. The probable end result is an in-
junction against high operational levels and an order for a mandatory mini-
mum streamflow until BPA has completed the consultation process with FWS
and, if necessary, applied to the ESC for an exemption.
The statutory exemption criteria will be of little help to the ESC in resolving
609. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (Supp. IV 1980).
610. Id § 1536(h)(1).
611. In requiring biological assessments, the statute speaks of "construction," id § 1536(c)(1), but
elsewhere uses the all-inclusive "action."
612. See Bodi, supra note 600, at 349 (discussing fisheries and other commercial enterprises reliant
on Columbia River).
613. See infra notes 747-52 and accompanying text (discussing hypothetical "taking" to which § 7
inapplicable).
614. See Bodi, supra note 600, at 366 (discussing decline in numbers of salmon and steelhead in
upper Columbia Basin).
615. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(3), 1536(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
616. Seesupra notes 387-91 and accompanying text (discussing Hill Court's effectuation of Congress'
judgment in enacting ESA).
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this matter because each litigant has statutory factors and equities on its side of
the question. The BPA can argue with some force that its program is one of
great regional significance and that Congress, by authorizing the system of
dams, has conclusively demonstrated that the system is in the public inter-
est.617 The salmon defenders will point out that the year-to-year operational
levels differ from the overall project authorization and that Congress in nu-
merous ways has given special attention to the valuable anadromous fish re-
source.618 The key element in the Committee's decision is likely to be its
estimation of reasonable and prudent alternatives: certainly an alternative to
high level operations exists, but whether it is either reasonable or prudent is an
essentially subjective judgment. Given that mitigation is required,619 and that
mitigation is really what plaintiff seeks, the weight of hypothetical argument
appears to favor the species over the increased hydroelectric power.
Project construction and development by the Defense Department introduce
another possible wrinkle of ESA interpretation. As noted above, the Secretary
of Defense can dictate an exemption by his declaration that the project is nec-
essary for national security,620 but his decision is reviewable.621 The Act
clearly contemplates that the activities and projects of the Defense Department
initially are subject to all of the section 7 constraints. 622 The Secretary can
dictate an exemption only after the consultation process is completed and an
application for an exemption filed.62
3
"National security" should not be synonymous with either "all Defense De-
partment activities" or "anything that the Secretary thinks is a good idea." The
location of a military installation may be beyond judicial purview, for exam-
ple, but "national security" does not depend on whether its water supply
should be drawn from a pool containing an endangered fish when alternative,
if more costly, water supplies are available. Military activities carried on close
to critical habitats were cited as a reason for passage of the 1973 ESA. Con-
gress, highly wroth at the use as a bombing range of an island in close proxim-
ity to whooping cranes, made it clear that such disregard of the public weal
must cease.624
B. FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND ACTWirIES
In most managedforests, wildlife habitat is a byproduct of timber man-
agement. As demands have grown for increased production of wood
617. Confirmation, they could argue, is the enactment of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Plan-
ning and Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697. See Blumm & Johnson, supra
note 604, at 504-08 (discussing congressional purposes in enacting Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act of 1980).
618. See Anadromous Fish Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 757a-757g (Supp. IV 1980); see also
Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428, 438 (1967) (Congress' great concern with depletion of
anadromous fish resources led it to pass Anadromous Fish Conservation Act).
619. "16 U.S.C. § 1536(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
620. Id § 15360).
621. See supra notes 517-21 and accompanying text (discussing national security exemption to ESA).
622. See Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 857 (1st Cir. 1981) (Navy failed to fulfill its obli-
gations under ESA § 7 to consult with FWS regarding Navy actions that affect listed endangered spe-
cies), rev'd on other grounds sub nonz Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 1978 (1982).
623. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
624. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 183 (1978) (quoting 199 CoNG. REc. 42,913 (1973) (remarks of
Rep. Dingell) (section 7 would require Defense Secretary to take steps to eliminate threat to whooping
crane).
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fiber, recreation, and livestock, as well as/or increased allocation for
wilderness, it has become increasingly obvious that such cliches as
"good timber management is good wildife management" will no longer
suffice.
J.W. THOMAS, WILDLIFE HABITATS IN
MANAGED FORESTS 11 (1979) (USDA
Agriculture Handbook No. 553).
Federal construction projects pose relatively simple problems of ESA inter-
pretation compared to the nearly limitless array of federal programs and activ-
ities that do not necessarily involve construction. It would be fruitless to try to
list or even categorize every federal program or activity. This section examines
a few hypothetical examples from the areas of federal land management and
federal regulation.
1. Federal Land Management
The United States government owns far more land in America than anyone
else.625 Federal ownership is crucial for endangered species protection because
federal lands provide the last remaining habitat for many listed species. 626 The
bulk of the federal land holdings is divided into five systems managed by four
agencies: the National Wildlife Refuge System, managed by the Fish and
Wildlife Service; the National Park System, managed by the National Park
Service; the National Forest System, managed by the Forest Service; the Pub-
lic Lands, managed by the Bureau of Land Management 627 and the National
Wilderness Preservation System, units of which are managed by each of these
agencies.628 Each federal land management agency faces distinct legal
problems under the Endangered Species Act.
The National Wildlife Refuge System comprises 34 million acres in 370-odd
locations throughout the United States.629 Although many parcels originally
were set aside for the benefit of large game species or migratory waterfowl,
630
Congress has recognized endangered species protection as a very high manage-
ment priority for the NWRS since 1966.631 National wildlife refuges do not
625. The United States owns one-third of the nation's surface area, about 750 million acres out of the
2.3 billion acre total. See generally G. Coooms & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND R!-
souRcEs LAW 1-33 (1981) (discussing nature and extent of federal public lands).
626. Swanson, supra note 103, at 428.
627. See generally G. CoGoINs & C.WILKNSON, supra note 625, at 34-143 (discussing history of
public land law).
628. As of June 1980, the Wilderness Preservation System included more than 19 million acres.
Additional acreage may be added to the System after the Bureau of Land Management completes
wilderness review of the lands. 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1976). Uses of wilderness areas are very restricted:
commercial enterprise, roads, aircraft, structures, and most resource exploitation activities are prohib-
ited. Those prohibitions tend to protect endangered and threatened species inhabiting designated
lands. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1976) (agency administering wilderness area shall be responsible for
preserving its wilderness character and shall administer it for other proper purposes in manner consis-
tent with preservation of its wilderness character).629. Greenwalt, supra note 101, at 401. This and like numbers do not include additions to the sys-
tems in December 1980 by the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487,
94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 16 & 41 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980)).
630. Greenwalt, supra note 101, at 403.
631. Id
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afford animals refuge from all human activities. On the contrary, mining, min-
eral leasing, hunting, trapping, boating, camping, farming, and grazing all may
be allowed if the Secretary determines that the activity is consistent with the
purposes for which the refuge was established. 632 Refuge managers long em-
phasized politically popular goals such as propagation of game species and
human recreation.633 Although refuge management has become more "non-
game" oriented in recent years, and the FWS attitude toward economic re-
source development has hardened, conflicts remain.
634
Assume that a Great Plains game reservation or a migratory bird area in a
major flyway was originally reserved for purposes unrelated to the rare or rem-
nant species living there and that the traditional human uses of the refuges
were compatible with the big game or the migratory birds, but not necessarily
with the kit fox, the red-cockaded woodpecker, or the eastern indigo snake.
Section 7's affirmative duty to conserve provides for another and overriding
purpose for every refuge with resident endangered species, and it requires a
reordering of management priorities to serve endangered species conservation.
The FWS must reevaluate all human activities on the refuge for consistency
with that purpose. A court has held that "consistency" is a biological determi-
nation that cannot be circumvented by "balancing" economic or political con-
siderations.635 The section 7 duty requires measures not only to avoid harm,
but also to restore populations of endangered species.
The precedents supporting the foregoing conclusions are incomplete,636 but
they make these arguments plausible: the FWS must close a refuge to hunting
if there is any possibility of either shooting a listed species through misidentifi-
cation or impinging on its food supply; the agency must eliminate or reduce
grazing if erosion caused by it silts up the stream inhabited by a rare fish;
637
and the FWS must curtail or outlaw human visitations to the extent they may
disrupt shy, endangered animals.638 In each instance, judicial resolution of the
asserted conflict will depend primarily on the evidence of causal nexus be-
tween the activity and its effect on the protected species. Once such a relation-
ship is established, the court should enjoin the agency from allowing the
632. Id; see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 455 F. Supp. 446, 449 (D.D.C. 1978) (striking
down as inconsistent with Refuge Recreation Act Interior Department regulations that permitted use of
boat with unlimited horsepower in refuge and breeding ground for migratory birds); Refuge Recrea-
tion Act, 16 U.S.C. § 460K (1976) (permitting Interior Secretary to open for public recreation certain
areas within National Wildlife Refuge System).
633. See Greenwalt, supra note 101, at 598.
634. R. HERBST, DIRECrOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM (April 1979).
635. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 455 F. Supp. 446, 449 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding boating regula-
tions inconsistent because they permit harm to wildlife resources in refuge).
636. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (Congress expressly stated that all agencies shall seek
to conserve endangered and threatened species); Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167,
169-70 (D.D.C. 1977) (agencies have affirmative duty to use all methods necessary to increase popula-
tion of protected species).
637. In Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), which involved a similar situation, the Court
upheld an injunction against pumping underground water for livestock purposes, based upon an im-
plied reservation of federal water rights. Id at 137, 147.
638. Cf Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 455 F. Supp. 446, 449 (D.D.C. 1978) (striking down as
inconsistent with Refuge Recreation Act Interior Department regulations that permitted use of speed-
boat in refuge and breeding ground for migratory birds).
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activity until it can insure a lack of detriment.639
The National Park Service (NPS) will have less difficulty complying with
the ESA because it has operated under a preservation mandate since 1916.640
Most of the human economic land uses, including hunting, are barred from
national parks, although some are allowed in other units of the Park Sys-
tem.641 After earlier efforts at predator and other wildlife population control
aborted, the NPS opted for the most "natural" management deemed possible,
which means that it protects all native species in parks.642
One endangered species management problem is endemic to the Service.
From Yellowstone to Glacier reside the last of the lower 48 states' grizzly bear
populations, now listed as threatened.643 The bears are leery of people and
usually avoid them, but when aroused they occasionally maul or kill them.
The Service has instituted a management program to keep bears and humans
separated. The question is whether the Act requires more. Had the grizzly
been listed as endangered, one could make a case that the NPS must redouble
its efforts to prevent all close-range interaction with humans, perhaps by clos-
ing large areas to all human visitation. Because the species now is only
"threatened," the protective measures need only conform to the regulations
promulgated by the Secretary.644
The other federal land management agencies are not subject to the preserva-
tion or "consistency" standards. Both the Forest Service and the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) have charge of far more land than either the FWS
or the NPS. 645 Much of that land is wild and undeveloped. It is under increas-
ing developmental pressure,6 6 and sharper land use disputes concerning it are
likely.
The Forest Service is a "multiple use" agency required to give fish and wild-
639. See supra notes 312-23 and accompanying text (discussing federal agencies' duty to conserve).
640. The purpose of national park management is "to conserve the scenery and natural and historic
objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 16 U.S.C. § 1
(1976).
641. 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.32, 5.1-.16 (1981).
642. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERmoR, NATIONAL PARK SERvICE, ADVISORY BOARD ON WILDLIFE MAN-
AGEMENT IN THE NATIONAL PARKS IV-6 (1963). Basic management policy is to strive to maintain
natural abundance, behavior, diversity, and ecological integrity of native animals. Id As part of"nat-
ural" management processes, natural fire, predation, and insect and disease epidemics are tolerated.
Id at IV-9, -12.
643. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1981).
644. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1976).
645. See G. CoGNs & C. WIuxNsON, supra note 625, at 34-143 (discussing history of public land
law).
646. See, eg., Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Andrus, 500 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980)
(action by trade association of oil and gas explorers challenging ban on mineral development in area
selected for possible wilderness designation); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp.
383 (D. Wyo. 1980) (action by MSLF challenging inaction by Interior SecretarX on pending applica-
tions to lease, for oil and gas exploration, certain areas selected for possible wilderness designation);
California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (action by California challenging Forest
Service determination that certain areas selected for possible wilderness designation should be devel-
oped instead); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979) (action by United States seeking to
enjoin road building on federal land being studied for designation as a wilderness area). For a discus-
sion of the resources found on those lands, see generally PUsLIC LAND LAW REviEw CoMMIssION, ONE
THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970).
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life "due consideration" in its resource decisionmaking. 647 Realistically, how-
ever, the main Forest Service business is timber harvesting, with other values
served as circumstances allow.648 Public outcry and statutory revision have
eroded its bias for timber production,649 and the ESA may erode it further.
The Forest Service's proclivity for "even-aged management" is a prime candi-
date for such revision.
Even-aged timber management produces a forest monoculture dominated
by a single, economically valuable tree in place of the original forest diver-
sity.650 The clearcuts and suppression of competing species with herbicides
used in even-aged management can adversely affect some listed species.
Clearcutting often destroys special habitat amenities required by the red-cock-
aded woodpecker or the spotted owl.65' Pesticides such as the DDT used to
spray for tussock moths can harm the reproductive capacity of peregrine fal-
cons and bald eagles.652 Herbicides, in addition to destroying plants that pro-
vide habitat, are potentially harmful to many species, including homo
sapiens. 653 If an endangered species in the area would be adversely affected,
the practice violates both sections 7 and 9 and may be enjoined.
The entire program by which habitat is altered on a regional or nationwide
scale to the detriment of listed species with specialized forest habitat require-
ments raises more difficult questions. Clearcutting that indiscriminately
removes necessary habitat amenities where a listed species is known to reside is
clearly illegal and subject to injunction.654 If the presence of such species is not
known, the Forest Service must carry the burden of demonstrating no adverse
effect.655 The broader and more subtle question is whether a pattern of
clearcuts in a region, even if endangered species are absent from each cut area,
still constitutes a violation of the Act by reducing the available habitat that
species might use or expand into. The Act does not directly answer the ques-
tion. The argument that the regional program violates the Act will be founded
on the Act's purpose to restore as well as maintain listed species, its emphasis
on ecosystem preservation, and its imposition of an affirmative duty to con-
serve. In defense of its practices, the Service can point to a lack of evidence of
jeopardization or taking, the absence of critical habitat modification, the re-
strictions against expansive critical habitat designation,656 and the difficulty of
establishing causal relationships. Unless plaintiffs can adduce strong evidence
relating the program to harmful consequences to endangered species, the For-
est Service probably will prevail.
647. The Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-529 (1976).
648. See Leopold, supra note 67, at 116-18.
649. See generally S. DANA & S. FAiRFAx, FoREsT AND RANGE PoLIcY 306-20 (1980).
650. Leopold, supra note 67, at 110-11.
651. Id at 113.
652. Lachenmeier, supra note 16, at 56; Leopold, supra note 67, at 113.
653. See Citizens Against Toxic Spiays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 931-32 (D. Or. 1977)
(discussing deleterious effects on humans of herbicide spraying).
654. See Lachenmeier, supra note 16.
655. But see Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201, 212 (5th Cir. 1978)
(Forest Service decision to pursue even-aged management and clearcutting subject to narrow arbitrary
and capricious standard of review), cert. deled, 439 U.S. 968 (1978).
656. Except in exceptional circumstances, critical habitat cannot include the entire geographical area
that a species may occupy. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(C) (Supp. IV 1980).
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The Bureau of Land Management faces a converse problem. While the For-
est Service is converting pristine, old-growth forests into managed monocul-
tures, the BLM must attempt to restore its millions of acres of sorely depleted
rangeland back to productive grassland.6 57 A century's mismanagement of the
semi-arid intermountain ecosystems has severely damaged native wildlife
populations.6 58 The Sonoran Pronghorn, for instance, became endangered par-
tially because of the competition from domestic ungulates.65 9 Prolonged over-
grazing has led to the takeover of much of the range by "pest" plant species
such as mesquite, creosote, and sagebrush.660 If grasses are to be reestablished
to former abundance, such plants must be destroyed.
The BLM can improve range condition by reducing cattle and sheep graz-
ing, making physical changes such as building fences, and eradicating undesir-
able shrubs.661 Although the first course of action is the least expensive and
probably the most beneficial for wildlife, it is also the most controversial be-
cause it could bankrupt some ranchers and hurt others. 662 Despite special
funding for range improvements, 663 adequate funding is unavailable. All
three approaches have been used by the agency as financial and political re-
sources allow, but it has consistently focused on reversing the plant succession
process, which can have detrimental effects on many species.664
The BLM prefers to eradicate brush by airborne application of potent herbi-
cides. 665 Its burden of insuring that such a massive program 666 will not destroy
critical habitat or take a listed species (there are about 70 in the affected
area) 667 initially would appear insurmountable. The BLM, however, is under
a court order to evaluate its grazing programs district-by-district by preparing
657. Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (Supp. IV 1980).
658. See generally Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 388 F.Supp. 829, 840 (D.D.C.
1974) (discussing failure of Bureau of Land Management to protect wildlife habitats adequately on
grazing lands under its management); P. Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS (1960); Cox, Deterioration of
Southern Arizona's Grasslands: Effects of New Federal Legislation Concerning Public Grazing Lands, 20
ARIZ. L. REV. 697, 701-12, 740 (1979) (extensive deterioration of range lands through woody plant
invasion, arroyo cutting, and general drying of streams and soils has occurred in past one hundred
years).
659. 35 Fed. Reg. 8495 (1970); 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (1967).
660. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, LIVESTOCK GRAZING MANAGEMENT ON NATIONAL RESOURCE LANDS 111-9 (1974).
Changes in plant species composition on the range have resulted in decreased habitat and food for
wildlife. Grazing competition between livestock and wildlife increases the severity of habitat loss. The
BLM expects that wildlife habitat will improve where "rest rotation" grazing systems are initiated. Id
at 111-22.
661. See U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, EAST ROSWELL GRAZING EN-
VIRONMENTAL STATEMENT 1-3 (1979) [hereinafter EAST ROSWELL GRAZING EIS].
662. Cf. Valdez v. Applegate, 616 F.2d 570, 572 (10th Cir. 1980) (reversing lower court denial of
preliminary injunction against BLM reduction of rancher's grazing allocation, finding that reduction
could force some grazing permit holders out of business).
663. Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (Supp. IV 1980).
664. Cf. Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397, 1398-99 (10th Cir. 1976) (BLM re-
voked rancher's license to graze livestock on federal lands because rancher indiscriminately sprayed
sagebrush on federal land, thus at least temporarily eradicating sagebrush that fulfilled food and
habitat needs for wildlife).
665. See EAST ROSWELL GRAZING EIS, supra note 661.
666. The BLM manages over 170 million acres outside of Alaska.
667. See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 625, at 659-61 (discussing endangered and
threatened species residing in public land states of the West).
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assessments of the environmental effects of grazing permits issued,668 and the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) requires it to
promulgate detailed land use plans.669 Each process offers an avenue by which
the agency can evaluate the effects of its programs on known endangered spe-
cies' habitats before the fact. The evaluation of a particular project of limited
geographic extent should reveal the presence or absence of listed species.
670
But certainty is precluded in a program applicable to tens of millions of acres,
and the burden of biological assessment is staggering. 671
Private initiative must bear most of the burden of identifying and resolving
species conflicts. Wildlife advocates must monitor the process and request ces-
sation or safety precautions when and where negative impacts are possible. If
the BLM agrees, the local problem is resolved. If the BLM refuses, the result-
ing litigation will turn on the biological facts. Is a listed species in the area?
Will the herbicide program or the change in habitat harm it? If so, the action
is illegal.
FLPMA commands the BLM to classify and manage "areas of critical envi-
ronmental concern" (ACEC's) where "special management attention is re-
quired... to protect and prevent irreparable damage to important.. . fish
and wildlife resources or other natural systems. '672 The BLM has assumed
that it has fairly complete managerial discretion in ACEC designation 673 and
that the presence of endangered or threatened species is merely a factor to be
considered under the heading of "fish and wildlife resources. '674 This ap-
proach is clearly too narrow as it fails to take the mandatory, sweeping nature
of the ESA into account. The affirmative duty of section 7 requires special
protective management of any such area regardless of designation.
675
2. Negative Federal Regulation and the Conservation Duty
The federal government acts like a private entrepreneur when it manages its
lands, but its more important role is that of regulator. The federal regulatory
function operates either by forbidding private activities deemed harmful (or
dictating their mode of operation) or by licensing or financing those thought
beneficial. Few reported decisions are at all relevant to the effect of the En-
dangered Species Act on negative federal regulation. 676 Nevertheless, the stat-
668. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 841 (D.D.C. 1974).
669. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1712 (1976).
670. See EAST ROSWELL GRAZING EIS, supra note 661.
671. Cf U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUR.AU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT, LIVESTOCK GRAZING MANAGEMENT ON NATIONAL RESOURCE LANDS 1-7 (1974).
672. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (1976).
673. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, AREAS OF CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN-POLICY
AND PROCEDURES GUIDELINES 10 (1980).
674. Id
675. See supra notes 312-23 and accompanying text. The same duty should apply to BLM's wilder-
ness review process. In 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1976), Congress mandated that the BLM inventory all public
lands with roadless areas of 5,000 acres or more for wilderness characteristics and study their suitability
for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System. The restrictive management standards
that apply to lands under BLM wilderness review will inadvertently provide substantial protection for
endangered and threatened species in the review areas. See Op. Solic. Dep't of Interior, 86 I.D. 91
(1978); U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, INTERIM MANAGEMENT POLICY
AND GUIDELINES FOR LANDS UNDER WILDERNESS REVIEw (1979).
676. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 169-70 (D.D.C. 1977) (agency has af-
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utory standards apply to every action of every federal agency, and seemingly
unrelated administrative action or inaction 677 often can affect the welfare of
listed species. Negative federal regulation may provide the context for judicial
delineation of the range and contours of section 7's affirmative duty to
conserve.
The Act first requires all agencies to have a conservation program. In the
case of land management agencies, implementation of the requirement is rela-
tively simple: by rule or practice, the agency must insure that it or its licensees
do not harm a protected species, and it must take whatever steps are possible to
assist the species' survival. The obligation is less clear, however, for federal
agencies without direct jurisdiction over lands where endangered species reside
or with missions not directly related to wildlife conservation.
A reasonable reading of section 7 would impose on all agencies duties first
to review their operations for areas of potential conflicts with the welfare of
listed wildlife and then to institute safeguards by regulation.6 78 Further, the
Act arguably requires agencies to take action whenever they have power to act
and their inaction contributes, however indirectly, to a species decline.
679 If
this interpretation is accepted, endangered species protection will be forced or
insinuated into areas apparently beyond the contemplated scope of the Act.
The statute, however, explicitly binds all federal agencies, and similar statutes
have been similarly extended.680 Many "nonenvironmental" federal agencies,
for instance, have found themselves subject to NEPA procedures even though
Congress did not specifically name them in the statute.6 1
Whether courts develop and extend the affirmative duty into unlikely areas
is speculative. If they do, what might the affirmative duty require in practice?
For example, if the SEC is considering the adequacy of a prospectus, is the
agency compelled to deny registration if the applicant fails to disclose its activ-
ities that may run afoul of the ESA or its potential liability for them? Must the
Bureau of Reclamation cancel contracts for delivery of water to farmers who
are adversely modifying critical habitat?68 2 Is the Corps of Engineers bound to
blow up one of its dams if it would assist the recovery of an endangered spe-
cies? Is the traditional prosecutorial discretion of the Justice Department over-
firmative duty to increase population of protected species; must do more than avoid elimination), dis-
cussed at supra notes 315-20 and accompanying text. Although only the FWS was the defendant in that
case, the same general duty applies to all federal agencies. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980)
(all agencies must use authority to further purposes of Act by carrying out conservation of endangered
and threatened species).
677. Cf. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (inaction is not
action for purposes of NEPA).
678. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
679. Although the statute applies only to "actions" and inaction was deemed outside the scope of
NEPA in Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the line between
the two is not as bright as the court assumed. The consequences of inaction can be as dire, and Con-
gress sought affirmative changes in agency operations. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(1) (1976); Aberdeen &
Rockfish Ry. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 318-19 (1975).
680. See Coggins, Some Suggestionsfor Future Plaint'Ifs on Extending the Scope of the National Enyl.
ronmental Policy Act, 24 U. KAN. L. REv. 307, 341-43 (1976).
681. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 699 (D.D.C. 1974) (SEC
rulemaking in corporate disclosure regulation must be in full compliance with letter and spirit of
NEPA).
682. See infra notes 747-52 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on private action when no
governmental funding or permission involved).
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ridden by this section in the case of an alleged ESA violator? 683 These and
similar questions seem absurdly rhetorical, but the issues they raise are not
that simple. In each instance, the drastic agency action would be in keeping
with the spirit of the statute. The statutory language is mandatory and is later
in time than the agencies' other statutory directives. And, after Hill, the line
between reasonable and absurd is not bright. Plant and wildlife species are,
after all, of incalculable value.684 The literal approach used in Hill would sup-
port the imposition of a duty.
C. FEDERALLY LICENSED OR FINANCED PRIVATE PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES
Since compensating losers is so impractical, a regulatory strategy was
adoptedfor protecting species habitat, letting costs fall rather haphaz-
ardly on those developers unlucky enough to choose areas where endan-
gered species live.
Harrington, The Endangered Species Act
and the Search for Balance, 21 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 71, 85 (1981).
The number of private projects and activities that could run into problems
under the Act is coextensive with the regulatory and financial reach of the
federal government. These private actions include, but are not limited to,
every project that affects a navigable waterway,685 every water pollution point
source, 686 every housing project financed by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development,687 every offshore oil lease,688 every deep sea mming op-
683. Although the Justice Department litigates against endangered species on the civil side when
they pose a threat to a federal project, see supra note 552 (d g.Jstie Department support'i
subsequent litigation of agency acting contrary to FWS biological opinion), it has organized a Wildlife
Law Section within the Lands and Natural Resources Division that appears zealously to be pursuing
criminal convictions against illegal hunters and importers.
684. "[Tlhe plain language of the Act, buttressed by its legislative history, shows clearly that Con-
gress viewed the value of endangered speces as 'incalculable." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978).
The Supreme Court also noted that th e proceedings are "replete with expressions of concern
over the risk that might lie in the loss of any endangered species." ld at 178.685. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 prohibits the creation of any obstruction to the navigable
capacity of any of the waters of the United States without permission of the Secretary of the Army. 33
U.S.C. § 403 (1976). This section of the Rivers and Harbors Act obviously is a owerful instrument ofland use control The Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. IV 1980), supplements te
extent of federal control over alterations of waterways by requiring federal approval to conduct activityresulting in any discharge into navigable waters. W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 388, 399 (1977).
686. The Clean Water Act requires a permit for the discharge of any pollution into navigable waters
from a point source. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Act's permit requirement coupled
with its broad definition of "point source" subjects most public and private entities to the complex
regulatoy scheme of water pollution control "Point source" is defined as "any discernable, confied
and discrete conveyance, incuding, but not limited to any pipe,.ditch, cannel, tunnel, conduit, well,
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other float-ing craft, from which pollutants are or may be disehargd." 1,1 § 1362(14).
687. HUD mortgage guarantees and interest grants to private housing developers .have been held to
create a "partnership between the developer and the Department that justifies an injunction agaist
the developer's construction in the face of the Department's noncompliance with NEPA. Silva v. Rom-
ney, 473 F.2d 287, 289-90 (1st Cir. 1973).
688. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 133 1-1343 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).The Secretary may prescribe rules for the conservation of natural resoeurces, Id 1334(a)(1), an3d natu
ral resoprces includes all living things on the continental shelf, as wel as mieral resources. umon o
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eration,68 9 every major hydropower project,690 every interstate natural gas
pipeline,691 every federally financed highway, 692 and every significant coastal
zone activity.693 Whether the ESA also applies to "no strings" programs such
as revenue sharing694 or Pittman-Robertson distributions695 has not been au-
thoritatively decided.
This section takes up a series of areas, categorized by the type of land use, in
which the endangered species legislation is likely to cause disputes. It singles
out public land users, farmers, and energy developers.
1. Public Land Users
The public lands are being subjected to ever-increasing human demands for
goods, such as minerals and timber, and for services and amenities, such as
forms of recreation. They also provide the sole remaining habitat for many
listed species. Miners, loggers, ranchers, and those who use motorized equip-
ment, such as off-road vehicles, for recreation are most likely to be adversely
affected by the ESA.
Miners have long been exempt from significant regulation because the Min-
ing Law of 1872696 was interpreted as giving them a near absolute right to
locate and extract minerals from the public domain.697 In recent years, some
controls on mining have been authorized by legislation 698 and imposed by reg-
Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 1975) (Secretary has power to suspend drilling operations on
outer continental shelf to conserve all natural resources, not just mineral resources).
689. The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980) (to be
codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1428), requires that persons may not engage in any exploration or com-
mercial recovery of minerals in the deep seabed without obtaining a license or permit. Id § 1411. The
permitting authority under the Deep Seabed Mining Act is the Administrator of the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration.
690. Federal Power Act of 1920, 16 U.S.C. § 802 (1976) (significant information to accompany appli-
cation for license under federal regulation and development of power).
691. Pursuant to the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (Supp. IV 1980), the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (formerly the Federal Power Commission) regulates the transportation of gas in inter-
state commerce.
692. Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1659 (1976) (Department of Transporta-
tion assures coordinated, effective national transportation program); see National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371-75 (5th Cir.) (Department of Transportation must insure its approval of
construction of interstate highway does not jeopardize continued existence of endangered species), cer.
denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
693. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976), authorizes the
Secretary of Commerce to make grants to any coastal state for the purpose of assisting the state in the
development of a management program for the land and water resources of its coastal zone and to
oversee implementation of resulting plans. Id § 1454.
694. Cf Carolina Action Coalition v. Simon, 389 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (NEPA not applicable to
construction of new county judicial building when only federal participation was distribution of reve-nue sharing funds to aid local community), qft'd, 552 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1976).
695. Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 669-669i (1976) (Pittman-Robertson)
(federal and state cooperation in wildlife-restoration projects). For a discussion of the interaction of the
Interior Secretary's duties under the Pittman-Robertson Act, NEPA, and the ESA, see M. BEAN, supra
note 44, at 217, 244-48.
696. 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-39 (1976) (general mineral lands regulation and exemptions under Mining Law
of 1872).
697. See generally G. CoooWs & C. WuLmrNSON, supra note 625, at 334-73; Haggard, Regulaion of
MiningLaw.4ctiilies on FederalLands, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 349, 349-51 (1975) (discussing
regulation of rights to enter public land to explore and locate mining claims).
698. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976), autho-
rizes activities such as the regulation of mining with respect to recordation of claims, Id § 1744, activi-
ties in wilderness and wilderness study areas, id § 1782, and activities in the California Desert
1514
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ulation,699 but the right to explore for and mine hardrock minerals is still the
highest priority public land use. Whether the land management agency, usu-
ally the BLM, can prohibit mining when it finds that the damage caused by the
mining operation outweighs its economic benefits is yet to be determined.
7°°
Although the agencies probably lack the power to impose a direct prohibition
except in certain extreme circumstances, 70' the ESA offers an avenue to ac-
complish the same result indirectly if the project threatens an endangered spe-
cies. The miner must prove the discovery of a valuable mineral deposit to
locate a valid claim.702 The agency may take account of all probable costs,
including the costs of compliance with environmental restrictions,70 3 when de-
termining profitability because "valuable" is construed to mean "immediately
profitable to develop in the circumstances.
' 7°4
Assume that a miner discovers a deposit of low grade ore that would be
profitable to develop as an open pit mine in the absence of special costs. As-
sume further, however, that the deposit is located within the known range of
the endangered Utah prairie dog or adjacent to a stream inhabited by the en-
dangered humpback chub. The prairie dog will be displaced or disrupted by
the pit mine, and the chub's stream likely will be polluted and silted up from
runoff. If the project and its consequences become public knowledge, private
parties should be able to enjoin the mining operation on the ground that it will
effect a taking of the protected species, assuming that the causal relationship
between project and species disruption can be established.70 5
Independent of the taking question, the land management agency may be
able to invalidate the mining claim under the mining laws. The cost to the
Conservation Area. Id § 1781. It also contains a catch-all section that authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior to "take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands." Id
§ 1732(b). See also Surface Resources Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. § 612 (1976) (mining claim subject to
United States right to manage surface resources and right of way).
699. 39 Fed. Reg. 31,317 (1974). See United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 1373,
1378-79 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (defendant enjoined from conducting further mining until in compliance with
regulation requiring filing of operational plan), rev'd in part, 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1980) (public does
not need license to enter mining area); Hecox & Desautels, Federal Environmental Regulations Applica-
ble to Exploration, Mining, and Milling, 25 RoCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 9-1, 9-8 to 9-10 (1979) (develop-
ment of federal regulation through BLM land use requirements).
700. An affirmative answer seemingly was assumed in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Butz, 406 F.
Supp. 742, 748 (D. Mont. 1975) (environmental impact statement not required prior to Forest Service
approval of exploratory mining operation), dismissed as moot, 576 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1978) (appeal
from summary judgment remanded to dismiss as moot because activity sought to be enjoined ended
when drillers struck water).
701. FLPMA alters mining law substantially, see supra note 698 (discussing FLPMA provisions), but
Congress was careful to say that rights of claims and locators under the 1872 Act, especially rights of
egress and ingress, were not otherwise affected. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1976).
702. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976) ("valuable" mineral deposits shall be free and open to exploration and
purchase).
703. More specifically, the test for determining whether a valuable mineral has been discovered is a
combination of a "prudent man test," which requires that a prudent person would labor for reasonable
prospect of success, and a "marketability test," which requires that the mineral be extracted and mar-
keted at a profit. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602-03 (1968) (quartzite is common variety
stone and not basis of valid mining claim).
704. United States v. Kosanke Sand Corp., 80 I.D. 538 (1973). See generally Lundberg, Birds, Bun-
nies, and the Furbish Lousewort-WtIldife and Mining on the Public Lands, 24 ROCKY MN. L. INST. 93,
113 (1978) (recognizing environmental constraints under ESA may alter marketability).
705. This conclusion follows from the Palila rationale. See supra notes 359-86 and accompanying
text (Palla justifies enjoining a program if causal nexus exists between program and decline of listed
species).
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miner of complying with the Endangered Species Act is going to be the
amount necessary to avoid any significant harm to the species' habitat. In the
case of the prairie dog, it is difficult to imagine that any remedial measures
would suffice to avoid disruption if the mineral and species areas coincide;
even if they do not, mine relocation and controls to insure no disruption could
be prohibitive. In the case of the humpback chub, it may be possible to con-
struct and operate the mine in such a way to avoid pollution of the stream
habitat if other water sources are available, but, again, the costs are likely to be
high and will detract significantly from profitability. Particularly if the mine
was marginally profitable at its inception, the costs of avoiding harm to listed
species can render the operation unprofitable and thus invalidate the mining
claim. 7°6 The same result is possible with respect to preference claims for fuel
mineral leases,70 7 in which a similar test of "profitability" is used and over
which the management agency exerts more control.708 The odds are against
the miner who happens to locate a claim in an area already inhabited by an
endangered species.
The effects of the ESA on public land logging operations are more easily
predictable. If logging a particular area will destroy designated critical
habitat, then the timber sale cannot go forward until such time as the ESC
grants an exemption. An exemption in this instance is highly unlikely. The
logger will have an insurmountable burden of showing no reasonable and pru-
dent alternative, or regional or national significance, or even public interest,
given the comparable areas available for sale and the relative insignificance of
any individual timber contract. 709 If no designation of critical habitat has been
made, but listed species are known to reside in the logging area, the result
should be the same. The species will be jeopardized by loss of members and
habitat and that disruption is a taking within the meaning of the Act, even if
the species can and will relocate.710 Loggers also may lose out from the incre-
706. f Lundberg, supra note 704, at 114-115. "If the regional biologist has issued an opinion that
mining on the claim will result in the taking of an endangered animal, then there may not be a valuable
mineral deposit because the applicant would be prohibited by section 9 . . . from developing the
claim." Id at 114. "Because the value of an endangered species exceeds anything to which a value can
be assigned, any land which is critical habitat ... cannot be chiefly valuable for another purpose.
Presumably the mandate of section 7 will also be applicable to mineral leases." Id. at 115.
707. A preference claim to a mineral lease is obtained when one holding a prospecting permit dem-
onstrates that the land to which the permit applies contains commercial quantities of the mineral. Pref-
erence leases for coal were outlawed in 1975. See American Nuclear Corp. v. Andrus, 434 F. Supp.
1035, 1038 (D. Wyo. 1977) (application for coal-prospecting permit denied; not protected interests,
proposals subject to discretion of Secretary of the Interior).
708. Regulations governing the issuance of coal preference leases require that the permittee show a
reasonable expectation that his revenues will exceed development and operating costs. 43 C.F.R.
§ 3520.1-1(c) (1981). See generally Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553,
556 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (lease applicant must establish profitability of mining, including costs
of complying with environmental requirements).
709. Only a fraction of the nation's 500 plus million acres of commercial forest land are within the
187 million acre National Forest System. But cf. Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 118-20 (D.
Alaska 1971) (largest Forest Service timber sale upheld), rev'd, 3 ENVT. L. RaP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)
20,292, 20,293 (9th Cir. 1973) (newly discovered evidence requires district court to consider whether
Forest Service gave due consideration to purposes other than timber production in national forest).
710. Cf Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 987-91, 995 (D.
Hawaii 1979) (state maintenance of feral goat herds constitutes taking when endangered species habitat
harmed through environmental modification; fencing herd insufficient because some would continue to
threaten habitat), af'd, 639 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1981).
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mental effects of timber harvesting; as discussed above, the pattern of harvest-
ing, the clearcutting of timber, and the pesticides and herbicides used by the
Forest Service in the aggregate conceivably could constitute ESA violations
that would require cessation of timber sales in some places to compensate for
the harm to listed species in others.71'
The ESA also may demand further restrictions on recreational public land
users. Off-road vehicles (ORY's) allow more people to penetrate formerly wild
places, and their noise and presence can easily disturb shy species to the point
of "significant disruption. 712 ORV's also tend to tear up fragile terrain with
resulting erosion of the land and its ecosystems. Power boats have similar ef-
fects on aquatic environments. 713 The presence of a skittish endangered species
should require the land management agency to close the entire area of the
species' habitat to ORV or power boat use, and perhaps to all human visita-
tion. If the species is vulnerable to disruption by noise, and if critical habitat
has been designated, closure seems inescapable. If the causal nexus is uncer-
tain, closure still should follow because the agency cannot insure a lack of
jeopardization.
The Osgood Mountain milk-vetch, an endangered plant found only on
mountainous national forest lands in Nevada and Idaho, is an example. The
FWS designated critical habitat for it in Nevada but not in Idaho.714 Mining
operations are the immediate threat to its existence,715 but any human activi-
ties in the area could affect it adversely. Assume that the milk-vetch habitat
area is popular for motorcycle scrambling. The taking problem does not arise
unless taking is specifically forbidden by FWS regulation 716 because taking
endangered plants is not a statutory offense.717 Thus, the question is whether
the Forest Service has an obligation to prohibit or regulate motorcycle or other
ORV use in either area. Because the Forest Service has proposed no action,
the duties not to jeopardize or to destroy habitat may not come into play,71 8 at
least in Idaho. The position of those seeking closure would rest on the affirma-
tive duty of the Forest Service to conserve. In this instance, it seems probable
that a court would require protective steps, regardless of whether the area was
officially designated as critical habitat.
Some seventy-odd endangered or threatened species live in Western states
711. See supra text accompanying notes 654-56 (discussing problems in establishing causal relation-
ships between clearcutting and jeopardization of forest habitat).
712. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.13(c) (1981) (definition of "harass" in definition of "take" is act which cre-
ates likelihood of injury). See generally D. SHERIDAN, OFF-ROAD VEHIcLEs ON THE PUBLIC LANDS
(CEQ 1978).
713. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 455 F. Supp. 446, 449 (D.D.C. 1978) (permanent injunc-
tion granted prohibiting use of motorboats in wildlife refuge).
714. 45 Fed. Reg. 53,968 (1980).
715. Id
716. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1976) (issuance of conservation regulations by Secretary).
717. Id § 1538(a)(2) (unlawful to import or export, or to deliver, carry, receive, ship, or sell in inter-
state or foreign commerce, an endangered species of plant).
718. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980) (agency action may not jeopardize endangered or
threatened species); S( Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (inac-
tion is not action for purposes of NEPA). But see National Wildlife Fed'n v. Morton, 393 F. Supp.
1286, 1294-97 (D.D.C. 1975) (BLM issued regulations on ORV use that failed to satisfy executive order;,
BLM instructed to reissue regulation after considering alternatives to proposed action as required by
NEPA).
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* where much of the national public land is located.719 Some species, such as the
various races of pupfish, occupy only a known, limited habitat, reducing the
potential for interference with land uses while increasing the knowledge and
means necessary for protection. Others, however, range widely: the known
habitat of grizzly bears is in the millions of acres, eagles range over much of
the West, and some fish, such as the Colorado River squawfish, lightly perme-
ate entire river systems. For some rare species, such as the black-footed ferret,
habitat is largely unknown. Public land users in the coming decade more fre-
quently will encounter strange creatures, such as the Santa Cruz long-toed sal-
amander, the Pahranaget bonytail, the Pahrump killifish, or the unarmored
three-spined stickleback. The encounters will certainly be expensive and time-
consuming, if not fatal to the desired land use.
2. Agricultural Land Users
Agriculture has caused the decline of many species by conversion of wild
lands to monocultures and use of the higher and more destructive technologies
now common on the farm. A number of agricultural practices contribute to
wildlife declines. Bulldozing hedgerows eliminates shelter habitat. Draining
marshes and potholes adversely affects many species. 720 Erosion from
croplands adds an enormous silt burden to rivers.721 Predator poisons kill
nontarget animals.722 Herbicides and pesticides take their toll, often indirectly
and incrementally.72 Plowing destroys the native ecosystems and eliminates
many species while benefitting more adaptable ones.
Despite the asserted individualism of the American farmer, agriculture in
the United States is heavily dependent upon the federal government. Farmers
rely on irrigation water from federal reclamation projects. Western ranchers
need the use of federal grazing land to make their operations profitable. The
ordinary farmer is supported by a variety of direct subsidies, price supports,
commodity loans, antitrust exemptions, tax breaks, import restrictions, rural
electric cooperative financing, Soil Conservation Service assistance, and rural
environmental assistance programs, among other federal benefits. In each form
of assistance lurks the threat of federal controls over operations that imperil
endangered species. Because a large portion of the land in the United States
has been put to agricultural use, the potential for conflict is high.
Suppose a farmer in South Dakota intends to plow a patch of prairie, previ-
ously used only for grazing, that contains several prairie dog towns. Prairie
dogs are the sole food source of the black-footed ferret, an endangered species
sighted on rare occasion in the area. Plowing and planting will eradicate the
prairie dog towns and may doom the area's ferrets, if any exist. The purpose of
the proposed plowing is to grow corn that will be irrigated by water from a
719. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1981) (list of endangered and threatened wildlife).
720. Burger, Agriculture and Wildlife, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 89, 96, 101 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978)
(detrimental effects and changes in habitat caused by clearing land and drainage of marshes).
721. Id at 101 (siltation from eroding farmland exterminated 25 mussel species in Illinois).
722. See generall, Cain, supra note 54 (Dept. of Interior killed 190,763 predatory and nonpredatory
animals with poison in 1963).
723. Burger, supra note 720, at 101 (pesticides carried by eroding soils jeopardize and exterminate
fish species).
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federal reclamation project pursuant to contract with the Bureau of Reclama-
tion. Can the Bureau legally contribute to a private undertaking that will or
may harm a protected species? If the area is critical habitat, the statutory an-
swer is a clear "no." The only question that might bar an injunction against
delivery of the water is whether the delivery will constitute an "action" within
the meaning of the Act. Under Hill, the answer is "yes" because the delivery
has yet to be carried out.7 24 Even if deliveries already had begun, future deliv-
eries are future actions, and the ongoing nature of the contractual obligation is
not a defense. 725 The federal action could also be Soil Conservation Service
assistance in building a farmpond to provide water, financing under the Rural
Environmental Assistance Program, federal crop insurance, or other federal
crop subsidies.
Although agency action is present, if the FWS has not designated the
plowed area a critical habitat, the question becomes more diffuse and the facts
of causation more critical. A reviewing court first will have to determine
whether the action would be likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the
species. This inquiry is problematical in light of the dearth of information on
the secretive ferret. The Bureau, however, must shoulder the burden of show-
ing a lack of substantial negative result. If a factual conclusion is favorable to
the agency and farmer, then the court must face the question of whether a
federal agency can be enjoined from indirectly assisting a possible private tak-
ing of a listed species. The answer will depend on the evidence: if the taking
seems sufficiently imminent and certain, the limited authorities indicate that an
injunction would be appropriate.726 Possible remedies against the farmer are
examined below.
727
This example can be extended indefinitely to show that endangered species
protection might well become an annoying thorn in the side of American agri-
culture, which still is the dominant American land use in terms of the acreage
devoted to it. Although many farming and ranching practices benefit wildlife,
on the whole agriculture has lowered wildlife numbers and diversity-neces-
sarily so in some instances, but not in others. Rural America is the first to
condemn restrictive zoning or land use planning, but the ESA is a land control
measure tolerating no claims of higher values. Species listed as endangered or
threatened and the natural systems essential for their survival have been im-
pressed with a public trust that under law will override notions of the sanctity
of private property use. Barring further statutory amendment, if the theoretical
land use problems discussed above come about, farmers and ranchers will dis-
cover to their dismay that their individual initiative has been subordinated to
the societal goal of species preservation.
724. 437 U.S. at 186 n.32 ("section 7 affects all projects which remain to be authorized, funded or
carried out").
725. Id at 188 n.34 (agency must insure that species not extirpated as result of federal activities).
726. See supra notes 354-86 and accompanying text (discussing judicial response to potential rather
than certain consequences of habitat modification).
727. See infra notes 747-52 and accompanying text (discussing private suit against farmer when no
federal permission or money involved).
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3. Energy Development Land Users
Energy-related development is likely to be the arena for the most severe
conflicts between endangered species and human land use. Refineries, oil
leases, deep water port facilities, pipelines, synfuel plants, shale oil and geo-
thermal development, and dredging for barges are all national priorities. Al-
ready a Maine refinery,728 several oil leases, 729 and a water project aimed at
serving synfuel development 730 have been delayed because of problems arising
under the ESA, and more such conflicts seem inevitable.
Private enterprise primarily conducts energy development in this country,
but with overlapping layers of state and federal regulation. Because many fu-
ture energy resources are located on federal lands, their extraction and process-
ing will implicate the federal land management agencies, as well as the usual
regulatory processes. Those regulatory processes include air and water pollu-
tion clearances; port, transportation, and other controls over oil importation;
and regulation of all changes in the capacity of navigable waterways. In addi-
tion, the federal government exercises, in varying degrees, regulatory power
over oil and gas prices, interstate natural gas pipelines, coal mine safety, strip-
mining, hazardous waste disposal, and nuclear power generation. The upshot
is that some federal agency will pass on some aspect of every significant energy
facility or program. If members of an endangered species are in the path of an
energy-related project, section 7 comes into play and section 9 is in reserve.
If a federal license or other clearance is required for a proposed energy de-
velopment, which is almost a certainty, the licensing agency must consult with
the FWS to identify affected species and consider means to avert adverse con-
sequences. 731 For projects that irreconcilably conflict with listed species, ESC
exemptions must be sought.732 This naked description, however, does not do
justice to the problems actually faced by an energy developer when a listed
species enters the picture.
The proposed Pittston refinery in Maine is a good example. The Pittston
Company not only had to comply with the strict plant-siting requirements im-
posed by Maine, 733 but also had to obtain federal clearances for air and water
728. Pittston Co. v. Endangered Species Comm., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1257, 1260-61 (D.D.C.
1980) (EPA decision to deny discharge permit not reviewable under ESA exemption provision because
no requisite final agency action when EPA decision still subject to reconsideration and adjudicatory
hearing).
729. See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (reversing injunction of
lease sale of federal property with gas and oil potential); Conservative Law Found. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d
712, 719 (1st Cir. 1979) (unsuccessful challenge to federal sale of leases of tracts for oil and gas
exploration).
730. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing woundfin minnow holding up synfuel
complex in Utah).
731. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
732. Id § 1536(g)(1). If the Energy Mobilization Board ever becomes a reality, it may be able to
operate as an additional exemption agency, cutting the "red tape" of endangered species protection,
depending on the terms of its charter. See Grainey, Recent Federal Energy Legislalow TowardA Na-
tional Energy Policy At Last?, 12 ENvTL. L. 29, 70-71 (1981) (discussing and criticizing congressional
proposal to create Energy Mobilization Board to expedite licensing of non-nuclear energy facilities).
733. Seeln re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d 736, 740 (Me. 1973) (denying approval for develop-
ment of petroleum refineries; general criteria include determination of effect on environment and threat
to public's health, safety and welfare).
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pollution, interstate pipelines, and alterations to navigable capacity.734 All
such permits were in hand or in progress when the FWS, in routine consulta-
tion, discovered nesting bald eagles nearby. The FWS then recommended to
EPA that it deny the water pollution permit.735 Shortly thereafter, the National
Marine Fisheries Service chimed in with an opinion concluding that the refin-
ery would adversely affect endangered whales.736 The EPA then denied the
permit on those bases. Pittston kept the permit proceedings open by requesting
an adjudicatory hearing and at the same time sought an ESC exemption for its
refinery.737 A court then agreed with refinery opponents that the exemption
procedure was unavailable until the administrative proceedings were final.738
At this point, Pittston faces a procedural labyrinth because if it takes the
wrong route, the already long delay and large expense could be exacerbated
and a definite decision postponed for years.739 First, Pittston could abandon
the administrative appeals over the pollution permit and seek an immediate
exemption ruling from the ESC.74° That is the best course of action if the con-
flict is evident and irresolvable, consultation has been completed in good faith,
and Pittston has exhausted necessary administrative remedies. If, however,
factual questions concerning the consequences for species exist, or if the permit
denial is alternatively premised on other grounds, the company faces undesir-
able consequences, whatever path it chooses.
If Pittston pursues an appeal through EPA and then through the courts, long
delays are likely and the company faces theoretical preclusion from the ESC
procedure. The statute states only that the ninety-day ESC application period
runs from the "completion of the consultation process; or, in the case of any
agency action involving a permit or license applicant, not later than ninety
days after the date on which the Federal agency concerned takes final agency
action. '741 A literal rendering of this provision is that the ESC exemption must
be sought within ninety days of the agency action, a requirement that cannot
be met if Pittston seeks judicial review of that action. In that case, a more
reasonable interpretation is that the agency action is not final until the court
decides and an exemption can be sought within ninety days of a final judgment
affirming the agency determination.
Assume that Pittston believes that its refinery will harm neither eagle nor
whale, or that the prospective harm does not rise to the status of a section 7
violation. In other words, Pittston argues that the FWS has erred factually or
734. Pittson Co. v. Endangered Species Comm., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1257, 1258 (D.D.C. 1980).
735. Id at 1259.
736. Id
737. Id Although the adjudicatory hearing before the EPA was pending, the endangered species
review board initially determined that the section 7(i) exemption application was ripe for decision, but
reversed its determination of ripeness after the plaintiff ified an action challenging the exemption pro-
ceeding prior to afinal decision by the EPA.
738. Id at 1260-61. The court relied upon legislative history evincing congressional intent that the
exemption process be available only as a last resort, to be considered only after the applicant had been
finally denied a permit or license. Id at 1261-62.
739. Pittston still lacks the necessary clearances because it could not adduce adequate information of
the impact of its operation on listed species. Roosevelt Campobello Internat'l Park Comm'n v. EPA,
684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982).
740. The requested hearing was optional; if further proceedings are foreclosed, the agency action will
be final and the ESC review process can begin.
741. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). The meaning of "final agency action" is determined in
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1976).
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legally by finding adverse effects when none will occur or by concluding that
section 7 will be violated in the absence of jeopardization or critical habitat
modification. Assume further that Pittston chooses to forego judicial review of
the EPA's permit denial and to seek an exemption from the ESC. The review
board considering the application for an exemption 742 will not rule on the fac-
tual positions because the review board has power only to deny an exemption
for lack of maturity or good faith.743 It was given no power to reverse the
consulting agency for legal or factual errors.7 "
It is conceivable, in such a case, that the board would find that no irreconcil-
able conflict exists. The matter would then be in limbo, because such action is
considered final agency action;745 the board cannot order the license granted,
nor can it forward the dispute to the ESC.746 If the ESC were to take up the
question, it too would be in a quandary because the allegedly erroneous basis
for the FWS opinion may remain on the record and the exemption criteria do
not include factual or legal errors in the consultation process. If Pittston's alle-
gation of error is correct, the consequent absence of a section 7 violation would
of course tend to impel Committee members toward granting an exemption,
but that decision would appear improper if such error were its sole basis.
If the board denies Pittston an exemption, there will be some difficulty in
determining just what the reviewing court may consider. The decision under
scrutiny is that of the ESC, not the FWS, and if the decision is sustainable on
the ground that the statutory criteria were not met, review arguably ends at
that point, precluding relief from the original erroneous FWS opinion. Al-
though such an outcome is facially consistent with certain canons of adminis-
trative law, it should not prevail, because of its fundamental unreasonableness
and lack of fairness. Even if the ESC cannot undo a faulty biological opinion,
the court must necessarily have the power to so so. Simply because Congress
did not foresee a charade such as this does not preclude finding that Congress
would have wished to provide a remedy had it thought of the problem.
D. PRIVATE PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES
We strong urge that the term "take". . . be rftnedandmod!fledso as
not to preclude normal land management practices. At present it would
bepossible for aprivate landowner to be penalized. .. if these had an
impact on a listed species.
1978 House ES4 Hearings, at
724 (William Hazleton, Forest
Industry Environmental Council).
742. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
743. See id § 1536(g)(5)-(7). If the review board determines that an irresolvable conflict does not
exist or that requirements of good faith in consultation, biological assessment, and restraint from irre-
versible commitments were not met, it denies the application, and this constitutes final agency action.
Id If the board finds that an irresolvable conflict does exist, it prepares a report for the Committee,
which makes a determination whether or not to grant an exemption within 90 days. Id § 1536(h).
744. The review board is, however, under a duty to make afull review of the interagency consulta-
tion. Id § 1536(g)(5).
745. See id § 1536(g)(5).
746. See id § 1536(g)(6), (7), 1536(h) (board forwards report to Committee for determination of
exemption when it finds irrevocable conflict).
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Federal permission or federal money was the trigger for ESA application to
the private projects discussed above, but federal involvement is not always
necessary before the Act bars or complicates private land uses. Recall the ex-
ample of the farmer who wished to plow up possible black-footed ferret
habitat; now assume that no federal agency permits or assists the private ac-
tion. If the area is designated critical habitat, can the United States success-
fully sue to prevent its adverse modification? As no federal action is involved,
section 7 of the ESA does not apply. This situation leaves only the questions
of whether the private action constitutes a taking, whether the regulatory
power of the United States extends to aid of species threatened by private prac-
tices on private lands, and, if these answers are affirmative, whether a court
can and will enjoin the proposed plowing.
A court adopting the Pa/ila rationale will rule that the action is an illegal
taking if a causal nexus is shown, that the United States has power to prevent
such an occurrence, and that an injunction is proper.747 In some ways, the
black-footed ferret presents an easier case than Palla because the effect on the
listed species is more direct, and the challenged action is a change in the status
quo, not the continuation of an ongoing program. In another way, however, it
presents a more difficult case because the ferret, although now extremely rare,
once had a wide range, and other black-footed ferrets exist elsewhere which
will not be affected by the plowing. Section 9 does not require a determination
of the degree of harm to the species: harming just one member is a viola-
tion.748 The precedents and the equities favor an injunction against a future
violation. Under section 7, the Supreme Court in Hill did not balance equities
once a violation had been found,749 and the Palila court followed suit in a
section 9 case. Even if such balancing is proper, the ferret should still win. Its
value is incalculable, the damage would be irreparable, and the existing land
use could continue.
Assume that no critical habitat had been declared and that a private organi-
zation sued to enjoin the plowing. The Act provides for suits to enforce its
provisions, 750 and standing has not been a problem in wildlife litigation.
751
Theoretically, the critical habitat designation or lack thereof should not affect
the outcome because the claim is for taking, not for destruction of critical
habitat, even though the taking consists of habitat modification. Practically,
however, the lack of critical habitat designation could be fatal to plaintiff's
case. The causal nexus between the action and its effect on the ferrets will be
far more difficult to establish when there is no official imprimatur that the
ferret lives there. Further, a court is less likely to enjoin otherwise permissible
747. See Palla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 987-91, 995 (D.
Hawaii 1979), aft'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
748. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1976).
749. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (Congress spoke plainly; Court enforced law as written).
750. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1976) (provisions for person to commence civil suit on own behalf).
751. See Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1005-16 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (environmental
groups have standing to challenge waiver of moratorium on importation of baby fur sealskins), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); see also Pala v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F.
Supp. 985, 988 (D. Hawaii 1979) (plaintiff is finch-billed member of the Hawaiian Honeycreeper fam-
ily, an endangered species), afl'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
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private conduct at the behest of private interlopers than it is in a suit brought
by the United States. Nevertheless, if the presence of the species can be estab-
lished, the current interpretation of "taking" demands an injunction against
the plowing. 752
For another example of the ways in which the ESA may affect private agri-
cultural land use, consider the ESA question left open in Cap aert v. United
States. 753 In that case, an endangered pupfish existed only in a pool that was
hydrologically connected to the surrounding groundwater table.754 Nearby
ranchers drilled wells for irrigation that lowered the pool level and jeopardized
the continued existence of the pupfish; the pool was located in a national mon-
ument that had been set aside for the preservation of the pupfish.755 The
Supreme Court ruled that reservation of the monument also reserved by impli-
cation a right to water in amounts sufficient for the welfare of the pupfish.756
The Court did not reach any potential ESA questions.
Assume, however, that the species lives on private or state land and that
reserved water rights do not intrude. The question is whether the ESA prohib-
its groundwater pumping that adversely affects the aquatic habitat of a listed
species by lowering the water level in its only pool. Again, without federal
involvement sufficient to invoke section 7, the answer must come from section
9. Again, the answer must be that the pumping is an enjoinable taking. In this
instance, the anomalous result is that the adjacent ranchers have no recourse
whatsoever because no provision for exemption from section 9 exists absent a
concurrent section 7 violation. Had a federal agency forbidden the pumping,
the exemption procedure would have been available, although probably
unavailing.
CONCLUSION
We don't have to worry about endangered species; why we can't even get
rid of the cockroach.
Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt75 7
A central premise of the Hill opinion was that ESA interpretation cannot be
"reasonable" in the usual judicial sense. Instead, the court functions to give
effect to the still uncompromising congressional goal, despite conventional
countervailing costs, values, and equities. In the subsequent reappraisal of en-
dangered species protection, Congress affirmed the Hill approach, reenacted
the substantive ESA provisions with knowledge of their potential stringency,
and provided an escape mechanism for exceptional projects in the national
752. See supra text accompanying notes 355-86 (discussing availability of injunctive relief when
harm certain and imminent).
753. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
754. Id at 133.
755. Id at 132. The proclamation stated that the national monument was being set aside "for the
preservation of the unusual features of scenic, scientific, and educational interests" and noted that the
area contains a "remarkable underground pool." Id The Court also relied on preambulary statements
pointing out that the underground pool contains a peculiar race offish found nowhere else in the world
and known to have survived for several million years. Id at 132.
756. Id at 141.
757. Letter from Cecil D. Andrus to solicit membership in the Democratic National Committee's
Natural Resources Protection Fund (copy on file at the Georgetown Law .ournal).
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public interest. The 1978 Amendments make the administrative tasks of listing
species and designating critical habitat more difficult, and they add layers to
the decisionmaking process. Although these complications may retard endan-
gered species protection in the short run, the legal position of precarious spe-
cies has been strengthened by Hill and the congressional response to it in the
long run.
It is irrelevant whether the priority the Act accorded listed species is good,
bad, or indifferent. As the Hill Court forcefully held, that is a question for the
political body, not for courts or agencies. All but the most ardent supporters of
either economic development or wildlife will admit that the dilemmas posed
are not amenable to absolute solutions. Wildlife, like soil productivity, trees,
or water, is an important resource for economic as well as aesthetic reasons.
Although the Tellico Dam may have been a pork-barrel boondoogle, other
projects and programs are more essential to the national well-being than the
continued existence of one of many similar little fishes. Where to draw the line
is more a matter of wisdom and politics than of science or law. Congress is the
proper organ to strike the balance, and it chose to weigh the balance heavily on
the side of endangered species. The political debate over the wisdom of the
choice will continue, but-barring future amendment or repeal of the Endan-
gered Species Act-the legal guidelines are assuming concrete form.
Most of the foregoing examples of ways in which the presence of listed spe-
cies may interfere with human land use are speculative: the anticipated judi-
cial and administrative decisions have not yet been handed down. Many of
the hypotheticals promise to be the subject of future litigation. The process
likely will be slow and painful because action agencies often become attached
to their creations, vehemently opposing any standards that require modifica-
tion or abandonment. The wildlife agencies, whose actions are the key factor
in endangered species protection, tend to be very cautious because whatever
they do will be offensive to some and politically controversial. And courts, the
penultimate arbiters of disputes between listed wildlife and human aims, may
be chary of according full force and effect to an Act that so drastically im-
pinges on traditional values.
But the handwriting is on the wall and the words are inscribed in the United
States Code. The preservation of species facing extinction takes precedence
over all other considerations until such time as the ESC or Congress declares
otherwise.
Given the present and probable future numbers of listed species, the flex-
ibility and uncertainties in the listing and designation processes, the degree of
human commitment to either preservation or projects, and the nearly infinite
number of instances in which conflicts can occur, matters surely are not as
simple as the preceding sentence indicates. The ESC will grant exemptions.
The FSW and the NMFS will refuse to list or to issue negative biological opin-
ions. Environmental organizations will neglect to sue. Courts will seek equita-
ble solutions in spite of Hill. Other perceived needs, notably that for energy
production, will take precedence. Nevertheless, endangered species protection
will be a significant influence on landf use and related activities in the United
States throughout the foreseeable future..
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